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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Freud maintained that psychoanalysis was not only to be a clinical discourse of 
the interpersonal and the subjective, however dynamic and necessary 
therapeutically, but that its principles could be taken from those contexts and 
applied to wider global, societal, and cultural issues. Since the 1960s, financial 
corruption has grown into what has become a serious and entrenched problem, 
albeit this is seldom addressed in psychoanalytic terms.  The ultimate aim of this 
research study is to enquire into the psychoanalytic roots of financial corruption 
and to ask whether it is possible to attempt a psychoanalytic investigation and 
explanation of acts of financial corruption committed in particular given 
circumstances, such as those existing in a developing, emerging, or transitional 
society, more precisely in the historical period of 1960s Africa.  To address this, 
particular attention will be paid to writings pertaining to Nigeria in its period of 
decolonisation, when the issue of financial corruption began gain international 
attention.  However, a series of initial steps are necessary in order to approach 
these issues.  
In the line of argumentation that this thesis will follow, two main aspects of 
financial corruption will be examined in depth: firstly, ‘money’, in its multi-
layered significance and secondly, the internal desires of the individual with 
respect to ‘money’ and the external social environment within which this 
individual is located. Thus, first of all this dissertation will begin by asking two 
interrelated questions. What has been a psychoanalytic theory on ‘money’? And 
how did psychoanalysis determine the role that ‘money’ played in the 
unconscious? The first three chapters of the thesis are devoted to answering 
these and following a survey of the field, return to pre-World War Two classical 
psychoanalytic theoretical writings, the correspondence of pioneering 
psychoanalysts and Ferenczi’s Clinical Diary, in order to arrive at a starting point 
for a further examination of psychoanalysis and financial corruption. Centrally, 
the status of the ‘anal theory of money’, derived from Freud’s indicative papers 
on anal erotism and elaborated by Ferenczi and others, will be put to the test.  
Close readings of classical psychoanalytic writings led to the central argument of 
this thesis: that there arises the possibility of contesting the enshrined status of 
the relation of faeces to ‘money’ on the grounds of this not being a truly 
unconscious symbolic relation, as ‘money’ is a construct that has to be taught. It is  
argued that the theorists of the classical period did not do justice to the possible 
connections between orality and ‘money’ – despite strong pointers within their 
writings to the oral developmental stage.  
The final chapters attempt to close a gap by setting out an alternative hypothesis 
to anality based on the unconscious and orality. Karl Abraham’s work provides a 
key theoretical scaffolding in this respect. An oral hypothesis, taking seriously 
the actual and fantasmatic aspects of hunger and greed, is argued to be 
important for the psychoanalytic understanding of the unconscious motivations 
and impulses that could underlie financial corruption. With recourse to both the 
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anal theory and the alternative oral hypothesis, which taken together enable a 
deeper analysis, a reading is undertaken of selected texts on 1960s’ corruption in 
order to explore the question of what could have been taking place 
psychoanalytically and to lay the building blocks towards a psychoanalytic theory 
of financial corruption.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Today, as more and more people become very rich, whilst more and more people 
remain in or sink into poverty; as the rigidities of the systems enabling wealth to 
be acquired become even more economically  and culturally entrenched whilst at 
the same time enabling flexibilities and opportunities for the ever greater 
enrichment for the few, it is timely to attempt a renewed theoretical modelling of 
the basic psychoanalytic frameworks that are likely to be useful to examine the 
psychoanalytic relationship between ‘money’ and the unconscious. More 
precisely, the contention here is that psychoanalysis can provide useful 
perspectives and enlighten the probable psychic reasons for the underlying 
motivations behind decisions to carry out acts of financial corruption. This 
research study hopes to make a serious contribution to the growing body of 
work concerned with psychoanalysis and ‘money’, ‘wealth’, and ‘finance’. 
That psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic concepts and tenets could be used 
outside of the clinical encounter as a method of analysis which is also applicable 
to problematic areas of social, economic, and cultural concerns follows on the 
tradition established by Sigmund Freud in works such as Totem and Taboo (1912 
– 1913), Civilization and its Discontents (1930), and The Future of an Illusion 
(1927). His dictum on the necessary application of psychoanalysis to global 
concerns has been supported and adhered to down the decades by many of those 
who write about and, or, practice psychoanalysis (Roudinesco, 2001; Marcus, 
1984; Kurzweil, 1998; Kernberg, 2004). Indeed, in The Future of an Illusion Freud 
appears to be prescient when viewed from the perspective of contemporary 
events, as he states that the distribution of wealth is important and that 
“civilization” has to be wary of and guard against the selfish, “hostile impulses” of 
“the individual” (Freud, 1927, p.6). Thus Freud used psychoanalysis as a general 
method of investigation, he felt that it was important that psychoanalysis be 
employed as an exploratory and explanatory methodology and undoubtedly, 
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psychoanalysis brings forward important insights into the functioning of the 
individual in society, especially when one takes fully into account Freud’s 
structural theory of the unconscious mental agencies, which he defined as the 
ego, the id, and the superego (Freud, 1923); his theory on narcissism (Freud, 
1914), his work on infantile sexuality (Freud, 1905), and the instincts (e.g. Freud 
1920).  
What could be the possible roots of financial corruption if the problem is 
approached from the perspective of psychoanalysis? This is the driving question 
that will be explored in the pages that follow.  But in order to attempt to provide 
an answer, it will be necessary to take a long detour via the work of pioneering 
psychoanalysts, Freud, Ferenczi, Jones, Fenichel and Abraham.  
It should be emphasized at this point that this study is a classical Freudian 
theoretical investigation as it focuses almost exclusively on the foundational 
theoretical principles laid down by Freud during the years preceding World War 
Two, augmented and developed by other leading Freudian theorists from the 
same historical time period. What was required was a simplified, 
straightforward, narrative in order to conduct a dialogue with Freud and the 
thinkers who were his contemporaries, in order to address the following: 
Freud’s theory-making with regard to ‘money’, the accumulation of wealth, and 
the impacts on people of having and not having ‘money’, as financial corruption 
and ‘money’ are, of course, inseparable. ‘Money’ is finance. In terms of financial 
corruption, therefore, the question arises as to how  the individual or the group 
moves  from wanting and taking a little money, akin to petty cash, as a 
commonplace, everyday “sweetener” in return for a “favour” awarded or carried 
out, to stealing millions. But the dialogue that this thesis conducts with Freud 
and others regarding ‘money’ is a critical dialogue pertaining to gaps in his 
theorising. We will delve into some of the reasons as to why he had not used his 
own classic principles and investigatory methods in order to construct a much 
more expansive psychoanalytic theory of ‘money’.  
The subject of money was seemingly avoided and neglected by the main 
pioneering theorists during the classical period when they were laying down the 
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foundations of psychoanalytic theory based upon their observations, reflections, 
and work with patients. They did not establish an encompassing architectural 
framework for a psychoanalytic theory of ‘money’ from which further work 
could then proceed. The reason for this state of affairs is incumbent on the 
reliance in the work on  the theory of anality with its core hypothesis which 
positioned faeces as the root symbolizing equation for ‘money’. This theory, 
established by Freud in ‘Character and Anal Erotism’ (1908), became almost a 
shibboleth in psychoanalytic theory generally. This rigidity around the 
acceptance and use of the anal theory of ‘money’ meant that there was little 
space for thinking beyond these parameters.  The present thesis contests the 
status of the anal theory and seeks to bring in alongside it the constructed notion 
of an oral hypothesis pertaining to what money means, one which will bring 
faeces in relation with food. 
At the heart of this thesis, then, is an examination of how the psychoanalytic 
conceptualizations of orality, the oral stage of development, and the oral drive 
can make critical, valuable contributions to a discourse as to why an individual 
may be driven to commit an act of financial corruption in certain specific 
circumstances, particularly during periods of radical historical, economic, and 
social transformation. The underlying hypothesis of the research conducted was 
that the need for money is, or can become, can develop into, as basic an internal 
need as the instinctual, libidinal, drive for food and sex, that is, hunger and love. 
Further, that the need for money can separate itself from its origins and linkages 
as a means of payment for goods and services and has the potential to define 
itself on its own terms in particular conditions.  When and how can that need, 
that hunger, that possible drive for money and wealth, turn into an unrepressed, 
sadistic greed, or become corrupted, or, indeed, perverse? What could be the 
probable building blocks for any possible psychoanalytic theory pertaining to the 
causation of acts of financially corrupt behaviour? 
Underpinning the important decision taken to return to the classical period of 
psychoanalysis was that of the Derridean sense of a dual motif in the term 
‘analysis’ (Derrida, 1998, pp.19-20) which sets forth a demand for a return to 
basics, to the archeological beginnings of a problematic, a textual consideration, 
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an assumption, an idea, a previous analysis, in order to embark on the process of 
untangling and unbinding, and then differing from and countering. In Resistances 
of Psychoanalysis (1998) Derrida analyzed the word “analysis”, and it is the 
connection he forms between analysis and solution that then leads to a 
determining demand to deconstruct in which analysis and critique enter as 
partners to untangle and untie in order to explore, in order to find possible new 
explanations.  
 
But what is financial corruption? The 1960s had established the study of 
corruption as an academic discipline and several definitions of what corruption 
was were produced, with one of the most prominent (still in use today in various 
formations) being proposed by the Harvard professor, Joseph Nye: “Corruption 
is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of 
private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status 
gains” (Nye, 1967).  Arguably, financial corruption is essentially about two 
elements: first of all there is the subject of ‘money’ and a need for or a greed for 
‘money’. Secondly, and probably at the same time, there is ‘the individual’ and his 
internal wants and desires and the possible conflict between those desires and 
the external social and public environment within which he is located. These two 
central elements will be examined in the context of Africa during the 1960s, in 
other words the application of psychoanalytic theories and reasoning to the 
study of financial corruption in emerging African independent nations during the 
1960s will be undertaken. This was the key period during which the problem of 
financial corruption reared its head as developing countries began to gain 
independent status on the world stage following their decolonisation. The 
analysis of a selection of texts from the period of the 1960s provides insights into 
what was taking place with regard to ‘the individual’ and the public and social 
space. It was also the period during which corruption on the continent was 
described as beginning to flourish (Wraith and Simpkins, 1963). The present 
thesis attends to Freud’s  call to engage psychoanalysis with the concerns and 
problems of the wider world by attempting to seek the archeological roots of a 
problem, corruption, that was to become serious enough to be called a cancer 
decades later (Wolfensohn, 1996). 
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 Clearly, Freud did not write about corruption, financial or otherwise, but he did 
write about anality and attitudes towards ‘money’ and that is what provides the 
starting point to this thesis. In the earlier chapters the focus is on the meanings 
that money takes on in the unconscious, allied with a close examination of the 
anal theory. A review of the literature is carried out in Chapter One and centres 
on how psychoanalysts theorized ‘money’ and the role it played in the psyche. 
Having separated out the vital element of ‘money’ in acts of financial corruption, 
it was clear that the priority had to be to arrive at an understanding of how 
psychoanalysis itself regarded ‘money’.  It was necessary to survey a theoretical 
landscape comprised not only of psychoanalysts, but also philosophers, 
economists, and sociologists, who could provide various perspectives on the 
subject of ‘money’, ‘wealth’, the ‘individual’ and societal transformations. Wider, 
more general perspectives on ‘money’ and ‘wealth’ helped to contextualize the 
views held in psychoanalysis whilst holding firm to the commitment to 
contributing a psychoanalytic understanding of ‘money’. The emergence of the 
hold that the anal theory of ‘money’ has on psychoanalytic thinking with regard 
to ‘money’ then becomes clear. At the end of Chapter One financial corruption is 
discussed in the context of Africa during the 1960s in order to set the stage for 
the attempt at a psychoanalytic analysis which takes place in the later chapters.  
As a result of the initial discussion on anality and money, Chapter Two conducts a 
close textual reading of Ferenczi’s seminal paper on ‘money’, ‘The Ontogenesis of 
the Interest in Money’ (Ferenczi, 1914) that sought to delineate how anality and 
‘money’ were, indeed, connected in the unconscious. It is this close textual 
analysis that leads to the conclusion that firstly the anal theory could be 
subjected to highly critical attention with regards to its claim of being 
unconsciously connected to ‘money’; and secondly, that there is something 
absent, missing, ‘not there’, in the work on ‘money’ that had been carried out so 
far by Freud and Ferenczi. That absence is orality. These two important 
criticisms are linked. If the anal theory of ‘money’ is not a truly unconscious 
theory, orality is and can be shown to be so theoretically.  
It was important to ascertain whether any of the main classical Freudian 
theorists had entertained notions of further developing theories on ‘money’ 
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during their conversations with each other or in any clinical notes or 
commentaries that they had not published. In Chapter Three the complexities 
that emerge from private correspondences are brought out, but the central focus 
of the chapter is the in-depth examination of clinical extracts from the diary kept 
by Ferenczi (1932). It was clear that patients had revealed worries and thoughts 
about ‘money’ that could have led to further theoretical thinking about the role it 
played in both their internal and external worlds. However, no further papers 
were published by Ferenczi on the theory of ‘money’.  
Chapter Four now has a clear mandate that authorizes an attempt to construct an 
oral hypothesis on the possible connection between ‘money’ and food in the 
unconscious. Karl Abraham’s work on orality (Abraham, 1916, 1924) is 
fundamentally important in the carrying out of this task, but cannot, in truth, be 
taken separately from the ground work laid down by Freud in his theory of 
sexuality (Freud, 1905). The two taken together enable the construction of an 
oral hypothesis on ‘money’ based on the infant’s primary need and primary 
satisfaction as derived from the intake of food.  
In Chapter Five psychoanalysis and the urge to carry out an act of financial 
corruption are brought into contact with each other. Amongst the work of those 
writing about corruption in Africa during the 1960s, the two papers written by 
David Bayley (1966) and Colin Leys (1965) play a key role in the attempt to 
analyze how financial corruption can develop in an emerging state during a 
particular epoch and under particular circumstances. Running through the 
chapter is a dialogue with Freud’s classical texts (Freud 1914, 1920), with 
respect to underscoring how the psychoanalytic basic instincts of ‘hunger’ and 
‘love’ (sexual instinct and ego instinct) can be joined together in particular 
circumstances in a narcissistic endeavour to repair damage to the ego and to 
engender self-regard. One single object could satisfy both instincts: ‘money’. The 
part that such a notion can play in the examination of financial corruption is 
significant. The powerful summary by Fenichel (1938) in ‘The Drive to Amass 
Wealth’ outlined the conflictual relations between the forceful needs of the 
individual versus ideological imposed forces. Fenichel’s contribution here is that 
he raised the hypothesis that a ‘drive’ to accumulate wealth could exist.   
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Chapter Six concludes the thesis with reflections that draw upon the theoretical 
considerations thrown up by the preceding chapters. The notion of the 
possibility of a perverted fixation of the drive is commented upon, given the 
commonality of the usage of the term ‘perversion’ and ‘perverted’, albeit in a 
non-psychoanalytic contexts by writers on corruption. The notion of perversion 
as being something corrupted emerges as important and signals new avenues of 
research. Whether anality is still deserving of a place in relation to a psychic 
understanding of ‘money’ is also considered. Finally, Freud is taken to task for 
the neglect of ‘money’ in psychoanalytic theory down the decades. 
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Chapter One 
PSYCHOANALYSIS, ‘MONEY’, AND CORRUPTION:  
A SURVEY 
 
PART ONE: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 
The classical landscapes of psychoanalytic theoretical texts on ‘money’ 
contain the fundamental keys to the potential contribution that psychoanalysis 
can make to a deeper understanding of the unconscious motivations of a person 
who attempts to carry out an act of financial corruption. The application of 
psychoanalytic theories to international, societal, and cultural issues was already 
being suggested by Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, at time when 
the basic architectural and theoretical tenets of psychoanalysis as a new kind of 
clinical practice were being developed. Important examples of an applied 
Freudian psychoanalytic inquiry into cultural and societal issues occur in 
Civilization and Its Discontents (1930) and The Future of an Illusion (1927). Totem 
and Taboo (1912-1913) stands as an earlier application of psychoanalysis to 
culture.  What is clear from such writings is that psychoanalysis was never 
merely to be a clinical discourse of the interpersonal and subjective, however 
dynamic and necessary therapeutically, but that its principles were seen as ones 
that could be extrapolated from these contexts and applied to wider global and 
cultural issues. What is being dealt with, after all, is human agency whether 
expressed in private or public spaces and unravelled inside or outside the 
consulting room. That psychoanalysis can, and should have relevance outside the 
consulting room is an argument that this study not only supports but is a key 
assumption underlying the thesis.  
In this chapter, a survey of the discursive landscape in which these questions are 
debated is embarked upon, one that will discuss the occurrence of the subject of 
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‘money’ both within and outside the context of the analytic encounter. It is a 
journey in which there will also be engagement with more general writings from 
the fields of economics, philosophy, and sociology; writings that enquire into the 
nature of ‘money’ and wealth and their impact upon and relations with ‘the 
individual’ and society. The material of this chapter is divided into four sections. 
In section 1, Sigmund Freud, Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and John Maynard Keynes 
form the centre of the discussion in an overview of general writings on ‘money’ 
and ‘wealth’. The critical duality of the individual’s relations with ‘money’ and 
the individual’s relations with societal structures is brought to the fore in order 
to highlight the importance of the potential contribution of  psychoanalysis to 
such debates. Section 2 focuses on the ‘classical period’ – the pre-World War Two 
years – of psychoanalytic theoretical writing on the subject of ‘money’ and some 
of the characteristic social and historical contextual features of the period that 
stretched from the 19th century fin de siècle to the end of the 1930s. The 
question debated is when and how did psychoanalysis, the “talking cure”, start 
“talking” about ‘money’. Section 3 proceeds to the necessary consideration of 
contemporary psychoanalytic work on ‘money’, as it is in this literature, in the 
main, that the taboo nature of the discussion of ‘money’ and psychoanalysis 
raises its head, particularly in the expressions of the financial relationship 
between patients and analysts. Particularly revealing is its impact on the patient-
analyst relationship during socially transforming crises such as the 2008 
financial crash and its resulting economic austerities. In section 4, the final part 
of this chapter, material on financial corruption that can aid in opening pathways 
towards a psychoanalytic investigation of ‘money’ and ‘wealth’ accumulation 
during transitional economic changes is set out. Texts that will be used in 
Chapter Five to provide a seedbed for the germination of a psychoanalytic 
analysis of financial corruption in Africa during the 1960s are introduced  
But, let us commence the journey by first setting out the grounds for the use of 
psychoanalysis as a method of analysis, a discussion that reaches back both to its 
earliest decades of existence as a body of thought and into contemporary times. 
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1. Psychoanalysis as a Methodology 
 
That a psychoanalytic investigation could be a beneficial addition to the various 
academic fields of enquiry involved in analyzing general issues such as 
corruption and other subjects that impact on people and societies, is based on 
the premise that psychoanalysis is not only a treatment for psychical, mental, 
illnesses – a therapy, the talking cure – but that it is also an analytical 
methodology for reconstructing and theorizing thinking processes with the aim 
of unravelling and revealing unconscious thoughts and motivations. Otto 
Kernberg (2004) calls attention to the fact that no problem should be 
characterized as being too big for psychoanalytic attention and analysis for 
psychoanalysis should not only concern itself with the equivalence of daily 
clinical problems:  
 
The application of psychoanalytic understanding to problems of 
culture and society, a major concern of Freud’s throughout his entire 
work, also represents, I believe, a responsibility of the psychoanalytic 
profession beyond our concern for individual patients. It involves the 
complex area of the manifestations of the unconscious in the social 
and political process, particularly regarding the dramatic 
developments of the twentieth century with its unleashing of human 
destructiveness on a scale that was undreamed of before the 
development of modern totalitarian regimes. The upsurge of 
fundamentalist movements at this time signals the permanent nature 
of the threat to social life by unrestrained aggression triggered in the 
context of the social process. Psychoanalysis certainly does not have 
all the answers, but I believe it is able to contribute to our 
understanding in this field and bears responsibility to do so. 
 
(Kernberg, 2004, p. ix) 
 
Although the example that Kernberg underlines is that of the manifestations of 
the rise of fundamentalism in the 2000s, he is providing a general point that is 
highly relevant to a societal problem such as financial corruption. Steven Marcus 
in Freud and the Culture of Psychoanalysis (1984) also points out that the 
application of psychoanalysis to varied and multiple social and cultural subjects 
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was what Freud himself insisted upon. Marcus asserts that psychoanalysis has 
the potential for the application of its theories and practices that could even 
outstrip its therapeutic usages. His frustration that such usages do not occur 
more frequently is apparent: 
 
And I must go on to say that I cannot recall … coming across many 
references in the professional literature to Freud’s repeated 
admonitions that the major contributions that psychoanalysis had to 
offer would not finally be therapeutic in the accepted sense of the 
word. Such contributions, he held, would be found ultimately in 
education, in alterations of habits of child-rearing, in research and in 
applications of psychoanalytic theory and methods in a variety of 
cultural and scientific fields of endeavour. 
(Marcus, 1984, p. 257) 
 
Gay (2006) reflects that Freud, during years of turbulence, hard clinical work, 
and pressure from organizational conflicts between 1905 and 1915, “published 
papers on literature, law, religion, education, art, ethics, linguistics, folklore, fairy 
tales, mythology, archaeology, war, and the psychology of schoolboys” (Gay, 
2006, p. 306). And in her attack against what she regards as the restrictive and 
systemized dominance of what could be termed as pharmacologized thinking,  
Elisabeth Roudinesco (2001) states of psychoanalysis that it is in essence: 
“explanations of the psyche through models of meaning making” (Roudinesco, 
2001, p. 33). Further, “as a system of thought, psychoanalysis gave rise to 
theoretical trends that were distinct from one another and expressed important 
reworkings” (Roudinesco, 2001, p. 111). Roudinesco’s Why Psychoanalysis 
(2001) sets out a defence of the continuing importance and necessity of 
psychoanalysis in a “depressive society” (Roudinesco, 2001, p. 3). Although 
psychoanalysis since its birth has had its many critics who have attacked its 
methods (e.g. Sulloway, 1979; Grünbaum, 1984; Hook, 1959; Davidson, 1987) 
there has not been significant denting of the strong argument that 
psychoanalysis is the paradigm within which one can explore the repressed: the 
unconscious motivations and unconscious processes underlying and forming 
human behaviour and testimonies (Freud, 1915; Ellenberger, 1970; Mujeeb-ur-
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Rahman, 1977). In a paper on ‘Jealousy’ Ernest Jones (1929) sums up cogently 
the importance of having access to and being able to use psychoanalytic 
methodology:  
 
Why psychoanalysis is a discovery of great importance can be told in a 
word or two. It is because it has shown that what we have hitherto 
known as our minds is really but the small part of a totality. In the 
future we shall have to refer to them by the more modest title of 
conscious mind, realizing that this conscious mind is only a relatively 
small and selected portion of our whole mind, that it is in great part 
derived from a deeper layer which we now call the unconscious, and 
that it owes to this its driving force. The nature of this unconscious, 
absolutely and totally unknown to the conscious mind, has been laid 
bare to us by Professor Freud, of Vienna, whose genius forged a 
method for exploring this previously dark and inaccessible territory. … 
This work has not only answered many questions previously obscure, 
but has made us realize that there are a number of questions which 
till now we had not even put, because being content with our 
knowledge we did not know that these questions existed. 
(Jones, 1929, p. 326) 
 
Roudinesco describes “the Freudian unconscious” as “a place detached from 
consciousness, peopled with images and passions, shot through with 
discordances” (Roudinesco, 2001, p. 53). For the sociologist Edith Kurzweil in 
The Freudians (1998), psychoanalysis responds to an unconscious demand from 
turbulent social forces for the necessity of psychological explanations and the 
provision of relief from mental torments: 
 
Freud’s ideas arose from a specific conjuncture of theoretical and 
practical conditions and elicited a variety of responses. In central 
Europe, what is roughly called “modernism” was nearing its height. 
Industrialization and bourgeois culture had become successful enough 
to allow more and more individuals to focus on matters beyond the 
essentials for survival. … If psychoanalysis had not emerged, another 
psychological explanation would have been found for the 
unhappiness of the affluent in spite of their possessions and for the 
tendency of the poor, even though hardworking, to remain poor. 
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(Kurzweil, 1998, p. 34) 
 
In the spirit of a response to such a demand, let us now put forward the following 
general question: What is the value of ‘money’ and ‘wealth’ in the life of the 
‘individual’? 
 
2. On Being ‘Wealthy’ and Having ‘Money’ 
 
At the outset of The Future of an Illusion, Freud outlines what he sees as the 
observable characteristics of “human civilization”: 
 
It includes on the one hand all the knowledge and capacity that men 
have acquired in order to control the forces of nature and extract its 
wealth for the satisfaction of human needs, and on the other hand, all 
the regulations necessary in order to adjust the relations of men to 
one another and especially the distribution of the available wealth. 
(Freud, 1927, p. 6)  
 
There are multiple valid ways in which one can define ‘wealth’. In his 
monumental work of economic and political theory, The Wealth of Nations, Adam 
Smith criticised people who only thought of ‘wealth’ in terms of ‘money’, and 
who forgot to, or did not include, “lands, houses, and consumable goods of all 
different kinds” (Smith, 1776 [1994], p. 478), but he understood why such an 
“ambiguity of expression” (Smith, 1776 [1994], p. 478) happened regularly, as: 
“The great affair, we always find, is to get money” (Smith, 1776 [1994], p. 456).  
 
That wealth consists in money, or in gold and silver, is a popular 
notion which naturally arises from the double function of money, as 
the instrument of commerce, and as the measure of value. … To grow 
rich is to get money; and wealth and money, in short, are, in common 
language, considered as in every respect synonymous. 
(Smith, 1776 [1994], p. 456)  
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No definitional discussions of these topics can escape Karl Marx’s critical input. 
“Money,” he states in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, “since 
it has the property of being able to buy anything, and to appropriate all objects to 
itself, is thus the object par excellence” (Marx, 1844, in McLellan, 1979, p.179). 
Insightfully and passionately, Marx illuminated widely held perspectives relating 
to mankind’s relationship with ‘money’, particularly its unavailability, something 
that he was well acquainted with given the poverty in which he spent most of his 
working life:   
 
If I long for a meal, or wish to take the mail coach because I am not 
strong enough to make the journey on foot, then money procures the 
meal and the mail coach for me. This means that it changes my wishes 
from being imaginary, and translates them from their being in 
thought, imagination and will into a sensuous, real being, from 
imagination to life, from imaginary being to real being. The truly 
creative force in this mediation is money. Demand also exists for the 
man who has no money but his demand is simply an imaginary entity 
that has no effective existence for me, for a third party or for other 
men and thus remains unreal and without an object. The difference 
between a demand that is based on money and effective and one that 
is based on my needs, passions, wishes, etc. and is ineffective is the 
difference between being and thought, between a representation 
that merely exists within me and one that is outside me as a real 
object 
(Marx, 1844, in McLellan, 1979, pp. 181-182). 
 
This passage by Marx can be held to be highly psychoanalytically attuned 
decades before psychoanalysis was born. It would appear that Marx had come to 
realize and to feel psychically the impacts that not having ‘money’ can have. 
‘Money’ can be considered as being never really about itself as it often represents 
the need for (and stands in the place of that need for) something else. If a person 
wants some ‘thing’ that costs ‘money’ but does not possess ‘money’ what is he 
really desiring, ‘money’ or that ‘thing’? This highly pertinent area and these 
concerns opened up graphically by Marx’s plea will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter Five, but suffice it to say here in summary that lack of what one desires 
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has tremendous impacts and affects on the ‘ego’. Jacques Lacan’s theoretical 
work on ‘desire’ and ‘lack’ also address these issues, and he states, almost as a 
throwaway at the start of a seminar from the mid-1950s (the italics are his): 
“Defining the nature of the ego will take us a long way. Well then, it is from this 
long way off that we will start in order to return back towards the centre – which 
will bring us back to the long way” (Lacan, 1955, [1988] p. 3). There will be 
reflection later in this chapter on the notion of ‘the return’ and having to ‘return 
to the past’ when Jacques Derrida’s concept of the archaeological necessity of the 
return to the past, if one wants to conduct ‘analysis’ of a topic, will be broached. 
But for now let us continue with general perspectives on ‘money’. The man 
described as “The Twentieth Century’s Most Influential Economist” (Clarke, 
2009), John Maynard Keynes, would appear to be an appropriate next stop after 
Marx, particularly in light of his openness to Freudian ideas. 
 
3. Using Freudian Theories: The Example of Keynes 
Keynes was born in the year that Marx died in 1883 but lived, in sharp 
contrast to Marx’s poverty, a life of affluence. Perhaps if they had been able to 
meet Keynes would have related that:  
 
An act of individual saving means – so to speak – a decision not to 
have dinner today. But it does not necessitate a decision to have 
dinner or to buy a pair of boots a week hence or a year hence or to 
consume any specified thing at any specified date. Thus it depresses 
the business of preparing today’s dinner without stimulating the 
business of making ready for some future act of consumption. 
(Keynes, 1936 [1981], p. 210) 
 
It can be argued that Keynes holds a central connecting role between economics, 
psychoanalysis, and ‘money’ on the basis that Keynes had close contact with 
Freudian thinking and its dissemination, and that these ideas appear to have 
influenced him with regard to what he thought about mankind’s attitude to gold 
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and the hoarding of ‘money’. Prior to exploring this, the question should first be 
raised as to how Freud’s ideas arrived on Keynes’s desk. The answer emerges 
from the fact that during the Edwardian years and up to World War Two Keynes 
belonged to a close circle of intellectuals, artists, and writers based around a 
particular set of central London streets – the Bloomsbury set – some of whom 
were very involved in the founding years of psychoanalysis in Britain. The 
Bloomsbury group included James Strachey, translator of Freud’s works, and 
Leonard Woolf, whose Hogarth Press was the publisher of those translations. In 
his paper, ‘Keynes and Freud: Psychoanalysis and Keynes’s Account of the 
“Animal Spirits” of Capitalism’, E. G Winslow (1986) explains that: 
 
Keynes had access to Freudian ideas through Bloomsbury, which 
numbered amongst its associates and relations four practising 
psychoanalysts all of whom had studied with Freud in Vienna. These 
individuals were: Adrian Stephen, brother of Vanessa Bell and Virginia 
Woolf and one of the original members of Bloomsbury; Karin 
Stephen, Adrian Stephen’s wife; James Strachey, brother of Lytton 
Strachey and general editor of the Standard Edition of Freud in 
English, one of the works in the International Psychoanalytic Library 
published by the Woolfs’ Hogarth Press; and Alix Strachey, James 
Strachey’s wife. Though opinions as to the value of Freud’s theories 
were mixed in Bloomsbury, several members other than Keynes did 
make use of psychoanalysis in their own work. 
(Winslow, 1986, p. 554) 
 
Moggridge (1992) asserts that Bloomsbury “was to become for Keynes a means 
of relaxation and of greater education outside his main area of activity” but that, 
“For Keynes, Bloomsbury and its members were part of a way of life, and a rich 
one at that, but they were only a part” (Moggridge, 1992, pp. 218-219). On 
Keynes’s Freudian connections, Clarke rather unfairly describes Keynes’s use of 
the term “raw Freudian complex” in The Economic Consequences of the Peace 
(Keynes, 1919) as “certainly a Stracheyan insight, whether attributed to Lytton 
or to his younger brother James, already interested in Freud, whose English 
translator he became” (Clarke, 2009, p. 48).  
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Keynes appears to have been particularly attracted by Freud’s anality hypothesis 
on ‘money’. The ‘anal theory of money’ will be outlined in Section 2 of this 
chapter and Chapter Two will elaborate it in detail. It can be stated briefly here 
that the hypothesis of a symbolic equation in the unconscious between ‘money’ 
and faeces and is founded upon Freud’s paper on anal erotism (Freud, 1908). 
Among the multitude of Keynes biographers, Robert Skidelsky is well-regarded 
as the producer of a trilogy on Keynes’s life. Skidelsky (1992) highlights the 
argument made by Winslow (1986) to explain the attraction to Keynes of Freud’s 
anal hypothesis on ‘money’.  
 
Winslow argues that Freudian ideas were increasingly important to 
Keynes after the First World War. Specifically, a psychological 
propensity which Keynes identifies as ‘the hoarding instinct’, or ‘love 
of money’ lies at the heart of the malfunctioning of the capitalist 
system. Winslow’s argument is that this trait (typical, incidentally, of 
many economists!) closely corresponds to Freud’s notion of the anal-
sadistic character, and that Keynes was perfectly aware of this, 
though veiling his knowledge in order not to overstep the limits of 
economics. Thus unconscious impulses shape and distort so-called 
rational purposive behaviour. 
(Skidelsky, 1992, p. 88) 
  
The anal theory had landed quite a catch, as it seems that Keynes had absorbed 
the hypothesis on ‘money’ and gold and had proceeded to apply one of its main 
characteristics as established by Freud in 1908 – parsimony, hoarding – to the 
malfunctioning of capitalism and the conduct of business. That as eminent an 
economics academic and practitioner as Keynes had acknowledged “unconscious 
impulses” is important. Winslow states that: “The three business motives which 
Keynes emphasizes – love of money, love of money-making, and a sadistic love of 
power – are … very similar to the dominant traits of the anal-sadistic character” 
(Winslow, 1986, p. 558). Winslow proceeds to include the Keynesian notion of 
“animal spirits” – that is, a spontaneous drive to action in people that is 
necessary in order for the economy to flourish – in the correlation with anality.  
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But is Winslow correct in linking Keynes’s theoretical statements on capitalism 
and entrepreneurial optimism with the psychoanalytic concept of anality? Can 
the two be compared? Winslow makes a good attempt but ultimately fails to 
convince that there is strong enough justification for such linkages to be 
supported. What he failed to clarify first is whether you instil yourself with 
animal spirits or you have animal spirits instilled into you. In Freudian theory an 
instinct is a biological function, an urge. Animal spirits, on the other hand, appear 
to be more like a mood, for example, “business confidence” that can be created or 
dissipated, a mood that comes and goes at someone else’s command, for 
example, the government’s. A psychoanalytic instinct must continue its journey 
until satisfaction or repression into a new aim or onto a new object, or 
sublimated into new areas of activity (Freud, 1905, 1915, 1917).  
Keynes’s employment of the terminology of the anal hypothesis, for example, 
“hoarding”, shows that the theory had reached the very heights of the analysis of 
economics, given Keynes’s status both domestically and internationally as the 
most eminent economist of his generation, as already stated. He brought in 
anality again after World War One when there was a controversial and charged 
debate on whether Britain should return to fixing its exchange rate to the dollar 
with an official parity that was backed by its gold reserves. However, one option, 
a pre-war rate of exchange to the dollar, would lead to unemployment. Skidelsky 
(1992) states that:  
 
Keynes’s friend Nicholas Davenport believed that the policy of going 
back to gold sprang from a sadistic desire by the bankers to inflict 
pain on the working class. Keynes himself hinted at Freudian 
explanations in his book the Treatise on Money. He gave a reference 
to Freud’s Collected Papers, edited by his friend James Strachey, 
where Freud claimed that the baby’s ‘interest in faeces is transformed 
into the high valuation of gold and money’. An anal fixation on gold 
was thus the ultimate cause of unemployment! 
(Skidelsky, 1992, p. 188) 
  
In other words hoarding and not spending ‘money’ (gold) could cause 
unemployment by not stimulating economic growth via capital investments 
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(Keynes, 1936; Dostaler, 1998; Lau and Smithin, 2002). Keynes’s name was to 
become synonymous with government-provided, economy-stimulating financial 
boosts to countries suffering from depressions, recessions, and severe 
unemployment (Smithies, 1951). Arguably, a far more significant factor in 
Keynes’s writings, but a factor that is disputed over whether it can or cannot be 
attributed to a Freudian influence (Barnett, 2015), is Keynes’s clear general 
understanding of the psychological functioning of the individual in society (King, 
2010). In the ‘Concluding Notes’ of his most famous work, The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money, Keynes (1936) observes that: 
 
For my own part, I believe that there is social and psychological 
justification for significant inequalities of incomes and wealth, but not 
for such large disparities as exist today. There are valuable human 
activities which require the motive of money-making and the 
environment of private wealth-ownership for their full fruition. 
Moreover, dangerous human proclivities can be canalised into 
comparatively harmless channels by the existence of opportunities for 
money-making and private wealth, which, if they cannot be satisfied 
in this way, may find their outlet in cruelty, the reckless pursuit of 
personal power and authority, and other forms of self-
aggrandisement. It is better that a man should tyrannise over his bank 
balance than over his fellow-citizens; and whilst the former is 
sometimes denounced as being but a means to the latter, sometimes 
at least it is an alternative. 
(Keynes, 1936 [1981], p. 374) 
 
As Keynes had claimed during the mid-1920s to be “going through the whole of 
the Dr.’s [Freud’s] works” (Winslow, 1986, p. 555), there could be leeway to 
suggest the probability that he would proceed to read later works, as Keynes’s 
general writings about mankind and human behaviour, as in the example cited 
above, appear to understand and accord with Freudian psychological 
mechanisms such as repression and sublimation but without any such 
attribution being made to specific writings by Freud. When one reads thoughts 
such as “dangerous human proclivities” being “canalised into comparatively 
harmless channels” or finding other outlets, it could be argued that the most 
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influential British economist of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, whose pre-
eminence and influence are still undimmed today, owes a significant intellectual 
debt to Sigmund Freud. As Skidelsky notes: “Keynes was fascinated by Freud’s 
reflections on the pathology of money, particularly its association with the anal 
sadistic character, and by the Freudian mechanism of sublimation. Freud 
enabled him to build on his insight into the sacrificial nature of capitalism” 
(Skidelsky, 1992, p. 234).  
The Freudian demand to engage psychoanalysis with the concerns and problems 
of the wider world is a two-way process. Those engaged in a dialogue with the 
issues of the world who were not themselves either psychoanalytic researchers 
or clinicians found it necessary, indeed often made it obligatory, to reach to 
psychoanalysis and its writings in order to support, add emphasis, or clarify their 
own intellectual endeavours, as we have attempted to illustrate with Keynes.  
But let us turn now to Freud’s views on ‘wealth’ and ‘money’ with the 
expectation of ascertaining how he brought in psychoanalytic insights and 
psychoanalytic discourse into his wider social enquiry. In the citation from The 
Future of an Illusion (Freud, 1927, p. 6) at the beginning of this chapter, Freud is, 
arguably, not literally to be taken as conceptualizing ‘wealth’ in the form of 
monetary or financial advantages – access to land or property could also be 
entertained as meaningful, as Adam Smith proposed – but it is nonetheless 
striking that Freud could be regarding ‘wealth’ as access to ‘money’ and riches. 
Again, as Smith explained, this was a regular occurrence when people thought of 
‘wealth’. Freud proceeds to state that the distribution of such ‘wealth’ was 
important and “civilization” had to be wary of and guard against the selfish, 
“hostile impulses” (Freud, 1927, p. 6) of “the individual”: 
  
 
civilization has to be defended against the individual, and its 
regulations, institutions and commands are directed to that task. They 
aim not only at effecting a certain distribution of wealth but at 
maintaining that distribution 
 
(Freud, 1927, p. 6) 
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We are not sure whether Freud is implying that this “certain distribution” is, or 
should be, an equitable one; but what is clear is that Freud’s hostile, selfish, 
greedy “individual” is thus set in opposition to the requirements of civilization, 
society, and the community. An inherent, resulting conflict arises because: “the 
mutual relations of men are profoundly influenced by the amount of instinctual 
satisfaction which the existing wealth makes possible” (Freud, 1927, p. 6). Now 
Freud has brought in psychoanalytic theory: he has stated here that it is the 
provision of an instinctual satisfaction, a psychical, energy-driven, satisfaction 
that is sought after in the seeking of the satisfaction that ‘wealth’ provides. For 
Freud an ‘instinct’ could be defined as (his italics): “an urge inherent in organic 
life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to 
abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces” (Freud, 1920, p. 36), 
and it can be “historically determined” (1920, p. 37) or “freshly acquired” (1920, 
p. 40). To state at this point the fundamental determination of ‘instinct’ by Freud 
is important, as in later writings by psychoanalysts (both in the Freudian school 
and in other psychoanalytic schools of thought) the question of the status of 
instincts and drives is a highly contentious area of theory, particularly in 
contemporary writings. But the original Freudian determination is an essential 
starting place. A discussion of later works in this subject area will take place in 
Chapter Four where the nature of the ‘instinct’ and ‘drive’ will be grappled with 
in the context of the individual in a society that is undergoing rapid economic 
change. 
The application of psychoanalytic thinking to non-specifically psychoanalytic 
questions flows through a work such as Civilization and its Discontents (1930). In 
one particular passage Freud states that: “The ownership of private wealth gives 
the individual power, and with it the temptation to ill-treat his neighbour; while 
the man who is excluded from possession is bound to rebel in hostility (Freud, 
1930, p. 113). He then proceeds to analyze the issue of the attitudes of 
communists towards the ownership of private property by using the searchlight 
derived from psychoanalytic thinking on aggression. This brings out what Freud 
clearly considered to be the unconscious nature of property and the 
psychoanalytic implications of separating people from property: 
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I have no concern with any economic criticisms of the communist 
system; I cannot enquire into whether the abolition of private 
property is expedient or advantageous. But I am able to recognize 
that the psychological premises on which the system is based are an 
untenable illusion. In abolishing private property we deprive the 
human love of aggression of one of its instruments, certainly a strong 
one, though certainly not the strongest; but we have in no way 
altered the differences in power and influence which are misused by 
aggressiveness, nor have we altered anything in its nature. 
Aggressiveness was not created by property. It reigned almost 
without limit in primitive times, when property was still very scanty, 
and it already shows itself in the nursery almost before property has 
given up it primal, anal form 
(Freud, 1930, p. 113) 
 
We have illustrated how Freud himself brought psychoanalytic theory into his 
general discourse on ‘wealth’ distribution and property ownership. It is now 
necessary to address the specific question of ‘money’ directly. One of the central 
questions that raised itself at the beginning of this investigation was this: When 
did psychoanalytic theorists first start thinking about the subject of ‘money’? To 
find the answer meant to turn attention to the period of the founding of 
psychoanalysis. What years were the years when its main tenets and practices 
were established? The answer is the period that extended between the 19th 
century fin de siècle to the eve of the Second World War: the ‘classical’ years of 
theory formulation. The death of Freud in 1939 is clearly an end of an era 
marking point (Nunberg and Federn, 1962; Jones, 1955; Roazen, 1971; Brome, 
1967; Gay, 2006; Grosskurth, 1991; Schwartz, 1999). Was there a psychoanalytic 
theory of ‘money’? What did psychoanalysis think about the subject of ‘money’ in 
its first decades? 
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PART TWO: CLASSICAL PSYCHOANALYSIS AND ‘MONEY’   
 
4. The ‘Anal Theory of Money’: Freud, Ferenczi, Abraham, and Jones  
 
It was Freud who established the general anality hypothesis that is 
embedded in classical writings about ‘money’ and the unconscious. ‘Character 
and Anal Erotism’ (Freud, 1908), short and to the point, became highly 
influential and commands an almost mandatory citation if ‘money’ is to be 
mentioned in the literature. Nobody sought to question its underlying 
hypothetical premise, well described, that behaviour such as parsimony and 
miserliness, orderliness, and obstinacy could emerge in an individual’s character 
as a result of conflicts and difficulties during the developmental period known 
psychoanalytically as the ‘anal stage’ (the “potty” training stage). Such conflicts 
were later aggravated or sublimated. Freud believed that there were people who 
were “born with a sexual constitution in which the erotogenicity of the anal zone 
is exceptionally strong” (Freud, 1908, p. 170). A second paper (Freud, 1917) 
reinforced his points. And, famously, he made the remarkable observation that: 
 
It is possible that the contrast between the most precious substance 
known to men and the most worthless, which they reject as waste 
matter (‘refuse’), has led to this specific identification of gold with 
faeces. 
(Freud, 1908, p. 174) 
 
Sándor Ferenczi proceeded to delineate a step-by-step construction of the 
Freudian theory of anality and its application to ‘money’ with his paper, ‘The 
Ontogenesis of the Interest in Money’, (Ferenczi, 1914). This paper has a strong 
reliance on Freud’s 1908 hypothesis and makes an essential contribution to 
understanding and reflection. Chapter Two gives it detailed consideration. 
In 1917 Karl Abraham published ‘The Spending of Money in Anxiety States’, 
which promised much from its title in that one hoped for more than the 
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exploration of anality. Could the “spending of” be separated from the “interest in” 
‘money’? However, the standard use of anality as explicatory factor was 
maintained. But Abraham’s paper is noteworthy for the potential it provides for 
the possibility of a differentiation in root source between “interest in” and 
“spending of”. The following year, Ernest Jones published a typically 
comprehensive paper – lengthy and with detailed types and sub-types, divisions 
and sub-divisions – on what constituted the anal character, and upheld the 
relation between faeces and ‘money’. In ‘Anal-Erotic Character Traits’, Jones 
(1918) states that: 
  
In Freud’s original article on the subject he proffered the opinion that 
the association is in part a contrast one – between the most valuable 
substance man possesses and the least valuable; but it is now known 
that the connection is a more direct one – namely, that the sense of 
value attaching to money is a direct continuation of the sense of value 
that the infant attaches to its excretory product, one which in the 
adult consciousness is replaced by its opposite, though it still persists 
unaltered in the unconscious. 
(Jones, 1918, p. 426) 
 
In Abraham’s 1921 response, ‘Contributions to the Theory of the Anal Character’, 
an “amplification and completion in certain respects” (Abraham, 1921, p. 372) to 
Jones’s 1918 paper, he writes about “the education of the child in cleanly habits”. 
Namely that: “The child has not only to be taught not to soil its body and 
surroundings with excreta, but it has also to be educated to perform its excretory 
functions at regular times” (Abraham, 1921, p. 372). The child is thus forced to 
renounce its “coprophilia and its pleasure in the process of excretion”, which 
Abraham characterizes as a “double process of limitation of infantile impulses” 
that has psychical repercussions (Abraham, 1921, p. 372.).  
What was emerging from the literature was a single anal-focused hypothesis on 
‘money’ and the unconscious. It was becoming clear that Freud’s anal theory was 
being firmly entrenched as a central principle in psychoanalytic theoretical 
discourse on ‘money’. And, as argued earlier with regard to Keynes, this 
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entrenchment meant that the ‘anal theory of money’ attained influence outside of 
psychoanalytic circles and discourse. 
5. Otto Fenichel’s ‘Drive to Amass Wealth’.  
The seemingly unchallengeable nature of the connection of ‘money’ to faeces in 
the psyche is only contested seriously in the 1930s by the Marxist psychoanalyst 
and theorist, Otto Fenichel. But even Fenichel is ambiguous and conflicted about 
it. What is the relation of instinctual forces, such as anality, versus social, 
ideological, forces such as capitalism or communism? He explores this area in 
‘The Drive to Amass Wealth’ (Fenichel, 1938), in which he asks outright whether 
there is an ‘instinct’ to acquire wealth. This is an important paper in which 
Fenichel expresses ambivalence, whether intentionally or not, as he rails against 
biologically structuring factors that are to the detriment of environmental 
impacts, whilst he seemingly ignores the fact that his continued support of 
anality also does that. His ambivalence is expressed in statements such as: “anal 
eroticism produces the desire to collect something. What is collected is 
determined by reality” (Fenichel, 1938, p. 89) but that “capitalism … cannot be 
the result of an ‘anal-erotic mutation’ that has fallen from heaven” (Fenichel, 
1938, p. 93). It could be construed as puzzling that the foremost pioneering 
theorists of the pre-World War Two period – Freud, Ferenczi, Abraham, Jones – 
and other adherents of the ‘money’ equals faeces equation, seemingly cannot 
countenance that ‘money’ is something that the instinct to collect can latch upon 
and that it is not necessarily an unconsciously fundamental underpinning of the 
anal collecting instinct. Fenichel postulated that ‘money’ could be regarded as a 
supply of narcissism from the environment for the benefit of the ego’s self-
regard (Fenichel, 1938, p. 78). This statement will be examined in detail in 
Chapter Five. But it is the almost total reliance on anality’s ‘money’ equals faeces 
equation that is striking here given that ‘possession’ and ‘gift’ and ‘collecting’, 
even ‘hoarding’, extend to a variety of objects for the infant – not just faeces.  
In summary it seems that it can be stated that up to World War Two not only the 
earliest psychoanalytic but also subsequent writings on ‘money’ and its role in 
the unconscious were based on the Freudian hypothesis of the ‘anal theory of 
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money’, in which the equation between faeces and ‘money’ was central. None of 
the leading theorists deviated from this rule and its status went unchallenged, 
with the exception of Fenichel’s ambivalence. Further, most of the thinking about 
‘money’ was done in relation to, and from the perspective of, its impacts on the 
adult character types that are described as developing from the psychoanalytic 
concept of anal erotism. Freud’s launch paper in 1908 discussed ‘money’ as a 
result of anal erotism. There is no sense of money having to be discussed for the 
sake of its impacts on patients’ lives outside of anality. ‘Money’ was explored as 
anality and as anal conflicts. Freud and his innermost circle did not develop an 
overarching or more general ‘theory of money’ when they were laying down the 
fundamental theories of psychoanalysis. Further, since its establishment the 
notion of an anal theory of ‘money’ has held as the decades have passed despite 
coming under some criticism as modern psychoanalysts attempted to renew and 
to reassert an engagement and a dialogue with the subjects of ‘money’ and 
‘wealth’, as will be discussed in Section 3. The question has to be raised whether 
what can be characterised as a rigidity in perspective was a result of the times in 
which the founding theorists lived, in other words was it a repression or a 
counter reaction against the turbulent, disturbing, potentially overwhelming 
societal changes of their times? What were the social and historical contexts of 
‘classical’ psychoanalysis’? 
 
6. Classical Psychoanalysis: Historical Contexts 
What were to be considered ‘classical’ psychoanalytic principles, theories, 
and tenets were produced in phases beginning with the 1895 publication of 
Studies on Hysteria (Breuer and Freud). According to George Makari in 
Revolution in Mind:  
 
By 1895, Sigmund Freud had distinguished himself from other French-
oriented psychopathologists with his notions of defence neurosis, 
mental conflict, psychical analysis, and transference. In the process, 
he began to refine the ancient dictum: know thyself 
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(Makari, 2008, p. 48)  
 
This was a period of rapid and sustained development of psychoanalytic ideas 
and the leading figures among many brilliant minds and thinkers were Freud 
himself, the Welshman Ernest Jones, the German Karl Abraham, and the 
Hungarian Sándor Ferenczi. Clara Thompson, a former pupil and patient of 
Ferenczi’s, sub-divides the formative years of psychoanalysis into several stages 
in Psychoanalysis: Evolution and Development (1952): 
 
The first period extends from the beginning of Freud’s collaboration 
with Breuer (about 1885) to around 1900. This was a time of great 
discovery gleaned from clinical observation … The second period 
extends from 1900 to somewhere between 1910 and 1920 … it covers 
the development of the first instinct theories, which drew attention to 
the biological sexual development of the child. … From 1910 to 1920 
Freud also was gradually evolving a new theory granting etiological 
importance to factors other than sex. The third period, therefore, 
began in 1910, although the full significance of its changes was not 
felt by the main psychoanalytic school of thought until about 1920. 
This was a time of an enlarging field of interest. A theory about the 
total personality was emerging. Narcissism came under scrutiny and 
this plus the discovery of the importance of another drive, aggression, 
laid the ground work for a new theory of instincts which was finally 
presented by Freud early in the 1920s.  
(Thompson, 1952, pp. 4-5) 
 
But in what historical and social contexts were psychoanalysts conducting the 
work in which their mutual intellectual stimulation and jousting is evident from 
their huge correspondences (Paskauskas, 1995; Falzeder, Brabant, and 
Giampieri-Deutsch, 1993)? The cities that they called home – Vienna (Freud), 
London (Jones), Berlin (Abraham), Budapest (Ferenczi) – were capital cities at 
the centre of and pivotal to dramatic social, political, and economic 
transformations in Europe during the period between 1895 and the second 
world war. Psychoanalysis’s classical past is allied with and berthed in those 
years during which many important historical events took place, each with its 
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own impacts upon the pioneering psychoanalytic thinkers and theorists and 
their patients, as they were all members of European societies and nations and 
therefore witnesses to the turbulence and changes in their own societies. Thus 
when one asks the question: In what historical contexts were classical 
psychoanalytic tenets founded in, surely the response has to be – given the mass 
of events and contexts – which particular historical context, which social context, 
and even, perhaps, which cultural context should one expound on for the 
purpose of contextualization? Young-Bruehl and Schwartz (2012, p. 142) 
attempt to construct a “history of history-writing” about psychoanalysis that is 
focused mainly on its internal group dynamics as opposed to external world 
events. But there is a sense of what one could describe as the “bigger picture” not 
being fully addressed. As Loewenberg (2007, p. 19) argues: “psychoanalysis is 
history” (his italics) and “any history is a product of interaction and compromise 
of the historian’s inner life and the socio-political outer world” (Loewenberg, 
2007, p. 19). Kurzweil (1998), in the citation earlier, spoke of externalities such 
as modernization, industrialization, and bourgeois culture. And these were 
profound influences. But, in addition, prior to the outbreak of war in 1914 and its 
devastation, there was the closeness of relations between Vienna and Budapest 
under the rule of the Habsburg monarchy. The post-war years brought the 
nationalist repercussions of the break up of the Habsburg empire and 
revolutionary ferment in Hungary. The economic chaos, booms and busts of the 
1920s – Berlin, Abraham’s city, was a particularly fraught case – culminated in 
the 1929 Wall Street crash and the Depression years of the 1930s across north 
America and Europe. The social uncertainties and national integrationist 
tensions of the times were underlined politically by the coming to power of new 
forms of government in the form of communist Russia and the rise of fascism 
(Hobsbawm, 1987, 1994; Joll, 1976).  
 
But, overall, and it might appear surprising given the above list of major events 
that took place during the ‘classical’ period, the single factor which is most noted 
in commentary about the social and historical context in which psychoanalysis 
developed is that it was beholden to “bourgeois culture”. The growth and 
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influence of an aspirational, middle class, bourgeois, liberal, intellectual elite in 
Europe’s capital cities was fundamental to the development of psychoanalysis 
and its theories. The factor of, and social context of, new “bourgeois culture” 
appears to override the other turbulent and world changing events of 
psychoanalysis’s founding years. It seems that the last two or so decades of the 
19th century cast forward into the 20th century a particular kind of person with a 
particular mental outlook and cultural perspective. But Eric Hobsbawm points 
out acutely what he describes as “the paradox”, that is: “It was only quite late in 
the century [19th] that bourgeois society developed a style of life and the suitable 
material equipment actually designed to fit the requirements of the class” 
(Hobsbawm, 1987, p. 166).  Commenting on Carl Schorske’s book Fin-de-Siècle 
Vienna (1980), Hobsbawm writes that its basic theme was that: “The culture of 
fin de siècle Vienna, it has been argued, was largely that of a class and a people – 
the middle class Jews – who were no longer allowed to be what they wanted, 
namely German liberals” (Hobsbawm, 1987, p. 168). Jewish migration from 
Eastern Europe to central and northern Europe was part of the mass migrations 
of peoples of these times. It was such a journey that Freud’s own family 
undertook to arrive in Vienna when he was a child. The Jewish populations of 
Austria and Hungary increased substantially as a result of these migrations and 
many were able to attain prosperous and professional lives despite anti-
semitism (Gay, 2006, pp. 18-21).  As part of the migrations to Budapest, 
Ferenczi’s family, with its 1848 revolutionary background, eventually settled 
into life as members of the new Jewish middle class intellectuals (Moreau-
Ricaud, 1996, p. 42). Marcus (1984) states that: 
Psychoanalysis was created in particular cultural and historical sets of 
circumstances and bears upon it the markings of the contexts in 
which it originated. It came into being in the context of a liberal 
bourgeois culture and may in some measure be understood as an 
institution of late high bourgeois culture – in its strengths, 
weaknesses, and contradictions. 
(Marcus, 1984, p. 262) 
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7. The Critique of  Classical Psychoanalytic Texts.  
In reading texts written during the classical period it becomes apparent 
that a decision has to be reached about the status of the works in the light 
of contemporary thinking. On what basis are they to be read?  And what 
weighting should be accorded to this psychoanalytic output of the 
classical era? The centrally important question was this: On what basis 
should we assess the writings of the past? Should we deal with historical 
texts in the light of contemporary developments and contemporary 
thinking or should we deal with them on their own terms, that is, on the 
terms existing during their own particular period? Is it fair to criticise, or 
even attack, texts written in the past on the grounds of what we have 
found out in subsequent decades (or centuries even)? Should there not be 
an insistence on maintaining the integrity and the validity of classical 
texts – from any academic discipline – as classical texts? Could this be 
done without being considered reverential and uncritical?2 
In considering this problematic it can be argued that there are at least two ways 
that one can respond. First, clearly it would be, and is, legitimate and proper to 
set out a critique of classical theoretical writings on ‘money’ that was based on, 
for example, contemporary object relations theories or contemporary Lacanian 
or Kleinian theories – if that was the objective of the research. Such an objective 
would have to be stated. Secondly, it is also legitimate and proper to set out a 
critique of classical writings and perspectives that intends to critique the 
writings of the past on their own terms. In other words, a critique that is based 
on such historical texts having ignored or failed to acknowledge the knowledge 
that surrounded them or was readily available to them. Again such an objective 
would have to be stated.  
The decision was reached that following the necessity of the return to the 
classical psychoanalytic texts on ‘money’, the second approach would be the one 
taken with respect to the texts in question. The approach in this thesis would be 
to allow the criticisms that could be made of the classical theoretical texts to 
emerge themselves from the writings and communications made by the 
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foundational theorists. Such an approach would also allow the space for the 
important argument to be made that any gaps or omissions could or should have 
been seen by the original writers themselves but were not.   
Freud’s, Ferenczi’s, Abraham’s, and Jones’s theoretical works on ‘money’ during 
the classical period were vital and would be considered on their own terms in 
the chapters that will follow. What would emerge as presence or absence in their 
work? It becomes appropriate to now discuss the Derridean philosophical 
position, which resonates with the decision that was taken here to ‘return to the 
past’, to the classical period, to focus there, to begin digging there.  
 
8. Jacques Derrida and the Return to the Past 
In Resistances of Psychoanalysis (1998) Derrida analyzes the word “analysis”, 
which for him is about language and the use of language, and the meaning of 
words: their presence and its meaning, their absence and the meaning of that 
absence. He is meticulous in his close textual readings, his analyzes, and the 
range of his questionings.  
 
The Greek word analuein, as is well known, means to untie and thus 
to dissolve the link. It can thus be rigorously approached, if not 
translated, by the Latin solvere (to detach, deliver, absolve, or acquit). 
Both solutio and resolutio have the sense of dissolution, dissolved tie, 
extrication, disengagement, or acquittal (for example, from debt) and 
that of solution of a problem: explanation or unveiling. The solutio 
linguae is also the tongue untied. 
(Derrida, 1998, p. 3)  
 
Note how Derrida proceeds from the Greek analuein to the Latin solvere, from 
analysis to solution, and connects the two by untying and detaching. Analysis is 
“untangling, untying, detaching, freeing, even liberation” (Derrida, 1998, p. 3) 
and perhaps, therefore, the solution can be, too. But what takes place in such a 
process? Surely one finds in the process of untying and detaching whether 
something there should be there or not, or whether something not there should 
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be there? In other words, one must determine in the process of untying and 
disentangling, in the process of analyzing and critiquing, whether the analysis or 
the solution on offer at present is adequate. 
This connection between analysis and solution then leads to a determining and 
defining use of the Derridean demand to ‘deconstruct’, in which analysis and 
critique enter as partners to detangle and untie in order to explore, in order to 
find possible answers. Derrida states (the italics are his): 
 
What is called “deconstruction” undeniably obeys an analytic 
exigency, at once critical and analytic. It is always a matter of undoing, 
desedimenting, decomposing, deconstructing sediments, artefacta, 
presuppositions, institutions. And the insistence on unbinding, 
disjunction, dissociation, the being “out of joint”, as Hamlet would 
have said, on the irreducibility of difference is so massive as to need 
no further insistence. 
(Derrida, 1998, p. 27)  
 
Thus, existing marriages or existing relationships may or have to be divorced. 
Such a divorcing or a breaking apart may or have to be insisted upon in order for 
the analytical, critical work of finding meaning to take place. In order for the 
finding of new interpretations and, or, probable answers that may provide 
possible explanations that differ from or are counter to perceived or received or 
accepted presently existing knowledge. That is what would appear to be the 
Derridean task demanded that is irreducible. Further, Derrida states: 
 
Since this analytic dissociation should also in deconstruction, at least 
as I understand it or practice it, be a critico-genealogical return, we 
have here apparently the two motifs of any analysis, which we have 
analyzed by analyzing the word analysis: the archeological or 
anagogical motif of return to the ancient as archi-originary and the 
philolytic motif of the dissociative – always very close to saying dis-
social – unbinding. 
(Derrida, 1998, p. 27)  
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The Derridean sense of a dual motif in the term analysis (Derrida, 1998, pp.19-
20) sets forth a demand for a return to basics, to the archaeological beginnings of 
a problematic, a textual consideration, an assumption, an idea, a previous 
analysis, in order to commence the processes of untangling and unbinding, of 
perhaps differing from and countering. An analytical, critical disentangling 
process with the possibility of an alternative understanding of, and a new 
knowing of, present-day knowledge. One has to return to the basics that came 
before and one has to be prepared to unbind what one might find buried there. 
The philosopher, theologian, and long-term critical specialist on Derrida, John D. 
Caputo, asserts in Truth: Philosophy in Transit (Caputo, 2013) that 
deconstruction should be overhauled as the centre piece of Derridean thought 
and replaced by a construct of the future, l’avenir, and ‘the event’. This, Caputo 
postulates, better encapsulates Derrida’s work. However, contrary to Caputo’s 
attempt at a reframing of deconstruction and a repositioning of Derrida’s 
thinking, one can still connect deconstruction to this ‘event of the future’, 
because the Derridean demand to return to the archaeology of the past and to 
unbury the knowledge found there, to deconstruct, means, results, implies a 
reconstruction, a new meaning of that past’s future ‘events’. In other words: a 
reconstruction and new meanings for today, as today was the future in the past. 
The past impacts the future and thus it is vital to deconstruct, to detangle, to 
analyze that past rigorously in order to better understand (from the position of 
looking back) the events that were to take place. Psychoanalysis returns to the 
past to unravel, to find the roots of, to unbury what is troubling today.  
Although this thesis will not follow an explicitly Derridean outlook, it is in 
sympathy with the Derridean philosophical demand to return to the past in 
order to better understand today and its possibilities for the future. This return 
will begin with the close  examination of classical texts on ‘money’ (particularly 
with the analysis of Ferenczi’s 1914 paper undertaken in Chapter Two). But 
before we get to that point, let us now turn to a review contemporary 
 41 
psychoanalytic literature on ‘money’ and delve into its connections with this 
classical heritage. 
 
PART 3: CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOANALYTIC TEXTS 
9. The Post-Classical Psychoanalysis of ‘Money’ 
In July 2010 an international “landmark conference” was convened in 
London entitled ‘Psychoanalysis, Money and the Economy’, and attended by “a 
multinational cast of philosophers, psychoanalysts, economists and cultural 
theorists to debate the relationship between theories of mind and money in the 
shadow (or light) of the global financial markets crash of 2008-10” (Bennett, 
2012, p. 6). The conference’s organiser, the academic David Bennett, wanted to 
“re-open a dialogue between two disciplines – psychoanalysis and economics – 
which for much of the past 100 years have been mutually indifferent and 
mutually opaque” (Bennett, 2012, p. 6). In the book he edited of the conference 
papers, Loaded Subjects, Bennett assesses that the topic of ‘money’ was handled 
by its main theorists, “Freud, Ernest Jones, Sándor Ferenczi” during the early 
years of psychoanalysis in a manner that “de-historicised and biologised money-
fetishism, explaining what they called ‘the capitalistic instinct’ of acquisitiveness 
as a neurotic displacement (in the potty-trained adult) of a universal, infantile 
anal-erotic drive” (Bennett, 2012, p. 19). And, moreover, that: 
 
Sigmund Freud, Sándor Ferenczi, Ernest Jones and Karl Abraham were 
just the earliest psychoanalytic theorists to decode monetary 
transactions and relationships into their presumed unconscious 
motives. And yet, psychoanalysis itself has been notoriously reluctant 
to speak frankly of its own economics as a profession and business - 
of how ‘filthy lucre’ is the indispensable stuff of its own transactions. 
 
(Bennett, 2012, p. 8) 
 
Bennett states in his paper, ‘Homo Oeconomicus vs. Homo Psychologicus: A 
Critique of Pure Reason in Economics and Psychoanalysis’, that: “psychoanalysis, 
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from its inception, has viewed the psychology of money as profoundly irrational 
– as a realm of illusion, neurosis, phantasy and psychopathology, both individual 
and collective“ (Bennett, 2012, p. 8). In staging a “confrontation” between “homo 
psychologicus and homo oeconomicus”, Bennett sought to negate the “historical 
rift” between these two subjects which designated primarily that 
“psychoanalysis deals with the ‘symbolic meanings’ of money (as if there were 
any other kind) whereas economics deals with ‘real’ money” (Bennett, 2012, p. 
8).  
But the first important post-classical collection that brought together writings on 
‘money’ and psychoanalysis was The Psychoanalysis of Money, published in 1976 
under the editorship of the writer and psychoanalyst, Ernest Borneman. It is a 
rich and varied collection of work. If Otto Fenichel was ambivalent about the 
anality hypothesis with respect to ‘money’ in the 1930s, both Borneman (1976) 
and Bennett (2012) have no hesitation in casting off ambivalence in their 
criticisms. Borneman states categorically that:   
 
When children who once found pleasure in retaining their stool later 
become collectors, this tells us nothing about the origin and 
development of capitalism, for what such anal erotics collect need not 
have monetary value. And even if a few anal characters should 
become bankers, this does not explain why capitalists constantly have 
to increase their capital if they do not want to be destroyed by 
competitors with larger capital reserves. Anal erotism has its specific 
laws, capitalism has others. During certain periods, both need and 
promote each other. At other times, they conflict. Since the anally 
oriented desire for possessions does not take its cue from the value of 
the collected objects but is governed by the compulsive element in 
collecting, it becomes irrational and, in its extreme form, contradicts 
the logic of capital and therefore harms it. Besides, there are aspects 
of anal erotism such as obstinacy and a desire for order which are 
directed against the ruling class and can in no way be reconciled with 
the interests of capital. All equations of anality and an interest in 
money should therefore be studiously avoided. 
(Borneman, 1976, p. 70)  
 
And there is a further no mincing of words from Bennett: 
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It was this sociologically impoverished view of the mentality of homo 
oeconomicus - the insistence that the foundation of economic reason 
is merely shit - that the Marxist Freudian Otto Fenichel objected to in 
his 1938 essay, ‘The Drive to Amass Wealth’, in which he criticised 
what he called Ferenczi’s and Freud’s ‘biologising’ of the origins of 
money and the drive to accumulate it. In Fenichel’s view, it was 
capitalism, not anal eroticism, that made the pursuit of wealth both a 
rational and a neurotic drive. 
 
(Bennett, 2012, p. 19)  
 
In his paper ‘On the Psychodynamics of Collecting’, Peter Subkowski (2006) not 
only aligns collecting with perversion in a further example of rethinking and 
reworking on the subject, but also asserts that gender differences demonstrate 
 
how the castration complex is being experienced. This can elucidate 
the special proximity of collecting to the perversions in men. In the 
unconscious, the object of collection can represent the phallus for the 
man, or, at an earlier stage of development, the phallic, omnipotent 
and magically endowed breast-object, which could be lost and thus 
must be protected, hoarded and hidden because of its greater 
vulnerability. 
 
(Subkowski, 2006, p. 386)  
 
 
Subkowski makes a strong case for the operation of the castration complex in 
male collectors, although his juxtaposition of the Freudian phallus with what he 
describes as a ‘phallic breast-object’ raises questions that he does not answer 
regarding how such an intriguing object arises and how it mechanizes itself.  
The recent arrival and acceptance of the disciplines of ‘emotional finance’ and 
‘behavioural economics’ (Pixley, 2004) highlight the reluctant but now equally 
necessary acceptance of the notion of ‘irrationality’ in mankind’s relations with 
‘money’ specifically and economics generally. The psychoanalyst and university 
professor, David Tuckett, entered these newly defined areas with the book 
Minding the Markets  (Tuckett, 2011), which takes up the themes from and 
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expands on his earlier work in which he investigated notions of financial 
products as phantasy objects involved in unconscious and irrational decision-
making among investment managers (Tuckett and Taffler, 2008). Since the 2008 
financial market crashes and the continuing economic recessions and austerity 
packages, and the violent reactions to them by people in different countries 
across the world, fresh attention has also been cast upon the patient-analyst 
consulting room-centred discourses on ‘money’.  
 
10. The Encounter in the Consulting Room  
 
Bennett (2012) confirms that there is evidence that analysts are still engaged in 
troubling dilemmas about how to handle the subject of ‘money’ and argues that:  
  
analysts themselves often find it hard to reconcile their therapeutic 
with their economic selves by owning up to being at once rational and 
self-interested subjects; they are more comfortable discussing their 
patients’ unconscious attitudes to money as a transferential object 
than discussing the relationship between the economics and ideology 
of their own profession. 
 
(Bennett, 2012, p. 21) 
 
Light is being shone on what has been deemed the “professional blind-spot” 
(Bennett, 2012, p.11): the financial and economic, in other words, monetary 
dependence of psychoanalysts themselves on their patients’ ability to afford 
treatment and to pay their bills. The perceived lack of frankness and 
unwillingness to address ‘money’, the what is considered to be the difficult and 
taboo area of the silence about psychoanalysts’ fees and patients’ bills, has been 
acknowledged within the profession: for example, David Krueger’s The Last 
Taboo (1986), Klebanow’s and Lowenkopf’s Money and Mind (1991) and 
Herron’s and Welt’s Money Matters (1994). Marcus (1984) states frankly that:  
 
To begin with, the institution has generally gone along with the 
inflationary character of the economy. Ten, fifteen or twenty-five 
dollars for a fifty-minute hour in 1950 has become fifty, seventy-five 
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and more for a forty-five minute session. To be sure, money is not the 
only force at play here, but sooner or later a point of diminishing 
returns has to be reached. Psychoanalysts have as a rule chosen to 
live in a certain moderately affluent – and identifiable – style. Their 
fees are to some extent an expression of this choice. One of the 
partial results of such a determination is the diminished number of 
psychoanalytic patients who are embarked upon a full analysis in the 
older sense of the term. According to a recent survey, analysts 
reported that only about 20 percent of their time was now spent in 
classical or full-scale analysis. 
(Marcus, 1984, p. 260) 
 
More recently, books such as Lesley Murdin’s How Money Talks (2012), and 
Berger’s and Newman’s collection, Money Talks in Therapy, Society and Life 
(2011), expand on and illuminate further the dilemmas of discussing ‘money’ 
within the clinical encounter. Murdin uses the device of a fictional character, who 
is partly based on clinical accounts, to explore the territory. She returns to a 
straightforward discussion in the latter part of the work, where it is notable that 
the points made by Marcus above with regard to high fees and the 
unaffordability of treatment in the US by those who need it but do not have the 
income to pay for it are clearly continuing problematics for psychoanalysts in the 
UK. Berger and Newman, north America-based analysts, are to be commended 
for the spread of views in their collection of essays from practitioners, and for 
the touching upon sensitive areas such as the analyst’s own desire, unconscious 
and conscious, for ‘money’. Such desire extends to wanting to have enough 
‘money’ and the neurotic conflicts that this engenders for the setting of high 
enough fees, fear of the economic impacts of the loss of income from the loss of 
patients, and the duration of treatments that might, unconsciously or 
consciously, be continuing long after having reached what could be considered to 
be a termination point for the patient. 
In Truth Games: Lies, Money, and Psychoanalysis, John Forrester, quoting Bob 
Dylan, claims that “money doesn’t talk, it swears” (Forrester, 1997, p. 34), and 
that: “Money, in its very nature, is potentially the yardstick of all other values; yet 
its very blankness reveals that it underpins everything else only because of its 
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intricate relations with everything else” (Forrester, 1997, pp. 34-35). This is a 
succinct encapsulation of the outcome that one could ascribe to an attempt to 
capture what the value of ‘money’ and ‘wealth’ can mean. But what happens, 
what is the state of one’s mind, when something that “underpins everything else” 
appears to be completely unattainable? In ‘When Money Dies: Anxiety and 
Melancholy in Times of Economic Crisis’, the Lacanian psychoanalyst and 
theorist, Renata Salecl (2010), writes of ‘money’ as being akin to Lacan’s object 
petit a – that cause of unattainable desire. Here it seems is the notion of residual 
desire, a desire that is left when the subject’s biological and physiological needs, 
such as hunger and thirst, have been met. A desire for something unnameable 
that has been lost or that is lacking in one’s life. A desire that perhaps can never 
be attained.   
In the final section of this literature review let us address how these valuations 
of the desirability of ‘money’ and ‘wealth’ can form and change during radical 
social and economic transformations. What could be the psychoanalytic impacts 
during such periods on conscious and unconscious notions of ‘money’ and 
‘wealth’, particularly when the concept of ‘the market economy’ enters into new 
territories? The considerable social disruptions have been well described by 
contemporary economists (e.g. Stiglitz, 2002; Kay, 2003). 
 
PART 4: PSYCHOANALYSIS, ‘MONEY’, AND CORRUPTION  
11. Towards a Psychoanalytic Theory of Financial Corruption 
The Russian professor and psychoanalyst Viktor Mazin’s ‘The Meaning of 
Money’ (2012), in Loaded Subjects, provides a brilliant account of the varied 
bewildering social transformations that can occur when ‘money’ enters 
forcefully into social spaces in which it was previously held in disregard and 
contempt but is then placed on a pedestal. His paper focuses on the days of 
wrenching transition from Soviet Union to Russian Federation via perestroika 
that took place from the late 1980s and through the 1990s: the dismantling of a 
socialist value system and a socialist economy and the bringing in and heralding 
of western-approved capitalist formations such as privatizations and 
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‘competitive markets’. These were traumatically ambivalent journeys that 
countries in Africa and other parts of the developing world, such as China 
(White, 1996), also embarked upon during the same period. But what Mazin 
makes available is a psychoanalytically-drawn cultural and social perspective. He 
states early on that: 
  
In the USSR, interest in money was regarded as a sign of philistinism, 
of a petty-bourgeois mindset. Loving money meant not loving genuine 
values: communism, labour, learning. It was impossible to love money 
and communism at the same time, given that money was famously 
supposed to die off under communism. 
 
(Mazin, 2012, p. 150) 
 
But by the 1990s Mazin makes clear that capitalism had taken a triumphant grip:  
 
People set about accumulating money, laundering it and praising it in 
the mass media. People were taught how to love it, how to make it, 
how to charm it and where to keep it. People began killing for small 
amounts of it, and this killing was not as pretty as in American 
westerns. In Soviet times, inspired by the discourse of the university, 
people would say, ‘Pushkin is our everything!’ Now, in conformity 
with the discourse of the capitalist, the country said as one: ‘Money is 
our everything!’ 
 
(Mazin, 2012, p. 154) 
 
 
The orality implicated in such a pursuit of ‘money’ and ‘wealth’ is made clear in 
his section entitled  “ORAL MONEY, OR THE VITAL BABLO OF THE IMAGINARY” (Mazin, 
2012, p. 154) where the slang term “bablo” meaning “loot, dough” had come to 
represent ‘money’ in Russian day-to-day life. Mazin explores effectively how the 
individual is turned and tamed orally by the dangling prospect of riches and the 
promotion of the need to accumulate wealth: “Man was turned into a biological 
organism with an instinctive love of money, itself transfigured into a kind of 
mother’s milk for adults” (Mazin, 2012, p. 155). Are social and environmental 
factors – here the introduction of capitalism – conducting the kind of biologizing 
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process – bringing out or heightening an oral need – that Fenichel, Bennett, and 
Borneman were dissecting with regard to anality?  
From Mazin’s account it seems that rapid and overwhelming social 
transformation, such as took place in formerly Marxist-Leninist Russia, has the 
strong potential to turn man, transform man, or revert man into a psychically 
biological frame of mind with regard to the desire for certain objects. Fenichel 
highlighted his ambivalence over instinct versus social structuring by stating, 
crucially, that: “Every psychological event is to be explained as the resultant of an 
interplay between biological structure and the influences exerted upon it by the 
environment” (Fenichel, 1938, p. 93).  
By the mid-1990s in Russia, financially corrupt behaviour became not only 
acceptable but praiseworthy and admirable as “the entire country had been 
afflicted with commercial psychosis” and: “People who in previous times had 
been called economic criminals, speculators and underground moneylenders 
were now praised as a new class of the successful, lucky and smart” (Mazin, 
2012, p. 154). Into being came “a new Russian ethics, in which the central place 
of the Good was occupied by Money” (Mazin, 2012, p. 155).   
Mazin’s paper highlights what will in due course emerge as  the core concern of 
the present thesis: Could ‘money’ become as mother’s milk, that is, as food, for 
adults who have unleashed or unrepressed an urge to get rich? Could the pursuit of 
‘wealth’ be oral, not anal, psychically? Does ‘the biological’ force its return under 
pressure from the social or the environment – like the return of the repressed? 
Mazin stated that a “savage money” culture had come into existence in post-
Soviet Russia. He asserted with strong Kleinian overtones of the mother’s breast 
as a part-object that: “Bablo, sucks human beings the way the breast sucks the 
mother’s body” (Mazin, 2012, p. 155). But could the pursuit of ‘wealth’ be oral 
and also sourced to ideological structuring? Fenichel acknowledges in the very 
title of his paper, ‘The Drive to Amass Wealth’, that an instinct could be at play 
and posits that possibility directly. He examined the interplay between biological 
instinct and ideologically founded economic systems as people tried to amass 
wealth. This dynamic could be important whether one is considering communist 
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state systems or capitalist ones or states in transition or emergence. What could 
be the nature of particular instinctual conflicts – whether oral or anal based – 
that are expressed in particular historical and social contexts with regard to 
‘money’ and ‘wealth’? In this area there is much potential for the exploration of 
the psychoanalytic roots of financial corruption. But so far what is observable is 
that psychoanalysis is only providing a key to the door of anality for its theories 
on ‘money’. The question, even demand, that is now beginning to force itself to 
the surface is this: Surely work has to be done on orality?  
With only its single hypothesis of anality, it can be argued strongly that 
psychoanalysis has not yet conceptualized adequate psychoanalytic theories of 
‘money’ and the accumulation of ‘wealth’ that would situate financial corruption 
within a psychoanalytic architecture that would contribute towards 
understanding why and how someone could become financially corrupt in 
certain social contexts, and what, unconsciously, could be the underpinnings of 
the behaviour.  
 
What is at work psychoanalytically when a bureaucrat or a politician or a 
businessman in an “emerging”, “developing” country is confronted with the 
sudden availability of a huge amount of money? There it is: the possibility of 
millions in international currency that is his for the taking. What conscious and 
unconscious processes are taking place inside that person? What is making that 
person decide that he can take that money, that he is entitled to it, that it belongs 
to him, and that it is his alone? What is at the root of his desire for that money? 
What urge is he attempting to satisfy? What forces are prevailing upon him to 
commit what amounts to an act of aggression? What kind of a person does he 
become in doing such a thing? What is his unconscious relationship to the 
thought of such a large sum of money? What factors have structured his 
conscious and unconscious phantasies about ‘wealth’ and the acquiring of 
‘wealth’? He must have that money even though in taking it he is committing a 
serious crime. Indeed, he could be said to be committing several crimes, not just 
theft but crimes against his people and his country.  
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It is with the theoretical support, theoretical challenges, and contextual societal 
observations of both classical and contemporary psychoanalytic work, of the 
type and nature that have been noted in the previous sections of this chapter, 
that progress towards a psychoanalytic discourse on financial corruption will be 
achieved.  This discourse will be based carrying out a psychoanalytic textual 
analysis of chosen writings on corruption from a particular historical period. 
These texts will be chosen from 1960s’ writings on Africa, Nigeria in particular. 
As explored earlier, philosophical support for a decision to visit the texts from 
the 1960s would also come from the Derridean demand for the need of a return 
to archaeological beginnings and to start the process of detangling and 
unbinding there.   
 
12. Indicative Writings from the 1960’s  
 
The period of the 1960s has been chosen because this is when financial 
corruption in the “Third World”, as the newly independent and modernizing 
countries were known, began to assume international importance and became 
the focus of academic studies. The aim of this study is to analyze the roots of a 
problem psychoanalytically and this is the period in which those roots were 
planted and the shoots began to emerge. This is the ‘archaeological’ period in 
question. But, as we have seen, one could also have taken the example of post-
Soviet countries like Russia since the 1990s, or, indeed, the example of the 
economic modernization of China since the 1980s. However, for decades in 
Africa, but particularly since the 1960s, the problem of financial corruption has 
loomed as intractable, impenetrable, and destructive. The discourses and 
narratives on corruption have fought for dominance in the coverage of Africa 
with those on poverty and lack of economic development. Texts that have come 
to the fore include: Wraith and Simpkins, 1963; Bayley, 1966; Nye, 1967; 
Klitgaard, 1988; Mauro, 1995. Texts from and about the 1960s will act as a 
portal, the door through which we shall examine the domain, the territory, 
psychoanalytically. 
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By the 1990s financial corruption had come to be regarded as the cause of 
Africa’s status as the poorest continent in the world. Whilst financial corruption 
is a worldwide phenomenon, as we have stated, and therefore not unique to 
Africa, it is of particular concern in Africa because of the duality of Africa’s 
existence as a continent vastly rich in resources and yet still the poorest 
continent in the world economically. The decades have witnessed the stealing of 
huge amounts of public money and the looting of national treasuries for private 
and personal gain. Such activities have been claimed as the main reason for the 
lack of economic development in African countries over the last fifty years 
(World Bank, 2010; Agbiboa, 2012). 
It might be appropriate here to make an attempt at a definition of financial 
corruption. Most of the general research work on corruption takes place in the 
fields of law, economics, economic development, criminology, and sociology, (for 
example, Rose-Ackerman, 1975, 2010; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Tanzi and 
Davoodi, 1997; Svensson, 2003; Fan, Lin, and Treisman, 2009; Van der Ploeg, 
2011; Ruggiero, 2012). However, in the 1960s, as the academic study of 
corruption established itself, Professor Joseph Nye provided one of the 
definitions that were being attempted in order to capture as much as possible 
the complexity of what corruption was or could be regarded as being. Nye’s 
definition later developed in a condensed form into a widely used template. His 
original statement was that:  
 
Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a 
public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, 
private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the 
exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. 
 
(Nye, 1967) 
 
The most commonly used definitional forms today are: “the abuse of public office 
for private gain” or “the misuse of public office for private gain”. According to 
Transparency International UK, a chapter of “the world's leading non-
governmental anti-corruption organisation” that has “unparalleled global 
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understanding and influence”, corruption per se can be defined as “the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain. It hurts everyone whose life, livelihood or 
happiness depends on the integrity of people in a position of authority” 
(Transparency International, 2010).  
Financial corruption can be regarded as the taking and giving of bribes, that is, 
money. An attempt at a definition could be: ‘Financial corruption: the abuse of 
power, privilege, influence, or legal access, for personal monetary gain’. By 
the mid-1990s the president of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, was able to 
state: “And let's not mince words: we need to deal with the cancer of corruption. 
In country after country, it is the people who are demanding action on this issue. 
They know that corruption diverts resources from the poor to the rich” 
(Wolfensohn, 1996).  
13. A Particular Type of Greed?  
Some texts written in the 1960s might seem gratingly old-fashioned in attitudes, 
approach, and language, but we are including them in its research because the 
investigation is into how ‘something’ that is ‘corrupt behaviour’ may have 
developed at a given time, and thus works expressing and documenting the 
attitudes of those past times are actually necessary for any attempt at an 
analysis. The classic text provoking such a viewpoint would be Ronald Wraith’s 
and Edgar Simpkins’s book Corruption in Developing Countries, published in 
1963. The country they examined was Nigeria, because they lived there, but the 
authors say that it was much the same across Africa: 
In Africa corruption flourishes as luxuriantly as the bush and the 
weeds which it so much resembles, taking the goodness from the soil 
and suffocating the growth of plants which have been carefully, and 
expensively, bred and tended. The forces ranged against it are 
negligible; not negligible in fire or indignation or idealism, but quite 
simply negligible in weight. The calm and balanced attitude, which is 
held by those who live in Britain rather than in new countries 
themselves, is, to say the least, inadequate … the comforting belief 
that given a free hand Africans today will behave like Englishmen a 
century ago. 
(Wraith & Simpkins, 1963, pp. 12-13) 
 53 
   
Wraith and Simpkins describe corruption as a “disease” (1963, p. 12) chiming 
with what Wolfensohn was to call a “cancer” more than thirty years later. David 
Bayley (1966) in ‘The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation’, takes issue 
with Wraith and Simpkins for stipulating that the corrupt man must also feel 
guilt. According to Bayley: “A man may act wrongly even though he is not 
conscious of acting wrongly. His lack of guilt feelings may have a bearing upon 
his guilt in law but surely does not affect society’s definition of what constitutes 
improper or illicit action” (Bayley, 1966, p. 721).  Bayley’s perception that a 
person can act wrongly without being aware of it is, knowingly or unknowingly, 
a psychoanalytic perspective. For Bayley: “The Western observer is faced with an 
uncomfortable choice” in “developing non-Western societies” whose “existing 
moral codes do not agree with Western norms as to what kinds of behaviour by 
public servants should be condemned” (Bayley, 1966, p. 721).  
The corrupt act binds those participating in it in a secretive bond and creates a 
secretive atmosphere. Corrupt acts are therefore acts that must not be known 
about or become known. They are hidden acts carried out by secretive actors. An 
act that they must not bring to the consciousness of others – or, perhaps, even to 
themselves. If asked they must lie about the carrying out of such an act. For the 
secretive act to be brought into public consciousness, brought into reality, the 
corrupt person must be found out. One wonders: Do they lie to themselves, too?  
Today, as more and more people become rich at the same time as more and more 
people remain in or sink into poverty; as the rigidities of the systems enabling 
wealth to be acquired become even more rigid economically and culturally, at 
the same time as they enable flexibilities and opportunities for enrichment, an 
opportune time has arrived to attempt a theoretical modelling of the basic 
psychoanalytic frameworks that are being dealt with when one examines the 
psychoanalytic relations between ‘money’, ‘wealth’, the unconscious, and 
financial corruption. Accordingly, here we reach the principal aim of that we 
have set ourselves in this research study:  to make a serious contribution to the 
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growing body of work concerned with psychoanalysis and ‘money’, ‘wealth’, and 
‘finance’.  
14. Preliminary Conclusions 
What has been learned by the end of this chapter? First, let us reiterate 
what the research study is about: The aim is to investigate occurrences of 
financial corruption in a particular historical period in Africa through the lens of 
psychoanalysis. We are proceeding from two the following assumptions:  firstly, 
that financial corruption involves ‘money’; and, secondly, that financial 
corruption involves often complex conscious and unconscious relations between 
the individual and ‘money’ and the individual and society. Chapter One has taken 
a journey through a landscape of literature that has involved the review of texts 
on psychoanalytic, economic, and philosophical theories on ‘money’ and ‘wealth’, 
and indicative texts on the terrain of corruption in 1960s’ Africa. 
It has become clear that the theoretical work carried out during the classical 
period of psychoanalytic writings deserves a strong focus because the 
conclusions the theorists reached then on ‘money’ and the unconscious have 
remained influential until this day.  But this also gives rise to a major concern: in 
thinking about this writings,  growing doubts have emerged about anality’s 
adequacy as the sole theory of ‘money’ and thus the sole method of analysis with 
regard to ‘money’ that is available psychoanalytically.  
There are strong grounds to support the view that there is something missing 
from the psychoanalytic theoretical work on ‘money’. During the review of the 
literature a hypothesis emerged on what is missing and what can be done about 
that gap began to form itself, but further probing is necessary at this juncture. 
There should be further investigation into the existing psychoanalytic theory of 
‘money’ that is based on anality in order to ascertain the precise grounds for 
concerns about its efficacy and potential for its deployment.  This will form the 
basis for the following two chapters.  
These  follow on from the concerns arising from the groundwork of  Chapter One. 
What have been the main thematic strands that have emerged? First, that there 
seem to bean almost total dependency and focus on Freud’s 1908 hypothesis 
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that links faeces and anality to ‘money’ in the unconscious. There have been only 
a few protests about this equation (Borneman, 1976; Bennett 2012; Fenichel, 
1938), and much ambiguity (Fenichel, 1938). Secondly, conversations were and 
are held in the consulting room that focus on the subject of ‘money’ in a variety 
of ways from, for example, the payment of fees to symbolic displacements and 
affects (e.g. Berger and Newman, 2011; Murdin, 2012). But the question remains, 
as to what extent was the significance of ‘money’ in patients’ accounts of their 
lives during the classical period reflected in the theoretical output of those years. 
What did patients from that time say during their clinical encounters? Further, 
what did the analysts and theorists tell each other in private about ‘money’ and 
what did those private communications reveal about ‘money’ and the 
unconscious? The vital task of Chapters Two and Chapter Three will therefore lie 
in exploring what psychoanalysis tells us about ‘money’ publicly and privately, 
delving into the theoretical formulations on ‘money’ in the former and on  the 
significance of patients’ and analysts’ private accounts in the latter.  
As briefly stated above, as the journey through the literature continued, what 
came into focus was that an absence of some thing, of some notion was beginning 
to insist. The hypothesis that began to take shape was that the absence in the 
writings was orality. Some psychoanalytic papers are starting to align ‘money’ 
with oral-related behaviour in dramatic social transformations such as post-
Communist Russia (Mazin, 2012). But would it not be better to hold back a firm 
conclusion of a missing theoretical key until the terrain of anality and its 
equation with ‘money’ in the unconscious has been determined in greater detail? 
As for financial corruption, we will hold off exploring this area psychoanalytically 
until until we know more fully what is in and what is not in psychoanalysis’s 
theoretical formulations on ‘money’. If there is a key missing, then it has to be 
found or it has to be made, constructed, to enable the unlocking of the door. But 
any such missing key has to be determined from a scrutiny of the existing 
psychoanalytic theoretical texts on ‘money’. Thus we will now proceed to  a 
detailed examination of ‘the anal theory of money’, and Ferenczi (1914) will 
provide the basis from which to start.  
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Chapter Two 
ON THE DELINEATION OF THE ANAL THEORY OF MONEY 
 
This chapter will set out the theories of key psychoanalytic thinkers 
working during the classical period, which engaged with what they saw as at the 
root unconscious cause of neurotic complexes around the question of ‘money’ 
and ‘wealth’. Sándor Ferenczi’s work stands out for providing an initial, 
comprehensive, developmental pathway towards a deeper understanding. His 
writings, read together with those of Freud which were a clear reference and 
starting point for him, will provide the focus for an exploration into how anality 
developed into the central tenet for psychoanalytic theoretical speculations on 
‘money’ and ‘wealth’. Ferenczi’s paper, ‘The Ontogenesis of the Interest in 
Money’ (Ferenczi, 1914), was the first psychoanalytic paper to place ‘money’ 
firmly in its title. It is an attempt to venture into psychoanalytic theoretical 
speculation about how a person develops an interest in money and its psychical 
connections, that is, its direct and indirect symbolization in other objects and 
other meanings, whether consciously or unconsciously.  
In a paper on ‘Symbolism’ that combined work written between 1912 and 1913, 
Ferenczi conducted a general exploration of the constructed nature of symbols 
and their interpretations using as examples his own symbolizing interpretations 
of Sophocles’ Oedipus myth, notably the name Oedipus itself and the potency of 
the king’s self-blinding. He argued that with the compulsion of mankind down 
the centuries to manufacture symbols out of man’s myths and oral storytelling, it 
was important to remember that:  
 
 57 
parallel with the tendency to give expression to psychical contents 
there is also an unconscious aim at bringing to presentation the 
mental ways of functioning that are operative in mastering these 
contents. Only this latter fusion then yields the perfected myth, which 
without foregoing any of its effect on men is transmitted unchanged 
for hundreds of years.  
(Ferenczi, 1912-1913, pp. 266-267) 
 
In his paper on the interest in ‘money’, Ferenczi relies heavily on Freud’s 1908 
paper ‘Character and Anal Erotism’ in order to set out his own arguments, and 
this chapter leaves his citations from Freud where he placed them, as Freud’s 
paper is an important one for the classical psychoanalytic interpretations made 
on the subject of ‘money’. The mental or cultural process of the formation of 
symbolic objects and the infantile developmental stage of anal erotism appear to 
provide the potential twin roots for the connection of the abstract notion of 
‘money’ to the concrete realities of ‘faeces’ and ‘dirt’ in the much-used 
psychoanalytic symbolic equation that connects ‘money’ to faeces. If these are 
the twin sources, it will be important to examine the manner in which such a 
constructed symbolic equation was defended in psychoanalytic terms. What will 
also be considered is whether it also operates in the area of myth, or in idiomatic 
language use.  An important area of enquiry into Ferenczi’s work will centre on 
the putative psychic force of such a symbolic equation. How can faeces, dirt, filth 
– anal-erotically extracted – exist in a symbolic equation, however refined, 
abstracted, displaced, or converted, with something acknowledged as precious, 
treasured, valuable and valued as ‘money’?  
It is necessary to begin with a general enquiry into the way psychoanalytic 
pioneers wrote about the construction of symbols, their use and their 
interpretations.  This enquiry is circumscribed by the material that was available 
to Ferenczi on the topic.  Ferenczi died in 1933 and so could not have read the 
foundational French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (born in 1908) on the 
symbolic nature and structuring of mankind, for example, as his work started 
being published from the late 1940s. But Ferenczi did have on his doorstep, 
literally in Budapest itself, the formidable psychoanalytic ethnologist, Géza 
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Róheim, as both were members of the small close circle of the Hungarian 
psychoanalytical society whose output punched well above its weight. Róheim’s 
prolific work ranged from his early output in the first decades of the twentieth 
century that focused on the customs, folktales and mythologies of Hungary to the 
customs, practices, myths and symbolisms of other countries and races, for 
example in Australia and more generally (for example, Róheim, 1925, 1932, 
1934). In the foreword to an impressive collection of essays by leading 
psychoanalysts in honour of Róheim’s 60th birthday, Sandor Lorand states that 
Róheim “directed the attention of workers in the fields of anthropology and 
sociology to the importance and value to their work of the psychoanalytic 
contribution to the understanding of behaviour and cultural patterns”, and that 
psychoanalysis in turn gained “the reinforcing and enriching findings of 
anthropology, demonstrating their importance to a more effective understanding 
of psychoanalysis. (Wilbur and Muensterberger, 1951, p. xi).   
1. Forming Symbols 
In 1916 Ernest Jones, Ferenczi’s fellow psychoanalytic pioneer, wrote a 
lengthy paper entitled ‘The Theory of Symbolism’ in which he sought to evaluate 
to place of  symbols,  their meanings and differing interpretations in 
psychoanalysis. Symbolic image making, particularly in neurotic dream work and 
dream interpretation, is never far from centre stage in this work but Jones does 
makes a reference to Ferenczi’s earlier paper on symbolism noting the emphasis 
there on the repression of unconscious affects. This is a vital area for any 
discussion on the construction of symbols, and Jones concludes that the general 
theoretical “touchstone”, was that: “Only what is repressed is symbolised; only 
what is repressed needs to be symbolised” (Jones, 1916, p. 116). Jones includes 
an extract (translated by Jones from the original German) of Otto Rank’s and 
Hanns Sachs’ ‘Die Bedeutung der Psychoanalyse für die Geisteswissenschaften’ 
(1913), (‘The Significance of Psychoanalysis for the Human Sciences’), in which 
these two psychoanalysts from the first generation of pioneers set out an 
excellent and comprehensive psychoanalytic definition of the term ‘Symbol’: 
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A final means of expression of repressed material, one which lends 
itself to very general use on account of its especial suitability for 
disguising the unconscious and adapting it (by compromise 
formations) to new contents of consciousness, is the Symbol. By this 
term we understand a special kind of indirect representation which is 
distinguished by certain peculiarities from the simile, metaphor, 
allegory, allusion, and other forms of pictorial presentation of thought 
material (after the manner of a rebus), to all of which it is related. The 
symbol represents an almost ideal union of all these means of 
expression: it is a substitutive, perceptual replacement-expression for 
something hidden, with which it has evident characteristics in 
common or is coupled by internal associative connections. Its essence 
lies in its having two or more meanings, as, indeed, it itself originated 
in a kind of condensation, an amalgamation of individual 
characteristic elements. Its tendency from the conceptual to the 
perceptual indicates its nearness to primitive thought; by this 
relationship symbolisation essentially belongs to the unconscious, 
though, in its function as a compromise, it in no way lacks conscious 
determining factors, which in varying degrees condition both the 
formation of symbols and the understanding for them. 
   (Rank & Sachs, 1913, cited in Jones, 1916, p. 96) 
In a paper entitled ‘Psychoanalysis and the Folk-tale’ published in 1922 in the 
then recently established journal, the International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 
Géza Róheim references Jones’s study as he affirms that: “By symbol we mean a 
substitute for something we are not conscious of, for a repressed unconscious 
concept” (Róheim, 1922, p. 182). Further, in response to a critic on the subject of 
universal symbolism, he states that: 
  
When the analyst has obtained the same solution to the same 
problem on x occasions he will expect to find it again in case x + 1, and 
if the dagger proves to be a substitute for the penis in a hundred 
dreams, it is very likely that it will mean the same in the hundred and 
first. This is what is meant by ‘universal symbols’ 
(Roheim, 1922, p. 182) 
 
But despite Róheim’s confidence in this matter, it is insufficient, as one could 
counter that it might depend on who those 100 people were in the first place: are 
they all the same kind of people, from the same ethnological background, and 
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how important or not would the factor of ethnicity and cultural valuations be for 
the “value of the symbolic interpretation when applied” (Róheim, 1922, p. 182), 
whether for the folk-tale or for the dream? Such questions would have 
consequences for our analysis and complicate notions of symbolic equivalence.  
Jones designated symbols as forms of “indirect figurative representation” (Jones, 
1916, p. 90), but stipulated that “true symbolism” was to be differentiated from 
the plethora of ways of representing something figuratively – for example, the 
use of similes and metaphors – primarily because true symbolism had to 
comprise of not only the characteristics possessed by, say, similes and 
metaphors, but, in addition, be further in possession of specific attributes. 
Primarily, true symbolism had to have the quality of being, of existence, that was 
the unconscious representation of a repressed affect, “and the individual is quite 
unaware of the meaning of the symbol he has employed; indeed, is often 
unaware of the fact that he has employed one at all, since he takes the symbol for 
reality” (Jones, 1916, p. 97). It could be considered that it would not be going too 
far to state that psychoanalysis would be crippled without the associations and 
interpretations that rely heavily on powerful symbols and the ability to 
symbolize. An attempt at a catch-all definition of ‘symbol’, ‘symbolic’, could be: 
‘come to render the meaning of’.  
The primacy of Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) as the standard 
bearer for the initial exploration of symbol usage and interpretations in 
psychoanalytic therapeutic work was unchallenged particularly in the period of 
psychoanalysis that forms the focus of the early chapters on this thesis, and this 
is underlined in Jones’s paper; but Karl Abraham’s clinical work also provides 
very good examples and thinking with regard to interpretations of 
psychoanalytic usages. For an example in that which relates to  an attitude 
towards the concept of having and losing money, here is Abraham in 
‘Manifestations of the Female Castration Complex’ (1920): 
  
This patient, whose libido was very strongly fixated on her father, 
once had a short dream before her marriage, which she related to me 
in very remarkable words. She said that in the dream her father had 
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been run over and had ‘lost some leg or other and his money’. The 
castration idea is here not only expressed by means of the leg but also 
by the money. Being run over is one of the most frequent castration 
symbols.  
 (Abraham, 1920, p. 356) 
 
In an intriguing footnote the translator notes that the German word used by 
Abraham for ‘money’, “Vermögen”, also has the meanings of “capacity” and 
“sexual potency”. This is useful to note for the possibilities of alternative 
interventions and openings in the discussion of the derivation of a symbolizing 
structure for ‘money’ and the resulting potential for alternative views and 
thinking on the possible theoretical consequences for how we understand 
‘money’ and the mind and financial corruption.  
In an example from Abraham’s ‘A Short Study of the Development of the Libido, 
Viewed in the Light of Mental Disorders’ (1924), a patient reveals how his 
unconscious anxiety about the loss of ‘money’ manifests itself during his bouts of 
depression: 
 
This patient told me one day that he had noticed a curious tendency 
that he had during his states of depression. At the beginning of those 
states he used to go about with his head lowered, so that his eyes 
were fixed on the ground rather than on the people about him. He 
would then begin to look with compulsive interest to see whether any 
mother-of-pearl buttons were lying in the street. If he found one he 
would pick it up and put it in his pocket. He rationalized this habit by 
saying that at the beginning of his depression he had such a feeling of 
inferiority that he had to feel glad if he even so much as found a 
button in the street; for he did not know whether he would ever again 
be capable of earning enough money to buy the least thing for 
himself. In the wretched condition he was in, he said, even those 
objects which other people left about must have a considerable value 
for him. 
(Abraham, 1924, pp. 444-445) 
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It is interesting to note that the patient’s state in which he symbolically equates 
‘money’ with buttons involves a connective association, one which Ferenczi 
would theorise in 1914 in his outline of the stages of development for the 
infantile processing of the symbolization of ‘money’. In the above example it is of 
clinical note that such symbolization of “button” for ‘money’ does indeed take 
place. However, it is also interesting to note that it was specifically “mother-of-
pearl” buttons that the patient sought, given the primary role in the infantile 
stages privileged by maternal nurturing and maternal provision. One must also 
mark the fact that mother-of-pearl buttons are expensive. The patient was not 
looking for any old buttons, for these were reminders of his unconscious fear of 
poverty and becoming impoverished; he was looking for buttons that incurred 
expense, ones whose outward appearance revealed that costliness; ones in 
which it was clear that money had already been spent. This is arguably 
evidentially supportive of the proposition that ‘money’ has already been 
symbolized in the patient’s unconscious in some form prior to the search for 
buttons. The question is whether this internal symbolic structuring is the linear 
developmental symbolic structuring, from ‘faeces’ to ‘money’, that Ferenczi, in 
line with classical psychoanalysis, outlines.   
What Ferenczi will be attempting to do in his paper on the interest in money is to 
theoretically structure  the symbolic meanings of an abstract notion – ‘money’. 
And he was going to attempt to construct such a symbolization from the ground 
up: to pull together a symbolic structure for an abstract notion based on 
language, idiom, common notions, and traditional beliefs. In using these tools he 
would be adhering to the formal construction processes of symbol formation.  In 
the following section we will be looking at the manner in which he delineated 
“the development of the money symbol” (Ferenczi, 1914, p. 327), and crucially, 
at the manner in which he negotiated potential – and possibly actual – fault lines.  
2. Embarking on the Road Towards a Psychoanalytic Theory of ‘Money’ 
From the outset Ferenczi implies in his paper that an interest in money 
could possibly be sourced to a combination of inherited and individual 
tendencies, that is, both phylogenetic and ontogenetic, and he notes that 
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psychoanalysis had not yet, at the time of his writing, the means to examine how 
such a combination developed in fusion. “Analysis has still to perform the task of 
separately investigating the phylogenesis and ontogenesis of symbolism, and 
then establishing their mutual relation”. Further: “individual experiences are 
necessary as well as the congenital disposition, these providing the real material 
for the construction of the symbol” (Ferenczi, 1914, pp. 319-320). He sets out his 
stall by posing this question: 
  
I wish here to examine the question of whether, and to what extent, 
individual experience favours the transformation of anal-erotic 
interest into interest in money. 
 (Ferenczi, 1914, p. 320)  
 
But what does he mean by “individual experience” and how is he using the terms 
“anal-erotic” and “transformation”? The discussion begins initially, as is frequent 
in Ferenczi’s work, with reference to Freud: 
 
Every psychoanalyst is familiar with the symbolic meaning of money 
that was discovered by Freud “Wherever the archaic way of thinking 
has prevailed or still prevails, in the old civilisations, in myths, fairy-
tales, superstition, in unconscious thinking, in dreams, and in 
neuroses, money has been brought into the closest connection with 
filth.” 
 (Ferenczi, 1914, p. 320) 
  
Therefore, according to Ferenczi, Freud not only discovered the “symbolic 
meaning of money”, but the creator of psychoanalysis also aligned and 
underlined this symbolic meaning with archaic references in order to highlight 
‘money’’s alleged psychic associations in the human mind with dirt and faeces. 
The symbolic meaning of ‘money’ is thus established at the outset of Ferenczi’s 
paper as being “filth”. The phrase “filthy lucre” meaning ‘money’ is still in usage 
today in English-speaking parts of the world. 
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That quotation from Freud comes from his 1908 paper on character traits of 
anal-erotic organizations. Ferenczi points out that Freud’s linkage of strong anal 
eroticism in infants to the formation of miserly characteristics when adulthood is 
reached is a consequence of the symbolism of the linkage between “filth” and 
‘money’:  
 
As an individual-psychological phenomenon parallel with this fact 
Freud asserts that an intimate association exists between the strongly 
marked erogenicity of the anal zone in childhood and the character 
trait of miserliness that develops later. …  
In the case of persons who later on were especially tidy, economical, 
and obstinate, one learns from the analytic investigation of their early 
childhood that they were of that class of infants “who refuse to empty 
the bowel because they obtain an accessory pleasure from 
defaecation”, who even in the later years of childhood “enjoyed 
holding back the stools”, and who recall “having occupied themselves 
in their childhood in all sorts of unseemly ways with the evacuated 
material.” “The most extensive connections seem to be those existing 
between the apparently so disparate complexes of defaecation and 
interest in money.”  
 (Ferenczi, 1914, pp. 320-321) 
 
But  surely the question remains as to why is there such a linkage, supposedly 
both consciously and unconsciously, between ‘money’ and ‘filth’, ‘dirt’, ‘faeces’. 
This may have required expanding the field of enquiry into the world of the 
philosophers, economists, novelists, and theologians. But Freud does not venture 
in the direction of the non-psychoanalytical social world, as, in typically 
persuasive fashion, he writes, as cited by Ferenczi, this:  
 
Observation of the behaviour of children and analytic investigation of 
neurotics allow us now to establish some single points on the line 
along which the idea of the most valuable thing that a man possesses 
(money) is developed in the individual into a symbol “of the most 
worthless thing, which a man casts aside as dejecta.” 
(Ferenczi, 1914, p. 321) 
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One cannot but note Freud’s categorical statement that money is “the most 
valuable thing that a man possesses”. Ferenczi goes on to state that:  
 
children originally devote their interest without any inhibition to the 
process of defaecation, and [that] it affords them pleasure to hold 
back their stools. The excrementa thus held back are really the first 
“savings” of the growing being, and as such remain in a constant, 
unconscious inter-relationship with every bodily activity or mental 
striving that has anything to do with collecting, hoarding, and saving. 
(Ferenczi, 1914, p. 321)   
 
Thus the first staging post has been reached on the road to constructing a 
symbolic equation that links psychically the “most valuable thing” with “the most 
worthless thing”. But what still remains to be understood is the general process 
that takes place in the manufacture of a symbolic object, and the reason and 
manner in which we use our bodies in this process.  
 
3. Symbolizing the Desired Object or Idea 
The projection of the body, body organs, and bodily functions onto 
desired objects as a means of symbol formation is a common feature of 
psychoanalytic case histories. What is observable is the symbolizing of the 
desired object by the patient’s use of the mechanism of projecting body organs 
onto that desired object. In other words, equating – that is, linking in measurable 
amounts, strongly to weakly – a particular body part with a particular object of 
desire, and creating a symbolic equation as a result of that process. But the 
question is: why is this done? Why is such a mechanism triggered? What would 
be the benefit to the mind in accessing, or trying to access, that desired object by 
utilizing such a method? Ferenczi attempts to answer this quandary in his paper 
on ‘Symbolism’ (written over two years):  
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The symbolic identification of external objects with bodily organs 
makes it possible to find again, on the one hand, all the wished-for 
objects of the world in the individual’s body, on the other hand, the 
treasured organs of the individual’s body in objects conceived in an 
animistic manner. 
(Ferenczi, 1912-1913, p. 275)  
 
This is a crucial point, as Ferenczi’s highly plausible argument is that symbolism 
is rooted in the need to believe that infantile wishes are being fulfilled. Ferenczi 
puts forward in his paper ‘Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality’ 
(1913) that the need to symbolize emerges out of the infant’s passage through a 
series of developmental stages that begin in infancy with omnipotent desire that 
must have satisfaction and is ignorant of (or deliberately ignores) reality, to the 
developmental stage where forced realization of an outer world of reality dawns. 
This is an outer reality that is able to deny satisfaction of desires and thus 
curtails omnipotence without completely restricting the agency of the child’s 
ego. In making this argument Ferenczi reinforces the animistic nature of such 
pathways and processes:    
 
Everything points to the conclusion that the child passes through an 
animistic period in the apprehension of reality, in which every object 
appears to him to be endowed with life, and in which he seeks to find 
again in every object his own organs and their activities. 
(Ferenczi, 1913, p. 227) 
 
And, it could be added, to invest psychically in those other objects the strength of 
feeling, repressed or unrepressed, conscious or unconscious, towards his or her 
own body organs or bodily functions. Infantile desire has to be at least addressed 
in some manner, even if that manner is to repress such wishes – particularly 
those concerned with sexuality and sexual arousals – or to displace the energies 
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excited onto other objects or other much safer, less obviously psychically 
exciting and sexually charged parts of the body.  
 
I imagine that this symbolic equating of genital organs with other 
organs and with external objects originally happens only in a playful 
way, out of exuberance, so to speak. The equations thus arising, 
however, are secondarily made to serve repression, which seeks to 
weaken one member of the equation, while it symbolically over-
emphasizes the other, more harmless one by the amount of the 
repressed affect. In this way the upper half of the body, as the more 
harmless one, attains its sexual – symbolic significance, and so comes 
about what Freud calls “Displacement from below upwards”. 
(Ferenczi, 1912-1913, p. 275)  
 
An example of how a modern symbolizing interpretation of an erogenous zone 
can emerge out of ancient mythologies is provided by Ferenczi in his note 
entitled ‘On the Symbolism of the Head of the Medusa’, written in 1923, about 
the mythological figure’s terrifying head. According to the Greek myth:  
 
Perseus roamed throughout the world and performed marvels, of 
which the most famous was the slaying of the snake-haired monster 
Medusa, one of the three Gorgons. Her hair had been beautiful once, 
but she had been ravished by Neptune – in the temple of Minerva 
who, in punishment, turned Medusa’s locks into snakes. Guided to 
the Gorgon by the aged daughters of Phorcys – who shared one eye 
between them – Perseus passed through lands filled with the rigid 
shapes of animals and men, who had looked upon Medusa’s face and 
been turned to stone. Perseus, on the other hand, gazed at her only in 
the reflection of his bronze shield, and this enabled him to overcome 
and slay her. He cut off her head 
(Grant, 1962, p. 346) 
 
Ferenczi’s commentary on this myth provides a good example of the 
developmental pathway and relationship between a mythic story and the 
potential for a symbolizing interpretation hundreds of years later. He also 
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references again Freud’s point about the displacement of charged, sexualized, 
psychic energy from its focus on the lower half of the body: 
 
The analysis of dreams and associations have repeatedly brought me 
to interpret the head of the Medusa as the terrible symbol of the 
female genital region, the details of which are displaced ‘from below 
upwards’. The many serpents which surround the head might, 
according to representation by the opposite, signify the absence of 
penis, and horror itself is the repetition of the frightful impression 
made on the child by the sighting of the genital organs deprived of a 
penis (castrated). The fearful and alarming starting eyes of the 
Medusa’s head have also the secondary meaning of erection. 
(Ferenczi, 1923, p. 219) 
4. Symbolizing in General  
Can a person symbolize a feeling, an emotion (particularly if one is trying to 
repress such a feeling or emotion)? Can one symbolize an action, an idea, a 
colour? Ferenczi explained that symbolization takes place in order for the belief 
to take hold that wishes are being sated, that we are satisfied – even if that is not 
the case in reality. For Ferenczi it appears that bodies are used to help in the 
process of symbolization because our bodies are ourselves: we have unique 
access to them. Effort is put into the usage of bodies or body parts – and the 
manipulation of the strength of feeling about them – in order to pretend that 
access has been gained to some thing or some object through the mechanism of 
the creation of a symbolic equation. In reality there is no direct access to that 
thing or object, but one can represent, associate, or project that which is 
symbolized onto some other thing or object. However, thinking or fantasizing 
symbolically, using symbolic equations – particularly when this is done 
unconsciously (with the free flowing tools of the unconscious such as 
condensation, displacement, reversal) – does not necessarily have to make use 
psychically of the body or body parts. Ferenczi notes that: 
  
There can be no doubt that the child (like the unconscious) identifies 
two things on the basis of the slightest resemblance, displaces affects 
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with ease from one to the other, and gives the same name to both. 
Such a name is thus the highly condensed representative of a large 
number of fundamentally different individual things, which, however, 
are in some way or other (even if ever so distantly) similar and are for 
this reason identified. Advance in the knowledge of reality 
(intelligence) then manifests itself in the child in the progressive 
resolution of such condensation-products into their elements, in 
learning to distinguish from one another things that are similar in one 
respect but otherwise different. 
(Ferenczi, 1912-1913, pp. 276-277) 
Further, Ferenczi rules out the theoretical possibility that entities such 
metaphors and allegories to be given the psychoanalytic weight of being termed 
and treated as if they were symbols. Ferenczi makes the highly important 
observation that to be a symbol something unknown and, in a sense, unwise and 
irrational and out of place, must be felt in the unconscious with regard to, that is, 
in relation to, in an equation with, something else that manifests as an object, an 
idea, a representation. 
 
similes, allegories, metaphors, allusions, parables, emblems, and 
indirect representations of every sort might also in a certain sense be 
conceived as products of this lack of sharpness in distinction and 
definition, and yet they are not – in the psychoanalytical sense – 
symbols. Only such things (or ideas) are symbols in the sense of 
psychoanalysis as are invested in consciousness with a logically 
inexplicable and unfounded affect, and of which it may be analytically 
established that they owe this affective over-emphasis to unconscious 
identification with another thing (or idea), to which the surplus of 
affect really belongs. Not all similes, therefore, are symbols, but only 
those in which the one member of the equation is repressed into the 
unconscious. 
(Ferenczi, 1912-1913, pp. 277-278) 
 
The strength of the affect aroused by the symbol is equal to the strength of the 
energy required to repress what has been repressed, that is, what is unconscious, 
which the symbol is replacing in consciousness. It is clear that there has to be 
what can be regarded as a symbolizing moment, or series of moments, that is, a 
series of symbolizing events – what Ferenczi calls “cultural education” (Ferenczi, 
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1912-1913, p. 280) – during which the ‘equation’ is struck for the first time (or 
incrementally) and placed, repressed, into the unconscious accompanied by the 
strength of the affect, or its potential strength 
We have reached a key point in our exploration of these early psychoanalytic 
theorisations of the symbolic equations at work around the question of ‘money’.  
A series of questions insist: How does the child or, indeed, the adult, transform 
such a chain of connections between dirt and the process of becoming clean, and 
transfer them symbolically to an inanimate object, an abstract conception, such 
as ‘money’? And when does the symbolizing, transferable, moment occur when 
the child forms the symbolic equation in his mind that another object – in this 
instance ‘money’ – is related to ‘dirt’ or becomes ‘dirt’? Is it a single symbolizing 
moment, or is it an accumulation over a period of time of such transferable, 
symbolizing moments during which the equating symbolic attachments are 
cathected to an object? What determines such processing in the mind: psychic 
infantile development or “cultural education”? These problematics are at the 
core of this study’s criticisms of Ferenczi’s theoretical work on “the interest in 
money” and of the anal theory of money generally. 
5. Symbolizing ‘Money’  
Let us return to the first staging post, that first direct linkage between 
‘money’ and financial affairs and acts of behaviour that involve attitudes towards 
faeces. It warrants repeating:  
children originally devote their interest without any inhibition to the 
process of defaecation, and [that] it affords them pleasure to hold 
back their stools. The excrementa thus held back are really the first 
“savings” of the growing being, and as such remain in a constant, 
unconscious inter-relationship with every bodily activity or mental 
striving that has anything to do with collecting, hoarding, and saving. 
(Ferenczi, 1914, p. 321) 
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Via a process of introjection, that is, a process of internalization, the faeces 
become a “sort of object-love” for the child (Ferenczi, 1914, p. 321), but one that 
he is severely reprimanded over for playing with, and he turns to substitutes:  
 
As the child’s sense of cleanliness increases – with the help of 
paedagogic measures – street-mud also becomes objectionable to 
him. Substances which on account of their stickiness, moistures, and 
colour are apt to leave traces on the body and clothing become 
despised and avoided as “dirty things”. The symbol of filth must 
therefore undergo a further distortion, a dehydration. The child turns 
its interest to sand, a substance which, while the colour of earth, is 
cleaner and dry. The instinctive joy of children in gathering up, 
massing together, and shaping sand is subsequently rationalised and 
sanctioned by the adults, whom it suits to see an otherwise unruly 
child playing with sand for hours, - and they declare this playing to be 
“healthy”, i.e. hygienic. None the less this play-sand also is nothing 
other than a copro-symbol – deodorised and dehydrated filth. 
(Ferenczi, 1914, pp. 322-323) 
 
Here, “filth” has been introduced as a symbol, according to Ferenczi. But a 
symbol for what? How can “filth” become other than what it directly represents, 
that is, “dirty things”? When a child is told that something is “filthy” or “dirty”, it 
is normally in association with the child himself having to be cleansed of 
whatever it is that has made him appear dirty to his parent or carer; and the 
child will note, or be led to note, that such and such is “dirty” in that it leaves 
marks or stains and produces “things” either on him or his clothes or in his 
surroundings that have to be cleaned.  
As has already been elaborated in this chapter, for psychoanalysis a symbol has 
to be in a relation with a ‘thing’. So far this has not yet happened in Ferenczi’s 
account. In the child’s mind “dirt” is still in relation to itself as “dirt”, in other 
words, ‘dirt is dirty’. Perhaps the child can extend the relation to him or her self 
personally, as in “I am dirty”, because if ‘dirt is dirty’, and he is being told that he 
is “dirty” because he has got ‘dirt’ on him, the child can probably deduce that this 
could mean that he is ‘dirty’, too, because of the dirt on him from faeces or mud 
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or other dirty playthings that he is being reprimanded (frequently) about. 
Continuing with Ferenczi’s delineation we find that: 
 
Progress in the sense of cleanliness then gradually makes even sand 
unacceptable to the child, and the infantile stone age begins: the 
collecting of pebbles, as prettily shaped and coloured as possible, in 
which a higher stage in the development of replacement-formation is 
attained. The attributes of evil odour, moisture, and softness are 
represented by those of absence of odour, dryness, and now also 
hardness. We are reminded of the real origin of this hobby by the 
circumstance that stones – just as mud and sand – are gathered and 
collected from the earth. The capitalistic significance of stones is 
already quite considerable. (Children are “stone-rich” in the narrow 
sense of the word.) 
(Ferenczi, 1914, pp. 325-326) 
 
Ferenczi has determined that the symbolic equation that connects ‘faeces-filth’ to 
‘money’ comes into existence through a placement on the infantile 
developmental path from faeces to small, solid objects that is explored and 
exploited by the small, growing child. Then: 
 
After stones comes the turn of artificial products, and with these the 
detachment of the interest from the earth is complete. Glass marbles, 
buttons, fruit pips, are eagerly collected – this time no longer only for 
the sake of their intrinsic value, but as measures of value, so to speak 
as primitive coins, converting the previous barter exchange of 
children into an enthusiastic money exchange. The character of 
capitalism, however, not purely practical and utilitarian, but libidinous 
and irrational, is betrayed in this stage also: the child decidedly enjoys 
the collecting in itself.  
(Ferenczi, 1914, p. 326) 
 
Thus Ferenczi has determined further that the child makes himself into a 
“character of capitalism”, but is this correct? Ferenczi has provided a series of 
transferable symbolizing moments along the infantile developmental path: from 
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playing with faeces (dirt), to playing with mud and sand (dirt), and then the 
momentous symbolic displacements of the collecting of stones. There is then the 
even further refined abstraction of the bartering of “artificial products” like 
marbles. The climax is approached with the conversion of earlier bartering 
practices into the trading of these “artificial objects” and the using of them as 
“measures of value” in an “enthusiastic money exchange”. Ferenczi provides the 
empirical evidence of idiom (“stone rich”) together with the observation about 
bartering (the trading of marbles and cards was certainly carried out 
“enthusiastically” in school playgrounds). All these ‘things’ – sand, stones, 
marbles, etc. – would be what Ferenczi would describe as coprophilic objects and 
copro-symbols in the anal theory of money. This mechanism of conversion into 
copro-symbols provides the underpinning of the connection of ‘money’ with 
faeces. 
Finally, Ferenczi takes the climatic “one more step” of making “the identification 
of faeces with gold” (Ferenczi, 1914, p. 326):  
 
Soon even stones begin to wound the child’s feeling of cleanliness – 
he longs for something purer – and this is offered to him in the 
shining pieces of money 
(Ferenczi, 1914, pp. 326-327) 
 
The climax has been reached. But, it is ultimately not one that satisfies, since as 
we will go on to explain, there is much that remains unpersuasive in Ferenczi’s 
(following Freud’s) line of argumentation. In effect, Ferenczi’s final step, the 
climatic identification with gold, is not a “step” but rather can be seen as an  
imaginative leap. And although psychoanalysis attends to and concerns itself 
with the imagination in its multiple structurings and forms and can defend its 
right to make leaps of the imagination, surely, for example, the stones’ “wound” 
to the child’s “feeling of cleanliness” is speculation and should be characterized 
as such. Even Freud himself admitted to “often far-fetched speculation, which the 
reader will consider or dismiss according to his individual predilection” (Freud, 
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1920, p. 24), as he worked out his ideas. Is this a “wound” of castration or a 
narcissistic injury? If it is supposed to be castration, is Ferenczi suggesting that 
some form of castration has taken place caused by the child’s proximity to dirt 
and faeces? This is an intriguing and potentially important consideration but it is 
not explored. However, this chapter has been devoted to a careful consideration 
of the symbolic relation between anality and a psychoanalytic theory of money 
because the far more serious disappointment with the anal theory of money that 
we find ourselves faced with now, lies in its failing to fulfil its own stated and 
necessary remit of being truly unconscious.  
6. Conclusion: Failing the Requirement of a Symbolic Equation. 
An object is awarded its symbolic rendering as a representational value 
object consciously or unconsciously in place of some other thing or meaning. 
What is being argued in this study is that the accumulated representations or 
accumulated meanings attached to a particular object can often lead to that 
object symbolizing whatever we want it to symbolize. It is still an assumption 
only that the anally erotized developmental lineage outlined above by Ferenczi 
provides the connective symbolic equation upon which the hypothesis that 
‘money’ equals faeces-filth-dirt can be founded upon. Objects such as stones and 
marbles and buttons may well be copro-symbols, but that does not mean that the 
child also has a spontaneous, simultaneously unconscious psychic comprehension 
of them as a monetary means of value or exchange. Surely such a situation would 
have to be in existence for any such symbolic equation linking ‘money’ with 
faeces to be warranted. Ferenczi himself, as already cited, stipulated the need for 
an unconscious affect. He stated crucially that the only symbols were those in 
which in consciousness there was: “a logically inexplicable and unfounded affect, 
and of which it may be analytically established that they owe this affective over-
emphasis to unconscious identification with another thing (or idea), to which the 
surplus of affect really belongs” (Ferenczi, 1912-1913, pp. 277). Again, the point 
has to be raised that surely this has to be a unilateral action on the part of the 
child? 
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The argument being made is that Ferenczi’s explanation of ‘the anal theory of 
money’, as detailed as it is, does not appear to provide satisfactory reasons for 
the upholding of the general psychoanalytic assumption that ‘money equals 
faeces-filth’ is the symbolic equation. The question has to be this: Do children 
spontaneously, untutored, provide themselves, consciously or unconsciously, with 
the notions of monetary value and monetary exchange? If ‘money’ is regarded as 
filth or dirt or as faeces, that could be for reasons other than those of an infantile 
trajectory that follows the child’s curiosity from faeces to small objects like 
stones and marbles that have themselves become marked in some way or other 
with monetary value. The child would have no way of knowing that such small 
objects had or could have any such monetary value, and could not therefore 
assign any such symbolizing value or symbolic equation to the stones. Surely any 
“money exchange” that takes place in childhood tends to be an activity engaged 
upon by older children. In other words, children who have already been 
culturally rendered by adults into such knowledge about the role and place of 
‘money’ in obtaining “things”. Children who have been taught the value of 
‘money’ and that “things” have to be paid for. There is the parental rhetoric of: 
“Don’t you know how much that cost?”, “We shall have to save for that”, “If you’re 
good, I’ll buy you this as a present”, etc. In other words, any such symbolic 
equation is a secondary one, moreover, one which is highly dependent on social 
and environmental influences. As such, as has been argued, it would fail the 
requirement of standing as a true symbolic equation in the terms outlined earlier 
in this chapter.  
 Ferenczi himself inadvertently provides support for this argument when 
discussing going coins in the hands of a child:  
 
the high appreciation of which is naturally also in part due to the 
respect in which they are held by adults as well as to the seductive 
possibilities of obtaining through them everything that the child’s 
heart can desire. 
(Ferenczi, 1914, p. 327) 
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One could argue that adults seduce children into the knowledge of the monetary 
value and usage of ‘money’ and of its status as “precious”. And hence, as a result, it 
is adults who produce the desire in children for ‘money’. This could be regarded as 
a process of seduction into what is regarded as necessary and vital cultural, 
societal, and economic knowledge. The child is tutored into knowledge and “high 
appreciation” of ‘money’, gold, and their values and usages. The child is given by 
the adult something called ‘money’: “offered to him in the shining pieces” 
(Ferenczi, 1914, p. 327), and then to all intents and purposes mimics his attitude 
to these shiny pieces based on direct copying or adaptations of the attitudes and 
behaviour of the adults towards the very same money-objects that he has been 
given. The child has no prior knowledge of what he can obtain with these things 
called ‘money’ – “seductive possibilities” or otherwise, desirable or not – until he 
sees how adults obtain their desires with ‘money’, or speak about obtaining their 
desires with it. Again, Ferenczi provides support for this view when he 
acknowledges that the child has no initial knowledge of the potential practical, 
economic power of ‘money’: 
 
Originally, however, it is not these purely practical considerations that 
are operative, enjoyment in the playful collecting, heaping up, and 
gazing at the shining metal pieces being the chief thing, so that they 
are treasured even less for their economic value than for their own 
sake as pleasure-giving objects. 
(Ferenczi, 1914, p. 327) 
 
What is a consistent observation in the activities of small children in places 
where ‘money’ is exchanged for goods (for example in supermarkets) and where 
they see their parents handing over some ‘thing’ in return for goods, is this 
contradiction: when they see something that they want, they reach out their 
hand to take it, as if it were free of any cost or exchange value. This is an amusing 
sight to observe in shops with layouts that are easily accessible to pushchairs. 
Indeed, in Melanie Klein’s powerful opening salvo, her first paper published in 
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the International Journal of Psychoanalysis entitled ‘The Development of a Child’, 
the following point is made about the paper’s subject, “Fritz”, at the age of four: 
 
Although he was often taken shopping, it seemed (from his questions) 
rather incomprehensible to him that one should not get things as a 
present from people who had a number of them, and it was very 
difficult to make him understand that things had to be paid for, and at 
various rates according to their value. 
(Klein, 1923, pp. 420-421) 
 
“Fritz” has a perspective that is an important illustration from nearly one 
hundred years ago (Klein first presented this paper in 1919) of children’s 
attitudes that continue to be observed today in settings that bear no resemblance 
in any shape or form to early 20th century Berlin. “Fritz” is described as being for 
his age “normal” but a little slower in “mental development” than other children 
(Klein, 1923, p. 420). And although Klein sounds disapproving that he found it 
“very difficult” to understand that “things had to be paid for” – “Fritz” had to be 
made to understand this concept – this implies that other children perhaps had 
less of a difficult difficulty, but that nevertheless it was a problem pertaining to  
children and childhood that had to be tackled by the adults. ‘Money’ and ‘paying 
for things’ were concepts, ways of behaving, and of social attitudes that had to be 
taught.  
It would seem, therefore, that ‘the anal theory of money’, although excellently 
delineated by Ferenczi, can be argued to be wanting in its hypothesis that claims 
a historically, socially, and culturally viable lineage for the symbolic equating of 
‘money’ with faeces, dirt, filth that is unconscious and not the result of cultural 
education. It can be disputed that a symbolic equation has been adequately 
established in the anal theory of ‘money’ that fulfils its basic requirement of 
being unconsciously rendered. The challenge can be made that it is one thing to 
connect certain types of behaviour in adulthood to psychical fixations and 
developmental stages during infancy; it is another thing to make a claim for a 
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symbolic equation that has difficulty establishing its symbolic status, that is not 
truly unconscious.   
It has become necessary to look towards other psychoanalytic alternatives for an 
unconsciously derived symbolic equation that could allow other meanings and the 
possibilities of other outcomes for the ways in which relations with ‘money’ are 
considered. We will proceed by investigating the following central proposition: 
What possibilities would result if the situation was turned the other way around,  
from below upwards, from bottom to top, and instead of anality we considered 
orality? We will turn to this in Chapter Four.  
But, prior to setting off on that journey towards an alternative explanation for 
the roles that ‘money’ and ‘wealth’ might play in the unconscious, let us pause for 
a moment to consider more fully the other dominant theme that emerged from 
the psychoanalytic literature explored in Chapter One: the narratives and 
accounts that were presented to the psychoanalysts within the analytic setting 
and their own private personal communications with each other. Was the 
question of orality or the oral developmental stage considered there in relation to 
‘money’? Perhaps the question of orality was raised and considered but not 
expanded upon or explored theoretically in publications. 
With the examination of these personal accounts in Chapter Three, both sides of 
the story – theoretical and clinical – would have been explored. This will enable a 
properly considered weighing up of the requirement for an elaboration of an 
alternative explanation for the relationship between ‘money’ and the 
unconscious. Focusing again on Ferenczi’s work, let us now turn to the subject 
matter of what patients actually revealed to the analysts in the consulting room 
about the importance or not of ‘money’ in their lives and in their psyches. 
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Chapter Three 
THE COMPLEXITIES OF ‘MONEY’ IN 
THE CONSULTING ROOM 
 
It seems appropriate to begin a discussion of the narratives and themes 
that emerge from the stories told by patients to psychoanalysts concerning 
‘money’, with Freud’s view about the status of this material: 
 
An analyst does not dispute that money is to be regarded in the first 
instance as a medium for self-preservation and for obtaining power; 
but he maintains that, besides this, powerful sexual factors are 
involved in the value set upon it. He can point out that money matters 
are treated by civilized people in the same way as sexual matters – 
with the same inconsistency, prudishness and hypocrisy. 
(Freud, 1913, p. 131) 
 
Although Freud began his discourse on financial affairs in ‘On Beginning the 
Treatment’ (1913) with the emphases on ‘money’ and its “self-preservation” role, 
its “obtaining power” role, and the “powerful sexual factors” associated to it, the 
points are made as asides, despite their importance. He does not proceed to 
discuss these points at any length, albeit they are critical to an understanding of 
the societal and cultural impacts of ‘money’ and ‘wealth’ on people generally, 
whether those people are patients in analysis or not. The main component of his 
advice to fellow psychoanalysts regarding ‘money’ focuses upon the payment of 
their fees and the potential pitfalls of dealing with patients with regard to that. 
Arguably, as his paper is one in a series of papers on technique, Freud might 
have felt that this was not the right place to delve further into the symbolic or 
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theoretical meanings of ‘money’ for patients, or to enquire into how those 
meanings might emerge in the clinical encounter, consciously or in the 
unconscious. However, apart from his two papers that specifically relate ‘money’ 
to anal erotism, (Freud 1908, 1917), Freud does not devote any papers in 
subsequent years to the areas of self-preservation or sexual power or power 
relations in conjunction with ‘money’. And, as shall be seen in this chapter, even 
when ‘money’ is referred to within the copious correspondences with other 
psychoanalysts, the main theorists on the subject of  ‘money’ are usually writing 
with a concern about the maintenance of a certain level of income and standard 
of living. As analysts they did not dispute the vital importance of ‘money’; but a 
criticism can also be added that as analysts they did not reflect such an 
importance in their theoretical outputs.  
For Freud, ‘money’ in the consulting room was to be dealt with on two fronts: 
first, the priority was the consideration of what was described as a “regulating 
effect” in the psychoanalyst’s dealings with his patients, that is, the enforcing of a 
practical, balanced, unemotional attitude – not predicated on gratitude as a 
result of free consultations – via the mechanism of having to pay the analyst for 
his time whether the hour was used or not. Second, there was to be frankness 
generally on the subject of financial payments. In ‘On Beginning the Treatment’ 
Freud makes it clear that the material existence of the psychoanalyst should on 
no account come under threat from events such as patients not being charged a 
high enough fee, from patients receiving free treatment, or by patients not 
making regular settlements of their bills. Psychoanalysts should not “sacrifice” 
their “living” with such practices. (Freud, 1913, pp. 131-133).  
From today’s perspectives, it is fascinating to realize the thoroughness of Freud’s 
assessment of the pitfalls that the problematic area of patients’ fees might entail. 
In contemporary psychoanalytic papers on the subject of ‘money’ and 
psychoanalysis, the majority appear to accept uncritically the status quo that 
privileges anality with regard to the theoretical development of the meaning of 
‘money’ (e.g. Christopoulos, 2014; Dimen, 1994; Morante, 2010; Myers, 2008). 
Dimen’s paper, ‘Money, love and hate: Contradiction and paradox in 
psychoanalysis’ is a good example of this. However, she does make the very valid 
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point, that Freud’s statements on ‘money’ in ‘On Beginning the Treatment’ were 
made only five years after his 1908 paper on anal erotism, and therefore that his  
perspective is  “only partially theorized ”. Furthermore, she states that “his ideas 
on the psychosexuality of money, which predate his instructions about its 
handling in the clinical setting, in essence constitutes the sole intellectual frame 
for his practical considerations “(Dimen, 1994, pp. 71-72). But Dimen is not in 
search of an alternative to anality but for a broader perspective that would bring 
in and involve approaches such as critical theory, anthropology, and a Marxist 
analysis of class and alienation. Hers is an interesting perspective within the 
framework of what she describes as “the spirit of the Marx-Freud tradition … but 
adding a postmodern perspective ” (Dimen, 1994, p. 71). 
Christopoulos (2014) takes up the dilemma of what happens when the patient 
suddenly says that he can no longer afford to pay either the same fee or any fee 
at all as a result of the impact on his personal financial situation caused by 
general economic circumstances, a dilemma that Dimen (1994) had asked 
analysts to address, unrepress, and to admit to as a source of anxiety. 
Christopoulos’s area of examination is “the current global socio-economic crisis” 
(Christopoulos, 2014, p. 1134), the continuing economic downturns and 
austerity-ridden circumstances existing in several countries as a result of the 
financial crashes of 2008. The problem of the payment of the fee rears its head 
unequivocally in such circumstances and Christopoulos explores this through 
several patients in her Greek practice. “The moment when the patient says that 
he cannot, or when it becomes otherwise evident that he cannot pay the agreed 
fee as a result of financial loss due to the crisis, catalyses a crisis in the analysis” 
(Christopoulos, 2014, p. 1136).  There is agreement with Dimen’s point that 
bringing the issue of ‘money’ into the setting of the consulting room, that is, a 
bringing in of external realities, can lead, in fact, to a deeper understanding of the 
complex, internal, interpersonal dynamics taking place within the analytic dyad. 
Christopoulos’s argument is that any economic crisis is very likely to have an 
impact on the analyst as well as the patient, leading to the analyst’s own 
conflictual internal and external realities. She states that: 
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Because there may be pressure from the patient to make a decision 
immediately as he feels he does not have funds, the analyst’s 
maintenance of the analytic stance – creating an analytic space by 
giving time to investigate and work through the issue – may 
essentially mean that the analyst will not get paid for that time, and 
by several patients, constituting a significant loss of income. The 
analyst’s self-preservation is thus immediately in conflict with his 
analytic stance and function, to care for his patient in the best 
possible way. 
 
(Christopoulos, 2014, p. 1137)  
 
 
But how should the analyst react? Should there be a practical, open, discussion 
about a bill not being paid, or should the patient’s personal financial difficulties 
be worked through in sessions through a process of analytical enquiry? 
Christopoulos’s position is that the latter would seem preferable and amenable 
to both parties. But the question arises that there might be the lingering 
suspicion that whatever the outcome of the working through, the analyst would 
like to be paid or otherwise sessions have to be discontinued. No income would 
be coming in and the Freudian advice rings loudly that analysts should not 
“sacrifice” themselves by not having any ‘money’. This critical theme is 
addressed by Christopoulos directly as she reveals her own “internal reaction to 
this, which in the main was an intense anger at the state of affairs in the world, 
followed by an intensification of investment in my work” (Christopoulos, 2014, p. 
1149). Thus it is clear that one hundred years ago Freud was writing about 
issues about the fee that today still dominate the patient-psychoanalyst 
discourse on ‘money’ in the clinical encounter, with satisfactory solutions and 
outcomes still apparently out of reach in many instances from the point of view 
of both analyst and patient. Of course, questions pertaining to transference and 
countertransference are also valuable to consider, linked as they are to the as yet 
barely theorised area of power-relations with respect to money within the 
classical texts.  
In Freud’s opinion underlying all this was his patients’ “false shame” derived 
from their middle class status (Freud, 1913, p. 131): their own inhibiting factors 
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imposed by class and social conditioning that prevented the free discussion of 
‘money’ as money during the consulting room encounter. The middle classes 
were those from central Europe’s bourgeois citizens who could afford to be 
treated by analysis, and Freud points out that: 
As far as the middle classes are concerned, the expense involved in 
psychoanalysis is excessive only in appearance. Quite apart from the 
fact that no comparison is possible between restored health and 
efficiency on the one hand and a moderate financial outlay on the 
other, when we add up the unceasing costs of nursing homes and 
medical treatment and contrast them with the increase of efficiency 
and earning capacity which results from a successfully completed 
analysis, we are entitled to say that the patients have made a good 
bargain. Nothing in life is so expensive as illness – and stupidity. 
(Freud, 1913, p. 133) 
1. Is ‘Money’ Nodal? 
 It is important to ask just how important was was ‘money’ to the first 
generation of psychoanalytic theorists and whether it was a major concern in 
their daily lives.  Although middle class and bourgeois like the majority of their 
patients, the pioneering psychoanalysts revealed no equivalent shame or 
inhibitions about discussing ‘money’ as a material concern in their private 
correspondences. In their letters they are clear that it is important to earn 
enough ‘money’ to satisfy the necessity of maintaining the standard of living that 
they desired as members of a particular social class. But this psychoanalytic 
generation also had a social conscious and established low fee-paying or free 
‘polyclinics’ in Vienna, Budapest, and Berlin (Fisher, 2007; Danto, 2005; Diercks, 
2002). Also revealed in the letters of the theorists are the impacts of loss or gain 
of ‘money’ upon their psyches, health, and sense of well-being. This is 
particularly notable in the early years of their correspondences and this 
significance can probably be attributed to the contextual background of their 
having to establish their psychoanalytic professional practices, revealing how 
they had to juggle with the resulting personal financial outcomes and anxieties. 
These personal factors are distinctive in being in sharp contrast to their neglect 
of a theoretical discussion of the same areas in their published work. In the 
following extract, for example, having spent Christmas with the Freud family in 
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Vienna, Ferenczi writes to Freud from Budapest at the beginning of January 1909 
to say that: 
 
After the beautiful days in Vienna it was difficult to resume work. To 
be sure, I am presently at an extremely low ebb; the month of 
December was fateful. I lost – all too soon – three patients. At the 
moment I have only two, and they are at “reduced rates”. But I am 
not depressed. I know it will come. 
(Freud & Ferenczi, 1993, p. 32) 
 
A clear linkage emerges from this statement between poor finances and poor 
spirits: that is, an impact on psychic well-being. But does Ferenczi want to make 
this linkage or admit that he, whether consciously or unconsciously has 
succumbed to or even been gripped by it? This is unclear. He does not want to 
admit to being “depressed” due to the impact of the loss of patients’ fees, but it is 
striking that he uses the term “depressed” given the psychoanalytic implications, 
for example, low libido. Further, to state that “I am not depressed” is tantamount 
to accepting that a certain situation can depress you. But what Ferenczi does 
allow is the sight of the connection, arguably only semi-consciously expressed by 
him, between his low spirits – he is “at an extremely low ebb” – and the low state 
of his financial health due to his having “only two” patients and at “reduced 
rates”. There is a sense that the reduction in rates is now in retrospect a cause of 
regret. There is also the indication that he would have liked the three patients 
that he lost to have continued with him not only for therapeutic and clinical 
reasons, but also for the benefit of his financial situation: he lost them “all too 
soon”, he writes.  
Following this unburdening about his ‘money’ problems, Ferenczi announces in 
the next sentence that he has been asked to give a lecture on the neuroses by a 
doctors’ organization: “The Association is very respectable; it pays 120 crowns 
for such a lecture” (Freud and Ferenczi, 1993, p. 32). Is Ferenczi’s 
characterization of “very respectable” referring not only to the status of the 
association but also, even if unconsciously, to its apparently more than modest 
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lecture fee payments? The answer has to be in the affirmative given that the 
lecture fee is specifically stated. Ferenczi, it seems, has acknowledged that the 
state of his finances is important enough to have an impact on his psychic well-
being. However, this importance and these impacts were not given the in-depth 
explorations and investigations that they, arguably, warranted. Ferenczi’s own 
reactions to tight financial circumstances cast doubt on the validity of his 
dismissal of his patients’ ‘money’ problems as being only “material” problems 
unworthy of psychic probing, as revealed in his clinical encounters in The Clinical 
Diary, which will be examined later in this chapter. 
In March 1909, upon receiving a book as a gift from Freud, Ferenczi writes to 
thank him but admits that: “through your gift you have robbed me of the 
satisfaction of “spending money for something valuable”. That might sound 
somewhat neurotic to you; and it really is a “symptom feeling” (Freud and 
Ferenczi, 1993, p. 48). When Ferenczi says in this letter that he has been 
“robbed” of “satisfaction”, it would seem to convey the probability that Ferenczi 
must have held a deeper psychical understanding than that expressed in his 
major theoretical work on money (Ferenczi, 1914) on the role that ‘money’ 
played, or could play, within the psyche: the satisfaction that it could bring when 
one had enough of it to spend on something valued. The expression that Ferenczi 
uses is not about the gift he received; it is about the spending of ‘money’ to buy 
that gift. But where there is satisfaction there is also the possibility of its 
opposite, dissatisfaction, and hence the aptness of Ferenczi noting the potential 
neurotic undertones of his reaction. This is an acknowledgement of psychic 
impact and an acknowledgement of the potential of ‘money’ to cause such 
impacts and feelings, in other words: symptoms. By May 1909, Ferenczi is able to 
write to Freud that: 
  
There is now a noticeable increase in my practice; and although the 
slump which I have endured for some months was not enough to 
depress me seriously, I do feel a certain satisfaction now that I see 
that better times seem to be breaking out. 
(Freud & Ferenczi, 1993, p. 60) 
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Indeed, he reinforced this point again a few weeks later by informing Freud that: 
“The material side of this practice is gradually improving, especially since I no 
longer accept any new non-paying patients” (Freud and Ferenczi, 1993, p. 68). 
However it is back to the drawing board in April 1910 as far as Freud is 
concerned when Ferenczi’s loss of a patient to another psychoanalyst causes 
Freud to remonstrate: 
  
I will take this opportunity to point out to you how wrong it is for you 
to charge ten crowns per session when Sadger demands twenty. You 
see, the ten didn’t keep him with you and the twenty didn’t keep him 
from going to Sadger. Promise me you will improve! 
(Freud & Ferenczi, 1993, p. 161) 
  
But Freud is contemptuous, as is Ernest Jones, about what they regarded as the 
sheer lack of any inhibitions that North Americans had about making ‘money’. 
Jones writes to Freud that the medical professionals interested in psychotherapy 
“are so concerned in money making as to do practically no original work or 
observations” (Freud and Jones, 1995, p. 13). He continues even more 
dismissively in the same letter: “The general quality of the neurologists and 
psychiatrists in America is much poorer than I expected. They are chiefly what is 
here called ‘business’ people, being concerned mainly with making money” 
(Freud and Jones, 1995, p. 15). But Jones does not have a holier than thou 
attitude to the material aspects of life that his middle class status demanded. In a 
letter to Freud in May 1916, that is, in the middle of the war years, he tells him 
that despite being busy with eleven analyses a day, he is developing his “hedonic 
side” for exercise purposes and that: 
 
I have bought an auto-cycle with side-car and take off Saturday 
afternoons for the summer, which gives me a night in the country. I 
am just buying a country cottage, built in 1627, about 90 km. from 
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London, and hope to see you there some day, as well as other of our 
friends. 
(Freud & Jones, 1995, p. 318) 
 
Martin Stanton (1990, p. 25) notes that when Freud relates the news about 
Jones’s purchases and the number of patients he has, plus a waiting list, 
Ferenczi’s reaction is: “Oh happy England!” But Jones was not alone. How far 
could ‘money’ stretch and what was it able to purchase during this part of the 
last century with regard to professional and academic disciplines? The case of 
John Maynard Keynes provides an interesting example from one end of the 
spectrum. The Cambridge university Keynes scholar, Peter Clarke, brought out 
an elegant biography during the global financial crises of 2008 -2010 in which 
the important factor in Keynes’s life of making ‘money’ came through clearly, as: 
“Keynes saw nothing wrong in making money” (Clarke, 2009, p. 51). A 
calculation is made, through conversion, of the approximate wealth that Keynes 
attained through his financial investments, currency speculations, and 
publishing:  
  
What made Keynes’s literary career distinctive was that he did not 
depend upon it as his sole, or even main, source of income. He 
became an active investor, managing his portfolio personally. From 
1923 onward, this was how the bulk of his income was generated 
(except in 1932-3, when Essays in Persuasion kicked in). His total 
income was at a level around £4,000 to £7,000 a year for most of the 
1920s and the early 1930s, with a dizzying peak of nearly £19,000 in 
1937-8 – say three-quarters of a million pounds or certainly over a 
million dollars today. What underlay his income was the fluctuating 
performance of his investments. 
(Clarke, 2009, pp. 49-50) 
 
Putting Keynes to one side, Clarke also provides a good illustration of what more 
ordinary middle class academic incomes of this period – the 1920s and 1930s – 
provided, making the case well that ‘money’ went much farther in those days in 
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its purchasing power and in its provision of what was considered to be a good 
standard of living. Although Clarke describes the income and living standards of 
an English academic, the attainment and maintenance of similar middle class 
lifestyles were prominent concerns and aspirations among the continental 
European intellectual classes to which the pioneering generation of 
psychoanalysts belonged. What is apparent is that an income as high as Keynes’s 
was not necessary in order to live well: 
 
 
Keynes’s income of £5,000 in 1920 could be expressed as the 
equivalent of some £150,000 or about $250,000 in today’s money. 
But this fails to capture the real value of what such an income was 
worth at the time. … a successful college teaching Fellow who became 
a professor in due course, [who] in the early 1920s had an income a 
bit over £1,000 a year (and by the 1940s about £1,500). This was a 
basis on which to live well, supporting a wife and family in a select, 
convenient part of west Cambridge; with a comfortable house, 
purchased for £3,000 in the 1930s and worth far more than £1 million 
today. 
(Clarke, 2009, p. 45)   
 
Therefore a well-provided for life could be obtained with £1,500 a year (and its 
European currency equivalents).  
2. Theoretical Epistles on ‘Money’  
Although Ferenczi does notify Freud in March 1912 that he has finished his 
paper on ‘money’ – “Next week I will send you the work on money and 
coprophilia, with a brief postscript on symbolism for Imago” (Freud and 
Ferenczi, 1993, p.354) – Ferenczi had given no indication in previous letters to 
Freud that he was collecting material for or writing what was to become the 
ontogenesis of interest in ‘money’ paper. In contrast to other topics, Ferenczi had 
not entered into any theoretical discussions about ‘money’ or ‘wealth’ in 
previous correspondences in preparation for any such forthcoming paper. Jones, 
on the other hand, in a letter to Freud in November 1910 includes a review of a 
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paper on anal erotism and the ‘Geld-complex’ (Money-complex) in this manner, 
(the emphases are his): 
 
I liked Sadger’s paper on Analerotik, and agree with him except 
perhaps for one point. He differs from you in believing that 
miserliness is not cardinal, and may be absent in women of the well-
to-do class. I find that in such women (several cases) the Geld-
complex is always important, that is, that the question of money is 
always very significant, though it may not appear on the surface as 
miserliness. I have in mind one patient who was apparently 
excessively extravagant and generous, who hated miserliness. It 
turned out that her generosity was a reaction against her mother 
whom she intensely hated, who was very miserly (and who used to 
give her clysters till she was twelve years old), i.e. Analerotik and 
homosexual sadism and masochism. Geld complex was none the less 
strong, e.g. she hated being made to pay a cent unless she wanted to 
in her own way, etc. 
(Freud & Jones, 1995, p. 74) 
 
Jones clearly had thought deeply about the theoretical aspects of ‘money’, but he 
did not publish any papers focusing on the subject of the ‘money complex’, 
despite his statement that “the question of money is always very significant”. A 
few months before Jones’s points in his letter to Freud, there is a rare occurrence 
from Ferenczi of a theoretical commentary on ‘money’ – and an important one. In 
a June 1910 letter he highlights repressed miserliness and refers to ‘money’ as a 
‘nodal’ point, (the emphases are his):      
 
In the last few months I have been occupied with a series of 
hypochondriacal anxiety hysterias, more often than not complicated 
by obsessional thinking. With great regularity I found in them the 
exceptional significance of a repressed miser complex. These are 
people who, in reaction to the miserly father, are consciously 
cavaliers, but unconsciously they are forced to sympathize with the 
father’s miserliness. Every expenditure of money (especially family 
expenses) makes them ill; in place of “impoverishment” the 
hypochondriacal idea of “going to ruin” through illness and death 
steps in. Money is the valuable thing that belongs to the father, onto 
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which the struggle for the mother is displaced – at the same time it is 
a substitute for renounced coprophilia. Money is a terribly important 
nodal point – it also takes upon itself the worries about masturbation, 
about “loss of semen” – (the husband, for instance, has carefree 
intercourse with his wife and becomes afraid of death from small 
expenditures of money). 
(Freud & Ferenczi, 1993, pp. 178-179) 
 
These expositions from Jones on anal erotic conflict and Ferenczi on the nodality 
of ‘money’ are beautiful illustrations of strong and early engagement on the 
subject of ‘money’. But it is Ferenczi who is radical enough to crown ‘money’ as 
“nodal”, that is, as central and essential. 
To conclude this section it should be noted that what is clear throughout is that 
Freud took his own advice and was as strict on himself as he advised his fellow 
analysts to be. In a letter to Ferenczi in February 1910 Freud declaims that: 
 
On the whole I am only a machine for making money and have been 
working up a sweat in the last few weeks. A rich young Russian, whom 
I took on because of compulsive tendencies, admitted the following 
transferences to me after the first session: Jewish swindler, he would 
like to use me from behind and shit on my head. 
(Freud & Ferenczi, 1993, p. 138) 
 
That rich young Russian was Sergei Konstantinovich Pankejeff or “the Wolf-Man” 
as his famed case history became known in psychoanalysis. .  
In this chapter so far there has been consideration of the manner in which Freud 
regarded ‘money’ in the consulting room and how that has reverberated down to 
today; and there has been a discussion of what Freud and his fellow pioneering 
psychoanalysts wrote to each other about ‘money’ in private correspondence. 
Let us turn now to a text written by Ferenczi, the man who published a 
theoretical paper on ‘money’, who grappled with the subject matter and its roots. 
We shall look at the ways in which his interest in the topic was pursued, albeit in 
 91 
an implicit way, in subsequent writings, including his posthumously published 
clinical diary.  
3. Reading the Clinical Diary of Sándor Ferenczi  
Ferenczi has proven his credentials with regard to his theoretical interest 
on the subject of ‘money’ with his decision to write the paper delineating the 
theory of anality in its relation to ‘money’. This theory in general and the paper 
in particular was subjected to a critical close reading in the previous chapter.  
However, no publication on the topic of ‘money’ were to follow on Ferenczi’s 
part.  A question thus arose: could a much later work, Ferenczi’s remarkable 
Clinical Diary (Ferenczi, 1932), contain writings or notes on ‘money’ and 
assumptions about its theoretical bases that he had gathered down the years but 
had not ‘written up’ for publication? In order to answer that question the Diary 
itself would have to be examined in order to locate traces of further theoretical 
elaborations. But there were two further reasons. The second, closely aligned to 
the first was this: the Diary, which Ferenczi started in January 1932 and kept for 
nearly a year, was a document that was notable for the detailed baring of the 
souls of Ferenczi’s patients, who came to see him with their neuroses and 
psychoses (Pelaez, 2009; Bokanowski, 2004; Rachman, 1993). The Diary’s status 
in the psychoanalytic literature as a classic, even iconic text (Aron and Harris, 
1993; Stanton, 1990; Hoffer, 1990; Grosskurth, 1988; Fortune, 1989) that 
explores the at times tortured mind (as presented by the man himself) of one of 
psychoanalysis’s most original thinkers, continues to be reflected today in a 
number of theoretical, clinical, and hermeneutical reflections (Haynal, 2014; 
Borgogno, 2004; Rudnytsky, Bokay, and Giampieri-Deutsch, 1996). But had his 
clinical encounters revealed anything in the consulting room on the subject of 
‘money’? The rich detail provided by the regularity and routine nature of a 
diary’s construction appeared to provide a potentially promising source for the 
emergence in written form of the kind of supposedly ordinary problem that 
‘money’ is often regarded as being. A supposedly mundane problem that 
suddenly manifests as extraordinarily important enough to emerge into the open 
when combined with emotional problems. The third reason for attention to be 
paid to the Diary was that, if the Diary contained any narratives about ‘money’, 
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these accounts would be pertinent to the classical period of psychoanalysis, the 
pre-World War Two years during which it was being written, and they would 
thus illustrate whether or not a leading psychoanalytic theorist of the classical 
period, Ferenczi, was or was not being provided with material that could have 
fed into his thinking theoretically, and perhaps developed it in non-standard, 
that is, non-anality driven ways.  
Thus a textual analysis of The Clinical Diary was conducted. A method of very 
close textual reading seemed to be best suited to digging out nuggets of 
information and hidden nuances about Ferenczi’s patients’ possible financial 
problems. Further, the method was necessitated by the Diary’s style of long 
dense paragraphs that were often tightly packed with technical details. 
Ferenczi’s style of writing could veer from the straightforwardly descriptive to 
the highly technical; and from the virtually opaque, fractured, and erratic to a 
seductively poetic and novelistic fluidity. The extracts on ‘money’ will be 
presented in the chronological order of a diary’s intent and have been left as 
unabbreviated and ‘raw’ as possible in order to provide a sense of how Ferenczi 
received them and wrote about them – what the patient’s ‘voice’ was during the 
clinical encounter and how it was heard by the analyst.  
One contextual note needs to be repeated before continuing: The Clinical Diary 
was written during the general period of the “Great Depression” caused by the 
1929 financial crashes in north America and Europe, as noted in Chapter One, 
and the social and historical backdrop is of difficult economic climates in many 
European countries. But it is a vital point that Ferenczi does not mention such 
economic factors and there is no suggestion that any of his patients suffered 
financially because of the financial crashes and that this was the underlying cause 
of their ‘money’ issues.  
4. The Subject of Money Rears Its Head With “R.N.” 
The first question that the Diary raises is whether Ferenczi mentioned 
‘money’ theoretically in the unique accounts of his patients’ traumas and in his 
therapeutic attempts to reconstruct their mental lives. The answer was that 
indeed he had done so. The follow-up questions pertained to the manner in 
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which ‘money’ entered the analytical setting during the classical period, for 
example via accounts of patients’ financial worries, and to kind of reception that 
the analyst gave to such ‘money’ anxieties. With regard to Ferenczi’s most 
famous patient in the Diary, “R.N”, Martin Stanton writes that “her refusal or 
inability to pay fees is seen by him as a determined castration attempt” (Stanton, 
1990, p. 158). An overall view of “R.N.” ‘s situation provides insight into 
Ferenczi’s general perspectives on ‘money’ and patients’ financial difficulties.  
In January of 1932, Ferenczi discloses his initial reluctance to accede to a female 
patient’s demand for ‘mutual analysis’ sessions in which she would be able to 
analyze the analyst. It is now known that the female patient, “R.N.”, was an 
American called Elizabeth Severn (Fortune, 1993). Through her demands in their 
encounters, Ferenczi reveals inadvertently the power of ‘money’ in the clinical 
patient-analyst relationship: the continuation or not of analytical sessions 
depends on the ability to pay for them. Therefore, ultimately, the treatment and 
potential cure of the patient depends on whether the patient has any ‘money’. 
This, as noted earlier in this chapter, is still a fundamental dilemma today 
(Christopoulos, 2014; Berger and Newman, 2011). Ferenczi, taking account of 
the progress of the mutual analysis sessions and raising questions to himself 
about how they should be conducted, records this note about the financial 
circumstances of “R.N.”: 
 
Example: financial situation desperate; all payments had stopped 
earlier, then the debt itself is cancelled. On a previous occasion a 
somewhat rash remark: in case of need, financial help is offered. 
(Shortly afterward inner opposition to this, combined with the feeling: 
one must surely not allow oneself to be eaten up by one’s patients.) 
Possible negative consequences: the patient, relying on this promise, 
neglected to make use of even such energies or real opportunities as 
were at her disposal: simultaneously, instead of allowing herself to be 
helped analytically, she tries to obtain material assistance (money, 
libido). 
(Ferenczi, 1932, p. 12) 
 
Ferenczi appears to unconsciously theorize his patient’s demand – the “inner 
opposition” to lending her ‘money’ – as arising out of a fear of being “eaten up” by 
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a patient. This is most interesting because of its pointing to an unconscious 
orality. However, this important observation is not developed. Further, in the 
above citation and continuing throughout, ‘money’ seems to be considered by 
Ferenczi to be a “material” matter whose impact on the psychic positioning or 
psychic well-being of the patient is neither here or there. ‘Money’ becomes not a 
concern for psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic theory, but a concern for the 
financial transaction necessary for the continuation of psychoanalytic sessions. 
This is an important distinction. Indeed, the disapproval in Ferenczi’s tone 
should be noted, as he comments on what he regards as his patient’s missed 
financial opportunities. This highlights that ‘money’ is here being related to work 
and the ability to work for pay in order to assure the continuation of sessions. 
‘Money’ has become nothing more than a pragmatic necessity. Fortune (1993) 
relates that: 
 
 
In June 1930, Severn’s condition deteriorated: she lapsed into 
periodic comas and could not look after herself. Alarmed, Ferenczi 
admitted her to a sanitorium near Budapest. Concerned by Severn’s 
grave state and anxious that she might not pull through, Ferenczi 
cabled Margaret Severn to come from New York to be with her 
mother. He offered to waive his own analytical fee if it would enable 
her to remain in Budapest. Margaret responded immediately and 
stayed four months. 
(Fortune, 1993, p. 108) 
 
The emergence of the subject of ‘money’ in the clinical encounter appears to 
highlight positive or negative transferential feelings and the fluidity between 
these two states on the part of both patient and analyst. In the above citation 
Ferenczi is offering to waive his fee, yet previously he had felt that he was being 
eaten up by “R.N”. One of Ferenczi’s achievements in The Clinical Diary was the 
decision to bring the analyst’s negative transference into forensic focus: the 
boredom, the resentments, the hostilities, even hatred, the financial 
manipulation. Ferenczi’s general breakthrough realization was this: what was 
necessary was the analysis of the analyst’s own continuing or newly arrived 
complexes. Why? Because they were certain to enter the clinical encounter. 
Ferenczi brought a focus to this problematic. In his 1909 paper on introjection 
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and transference he had expounded on the analyst-patient encounter in a 
manner that also brought in their financial contract: 
 
The circumstances that other persons also are being treated psycho-
therapeutically allows the patients to indulge without any, or with very 
little, self-reproach the affects of jealousy, envy, hate, and violence 
that are hidden in their unconscious. Naturally the patient has then in 
the analysis to detach these “inadequate”, feeling-impulses also from 
the current inciting cause, and associate them with much more 
significant personalities and situations. The same holds good for the 
more or less conscious thought-processes and feeling-impulses that 
have their starting point in the financial contract between the patient 
and physician. In this way many “magnanimous”, “generous” people 
have to see and admit in the analysis that the feelings of avarice, of 
ruthless selfishness, and of ignoble covetousness are not quite so 
foreign to them as they had previously liked to believe. (Freud is 
accustomed to say, “People treat money questions with the same 
mendacity as they do sexual ones. In the analysis both have to be 
discussed with the same frankness.”)   
(Ferenczi, 1909, pp. 44-45) 
The ambivalence of the analyst towards his own patients was an ambivalence 
that went further and was rooted in more than the countertransference (Myers, 
1996; Cabré, 1998). Ferenczi’s realization of the active force of the 
psychoanalyst’s unconscious negative agency foreshadows Winnicott’s (1949) 
embarkation, taking the reins from Ferenczi (Borossa, 2007), on an exploration 
of this combustible subject. Unconscious motivations have to be taken into 
consideration. What could be taking place unconsciously on the part of both the 
analyst and the patient? These countertransferential ambivalences come through 
on the subject of ‘money’ in The Clinical Diary.  
5. The ‘Money’ Problems of Ferenczi’s Patients 
 In this section,  the patients’ narratives about ‘money’ will be  set out 
chronologically in keeping with The Clinical Diary’s dating of entries. However, 
when necessary, comments will take a general perspective and not confine 
themselves to the single case being presented.  
19 January 1932 
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In the writing of a case of mutual analysis with another female patient, “Dm.”, 
Ferenczi, without any obvious sense of deliberation or theoretical intent, 
bestows a psychoanalytic description of ‘trauma’ upon a crisis concerning 
‘money’ by virtue of calling a second crisis that this patient has a “second 
trauma”: 
 
A slow thawing, later on definite progress toward trust, particularly 
when in a moment of great distress (money matters) she found 
protection and help from me, and probably also some emotional 
response. Then came an attempt at displacement onto a third person 
(R.T.), but finally, after a second trauma (brother’s death), also 
mitigated by me, she resigned herself to returning to her family and 
her duties. 
(Ferenczi, 1932, p. 15) 
  
The description of the patient as being in “great distress” should be noted.  Thus 
‘trauma’ and ‘distress’ are diagnosed, but the link to ‘money’ remains unclear. 
16 February 1932 
In a discussion on the difficulties of mutual analysis when conducted with more 
than one patient, Ferenczi reveals some of his machinations with a female 
patient, machinations exercised in order to help him retain some overall control 
of the analysis: 
A specific limit to this kind of mutuality will be created by the analytical 
situation if, for instance, I let the patient experience something by 
design, that is, without telling her in advance. It is questionable, for 
example, whether one can tell the patient, without prejudicing 
success, that I intentionally torment her and allow her to suffer, do not 
come to her assistance with kindness or money, in order to persuade 
her, first, to tear herself loose from the transference, second, to 
relinquish the idea that sooner or later suffering will bring her 
compassion or help, and third, that distress brings to the surface latent 
sources of energy. 
(Ferenczi, 1932, p. 35) 
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Ferenczi here is effectively employing as a powerful tool the withholding of 
‘money’, acknowledging that ‘money’ brings “assistance” and that its absence 
causes “suffering” and, again, “distress”. 
By March 1932 Ferenczi is conflicted about the positives and negatives 
surrounding “mutuality”, particularly mutual analysis conducted in depth with a 
female patient singled out “on the grounds of the uniqueness of her case and of 
our joint technique, which penetrates into deep metaphysical regions” (Ferenczi, 
1932, pp. 46-47). But what if the patient wanted to be paid: “the patient could 
start to demand financial assistance as recompense for my analysis by her” 
(Ferenczi, 1932, p. 46). This, he concluded, would bring an unwanted element 
into the analytical proceedings: “Providing financial help would, however, 
involve the analysis too much with reality and make separation more difficult” 
(p. 46). It is fascinating that Ferenczi connects ‘money’ with reality, seemingly in 
other words with consciousness and conscious life. Earlier on the same page he 
talks about having to have “regard for my own finances, that is, reality” (p. 46). 
For Ferenczi, ‘money’ is part of the outside, materially real world, thus outside 
psychoanalysis. But it is apparently this real, material world that has driven 
many of his patients into seeking psychoanalytic treatment. One must assume 
that Ferenczi is regarding ‘money’ as a hard, outside-world material transaction 
that psychoanalysis should not be concerned with. The female patient whose 
mutual analysis had caused Ferenczi these particular intellectual difficulties 
responds to his effort to curtail mutuality with wanting to end their sessions 
completely “in order for her to make practical use of the money still available to 
her, before she finds herself ‘vis-à-vis du rien’ ” (p. 47).  
Mid-March 1932: Patient “S.I.” 
“S.I.” was a female patient of Ferenczi’s who suffered from what he called 
“delusional” ideations and concepts. She described how “a great many of her 
symptoms had somehow been forced upon her from the outside” (p. 57), that her 
psyche had been implanted by two women, her mother being the chief one of 
them, and that “this implantation of something alien to her own ego” (p. 58) had 
left her with an ego containing “fragments of evil” (p. 59) forcibly bestowed by 
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these persons. She feared that she was turning into the hard vicious person that 
her mother was. After pursuing what seems to have been the patient’s own 
theory of returning these evil, alien, implanted fragments lodged in her ego back 
to those who had implanted them, and thus breaking the virtual connection 
between the patient’s ego and the egos of her torturers, the patient’s condition 
and her personal relationships are transformed. It is in detailing these 
transformations that Ferenczi notes that: “The most remarkable change is in her 
attitude toward money. She became generous, open handed, yet prudent” (p. 60). 
However, ‘money’ as a subject had not been mentioned at all in his writing of this 
patient’s case history, when clearly it had been a subject that had been discussed 
between the two of them, and he had kept an eye on how the patient behaved 
with her ‘money’ to the extent that he found it noteworthy to record the changes 
in that behaviour.  Here there is another, implicit and undeveloped potential link 
to ‘money’ to the questions around trauma and distress that were key 
preoccupations of Ferenczi.  
17 March 1932 
In another session of mutual analysis Ferenczi relates that: “The patient greeted 
me with the news that someone had placed at her disposal a sum of money, 
enough for another year of analysis” (p. 60). These citations suggest that it is 
becoming evident that, at the very least, a significant number of patients did 
bring ‘money’ concerns into the consulting room – consciously and 
unconsciously. It transpires that one can argue that the presence of ‘money’ 
infuses the world of many patients in the consulting room, consciously and 
unconsciously. 
19 May 1932 
Ferenczi’s Clinical Diary can stimulate many reactions in the reader for a variety 
of reasons ranging from the breathtaking acknowledgement of technical 
psychoanalytic brilliance, to incredulity, to anger, infuriation, and laughter from 
enjoyment and pleasure. The entry below, whose title says it is concerned with 
“the sense of guilt”, falls into the ‘money’ remit of this chapter, but it also reveals 
 99 
Ferenczi’s striking ability to deceive himself – for example his “for the fun of it” – 
whilst simultaneously extracting from his soul searing truths.    
 
On the constituent factors of the sense of guilt 
 
Two patients: one of them allows himself to analyze the other, a 
woman, for the fun of it. She soon discovers resistances in the 
analyst, and suggests mutual analysis, which unexpectedly leads to 
the discovery of the following situation: the woman “patient” was 
unable to put any trust in this man; it was not known why; he had 
clearly been extraordinarily good to her, yet in money matters he had 
been inconsistent. (1) Toward a man he was excessively generous, 
(2) toward the patient less so… His hatred of his mother in his 
childhood had almost led to matricide. At the dramatic moment in the 
reproduction of this scene he, so to speak, violently throws the knife 
away from himself and becomes “good”. The “woman analyst” 
discovers from this that in order to save his mother the “patient” has 
castrated himself. Even his relationship to men (father) is in fact 
compensation for a still more deeply repressed murderous rage. The 
entire libido of this man appears to have been transformed into hatred, 
the eradication of which, in actual fact, means self-annihilation. In his 
relationship to his friend the woman “analyst”, the origin of guilt 
feelings and self-destructiveness could be recognized in statu 
nascendi. 
(Ferenczi, 1932, p. 110) 
 
3 June 1932 
A female analysand’s use of ‘money’ is recognized by Ferenczi as a symptom of 
her seductive behaviour and a means of displacing anxiety. The italics in the 
excerpt are his: 
 
   
Symptom: Buying oneself peace and friendliness by excessive 
expenditure of tenderness and presents of money. Fear that without 
these one will remain alone. Better to give away everything. Behind 
this: outbursts of rage if the most exaggerated expectation of pleasure 
without reciprocity is not fulfilled by every object, every person. First 
impulse: to destroy the unaccommodating world! Then becoming 
aware of anxiety, obedience exaggerated, solely in order to escape 
the anxiety. 
 
(Ferenczi, 1932, p. 115) 
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12 June 1932 
In his Diary Ferenczi makes claims about what he regards as Freud’s hypocrisy 
towards patients. He wants to tell the reader what Freud really thinks in private 
behind the backs of patients: that Freud actually uses his patients for financial 
gain. But below he appears to accord with the allegations he makes against Freud 
by stating “Is true”: 
 
Doctor hating patients 
 
“Freud: “rabble,” “only any good for making money out of, and for 
studying.” (Is true, but must be admitted to the patients.) They feel it in 
any case and produce resistance. (When it is admitted – trust 
increases.) 
(Ferenczi, 1932, p. 118) 
 
It is to be wondered how much trust is actually “increased” when the above 
sentiments are admitted. And it will be seen in a later entry that similar charges 
are made against Ferenczi. But this is a good example of the kind of negative 
countertransference that Ferenczi was unafraid of, hence his “when it is 
admitted”.   
16 June 1932 
For the second time and with a different female patient – see the entry above of 
19 January 1932 – the occurrence of a sibling’s death, a traumatic event, is 
likened in emotionally disrupting scale to the situation the patient finds herself 
in because of great loss of ‘money’. Both are “tragic”, as Ferenczi records:  
 
Patient S.I., following a brief, passionate transference phase, kept 
entirely secret, entered a phase of strong resistance, exacerbated by 
the unexpected interruption of the analysis on my part (trip to 
America). Gradual return of trust, helped by my sincere sympathy at 
two tragic moments: (1) when it became known that her husband had 
squandered enormous sums of money on gambling and women, (2) at 
the sudden death of her beloved brother. The transference, however, 
assumed entirely the form of the most sublimated, congenial, 
intellectual rapport. 
(Ferenczi, 1932, p. 125) 
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The entry of June 16th is a long and densely interwoven mix comprising of case 
history narrative details, spiritualistic reflections – a decades-long passion of 
Ferenczi’s (Mészáros, 1993) – and psychoanalytic theorizing. Two further 
observations about “S.I.” and her financial situation are made: 
 
In the meantime, or perhaps under the influence of these changes, 
substantial increase in the sense of reality, and the undertaking of 
extremely practical measures to rescue the family’s financial and 
moral position. She becomes the adviser of all and sundry, takes 
charge of her daughter’s upbringing; indeed, she helps a whole series 
of people in her social circle. 
(Ferenczi, 1932, p. 126) 
 
It is also quite striking that this person who is otherwise thrifty and 
even stingy in small matters pays the not inconsiderable expenses of 
the treatment with pleasure, so to speak, and indeed firmly refuses my 
offer to reduce the fees or to remain in debt; surely an indication that 
part of the “sublimation” has taken the path of anal eroticism. 
(Ferenczi, 1932, p. 127) 
 
I would like to conclude the examination of The Clinical Diary with the two 
following entries. One corroborates Christopher Fortune’s citation earlier of the 
circumstances that necessitated the arrival of Severn’s daughter in Budapest; 
and the second entry is focused on Ferenczi himself. First: 
8 August 1932 
 
R.N.: About three years ago discovery of the amnesia, two years ago 
reproduction of the trauma, on each occasion ending with terrible 
pains and convulsive laughter. Since then an outburst every day, 
almost without exception. Adhering strictly to the theory that the 
quantity of abreactions will finally be exhausted and that this will lead 
in time to certain recovery, I continued to produce the attacks. 
Financial difficulties nearly led to a break in the analysis, but my 
stubborn faith made me carry on, even without being paid. Progress 
almost nil. Greater financial demands on me and increasing demands 
on my time and interest exhausted my patience, and we had almost 
 102 
reached the point of breaking off the analysis, when help arrived from 
an unexpected source. 
(Ferenczi, 1932, p. 193) 
 
The second story, quoted at length, encapsulates the resentment, conscious and 
unconscious, that swirls around the financial relations between the analyst and 
the patient.  Sexually graphic language – surprising to encounter and appearing 
quite regularly in the Diary – has been left out. It is notable that this in-depth 
entry, the only one that is completely devoted to a problem about ‘money’, 
examines a male patient. Did Ferenczi with his admitted mother complex – see 
entry of 19th May 1932 – regard ‘money’ as male, as a masculine matter?  
11 August 1932 
A note on criminality 
A former patient, analyzed for a time and relatively freed from his 
anxiety, consults me again: he is in some difficulty at the moment, but 
this does not upset him too much. In his business he has gotten 
“involved in undertakings far too large for the capital at his disposal…  
he got involved in love affairs with twelve or fourteen women, 
concurrently or one after the other. Ultimately, with three at once on a 
fairly steady basis: (1) his cook, who became devoted to him like a 
bitch, (2) one of the most attractive and intelligent young ladies of 
higher social standing, who is also scientifically talented (he broke off 
the relationship with her as this lady objected to the affair being made 
public, knowing that her reputation and career would be ruined in 
higher aristocratic circles if that happened), (3) an outstanding 
Hungarian physician, who quite the contrary made too public a show 
of the relationship and behaved as though she were his wife. He 
managed to get a considerable sum of money from her, and he has 
also failed to pay my fee for his analysis for many months. 
Now that he sees that he cannot become rich quickly, he is thinking of 
escaping from his obligations. At the same time he announces that he 
has been infected with gonorrhea by a prostitute in Paris but has since 
had intercourse with both the cook and the doctor. I told him that he 
must get treatment for himself and have both women examined. 
I used the opportunity to tell him that from now on he must pay me, 
but I did suggest that for the time being he could pay only half and 
continue to owe me the money for earlier treatment. Strangely 
enough, at the time of the first consultation I was still inclined to lend 
him the entire sum again, and it was only on further reflection that I 
told myself it was high time to show the man the limits of reality in 
analysis as well. (The slowness with which I realized this came out in 
my self-analysis: identification with the coward who overcoming his 
fear turns into a hero, beyond good and evil.) …For the present he 
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refused to accept my conditions; I remained firm, however, and expect 
a settlement from him, probably tomorrow… 
To some extent I admire the man who dares to do the things that I 
deny to myself. I even admire him for the impudence with which he 
cheats me.  
An interesting idea occurred to me today in connection with this man: I 
thought that he would physically attack me, and had the idea of 
carrying in my pocket my revolver that fires warning shots. For the 
moment I have put off settling matters until tomorrow; but I am 
determined to remain firm, and if necessary to let him go. I have the 
feeling that if I give way he will treat me like a fool – as he does almost 
everyone else – and take advantage of me. If I remain firm, he may 
really attack me; he has already started to hint that he gave me 
enough money before (so that he is not willing to pay me any more); 
he can threaten me with publicity, disparage me to my friends, etc. All 
of it will leave me cold. Perhaps he will then try to make me give in by 
breaking down; in that case I will offer to continue his treatment, if he 
accepts my conditions. 
(Ferenczi, 1932, pp. 194-196) 
 
Unfortunately Ferenczi does not return in subsequent passages to the subject of 
the man who owed him a large amount of money and about whom he was so 
worried that he thought seriously of arming himself with a gun. But what is 
apparent here is a complex set of dynamics around potency and power in 
relation to having or not having ‘money’.  
6. Concluding Remarks  
 The argument that is being made is that the above case stories from 
Ferenczi’s The Clinical Diary when taken together as a body of written evidence 
confirm that there was no absence of the subject of ‘money’ in the analytical 
setting during the classical period. Neither was there a lack of discussion about 
how the patients behaved with ‘money’, even if the unconscious implications 
theoretically were not always drawn out. The centrally critical question of 
whether the subject of ‘money’ arrived in the setting of the psychoanalytic 
clinical encounter could be answered with a “yes”. A further question had been: if 
the patient and the analyst do discuss ‘money’ during the analytical hour, what 
are they talking about and how are they talking about it? The Diary reveals 
textual evidence from a key figure of the classical period  that ‘money’ and its 
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problematics penetrate the enclosed space of the consulting room, both 
consciously and unconsciously. Furthermore, as a result, these financial 
problems have to be dealt in cognisance of the transference and the 
countertransference at play. ‘Money’, it seems, is often wielded by patients as a 
tool of their negative transferential feelings. 
 
Neurotics and psychotics, even if they are still halfway capable of 
fulfilling their functions as body and also partly as mind, should 
actually be considered to be unconsciously in a chronic death-agony. 
Analysis therefore has two tasks: (1) to expose this death-agony fully; 
(2) to let the patient feel that life is nevertheless worth living if there 
exist people like the helpful doctor, who is even prepared to sacrifice a 
part of himself. (Hence the tendency of patients to get into financial 
difficulties and to put our selflessness to the test.) 
(Ferenczi, 1932, p. 131) 
 
The “tendency” of patients to have ‘money’ problems that they place in front of 
the analyst in the consulting room, states Ferenczi. A tendency is a psychic aim. 
Ferenczi awards patients the psychoanalytic prowess of recognizing and utilizing 
‘money’ as a method of forcing the analyst to confront his countertransferential 
feelings, conscious and unconscious, towards the patient. ‘Money’ becomes the 
key that patients hope will unlock the analyst’s real emotions. Will the analyst 
yield in empathy and love and help them financially? Will he open up to them if 
they succeed in getting hold of his attention by threatening him with loss of his 
income? Will they find out in this manner what lurks in the depths of the 
analyst’s own psyche? A “woman patient”, (most likely Elizabeth Severn’s “R.N.” 
but who receives no designation from Ferenczi), is recorded as castigating him 
with a list of “reproaches” against the practices of psychoanalysts in an entry 
entitled, “A catalogue of the sins of psychoanalysis”. Interestingly, the patient’s 
reproaches accord with some of Ferenczi’s own views directed as attacks against 
Freud, as expressed within the Diary.  
 
(2) As most patients are psychic shipwrecks, who will clutch at any 
straw, they become blind and deaf to the facts that would indicate to 
 105 
them how little personal interest analysts have in their patients.… (4) 
The analysis provides a good opportunity to carry out unconscious, 
purely self-seeking, ruthless, immoral, indeed so to speak criminal 
actions and similar behaviour guiltlessly (without a sense of guilt), 
such as a sense of power over a succession of helplessly devoted 
patients, who admire him without reservation. Sadistic pleasure in 
their suffering and their helplessness. Unconcern regarding the length 
of the analysis, indeed the tendency to prolong it for purely financial 
reasons: if one wants to, one turns the patients into taxpayers for life. 
(Ferenczi, 1932, p. 199) 
 
Why do people suffering from problems of their psyche also seem frequently to 
get into financial difficulties? Whilst Ferenczi views the frequency of these 
‘money’ problems among patients as a testing of the sympathies of the analyst, it 
could, instead, be regarded in this light: patients who have mental health 
problems also routinely get into financial difficulties at some point during their 
illness. There appears to be a strong possibility of a connection between psychic 
ill health and later financial instability. And, of course, financial instability leads 
to psychic ill health.  
It seems that people who are in a “chronic death-agony” because of the impacts 
and implications of their trauma tend not to be in the best position psychically to 
handle their own finances capably – and it is interesting that Ferenczi puts 
neurotics and psychotics together given their differential diagnostics. Such 
people seem to get into debt and remain in debt on a more frequent basis. 
Ferenczi’s view is that patients in – or should that not be with – such difficulties 
are testing the willingness of the analyst to help them financially. They conduct 
these “tests” in order for the analyst to prove his commitment to them through 
the level and quality of “sacrifice” he makes towards the patient’s recovery. But 
might they not be behaving in this manner because they regard the giving of 
financial help as help extended towards recovering their mental health? It could 
be a vicious circle: poor mental health leading to incapacities around the 
handling of ‘money’ that leads to “money problems” that further disturb mental 
health. Getting into debt makes them more ill mentally. The manifestation of 
‘money’ difficulties and the resulting anxieties intensify the impact on the 
patients’ psychic health, and they would have no alternative but to bring such 
impacts and affects into their analytic sessions – even if it were only in the 
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material form of having to reveal that they were having difficulty in paying for 
their psychoanalysis sessions.  
Finally, suffering a mental breakdown because of an external cause such as an 
economic downturn and having to go into analysis as a result would 
demonstrate that lack of ‘money’ is linked to poor mental health. The stories of 
suicides committed during the “Great Depression” of the 1930s have almost 
become folklore. The relating to the analyst by the patient of ‘money’ problems 
during their clinical encounter is not a “testing” of the analyst; it is a cri de coeur 
to the analyst.  
This brings to a conclusion the discussion of the main thematic strands 
arising from the review of the literature in Chapter One. Those main themes were 
theory formation based on anality, and patients’ revelations in the clinical 
encounter. Thus, in Chapter Two the classical delineation of the ‘anal theory of 
money’ was explored and the critique opened up the possibility of the existence 
of an alternative hypothesis on ‘money’ and the unconscious. And in this chapter, 
clinical accounts given by patients in the consulting room, specifically in 
Ferenczi’s Clinical Diary,  have been examined together with insight derived from 
their correspondence as to how psychoanalysts themselves related to the topic 
of ‘money’ in private.  
It is evident from the material engaged with so far in this thesis, that ‘money’ and 
“material” concerns do appear to play an oral-related, life-preserving, role in 
people’s lived experience. It therefore seems that there is strong enough ground 
upon which to proceed towards the outlining and discussion of a hypothesis for 
the role that ‘money’ and ‘wealth’ could have in the unconscious that is based on 
orality.  
At the outset of the journey of investigation undertaken to discover what could 
be the root psychoanalytic causes of the pressing problem of financial 
corruption, it seemed that we had been like trying to enter a closed room that 
had two locks with only one key to hand. To investigate financial corruption 
psychoanalytically it had been necessary to look to the classical theoretical 
writings on ‘money’. That part of the journey was made via the past through 
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close textual readings of key classical texts. But what was found was that what 
should have been at least a dual carriageway was instead only offering a single 
lane – anality – to travel upon, that this road was not satisfying its own 
requirements, and that there were no turnoffs. It became clear that what was 
also needed was to build a second lane – orality – which would provide that more 
efficient dual carriageway towards the unconscious and the meaning of ‘money. 
In the next chapter, Chapter Four, we will therefore be outlining a hypothesis 
taking into account an oral explanation of the significance of ‘money’ based on 
classical and contemporary psychoanalytic principles. 
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Chapter Four 
ORALITY:  
AN ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS FOR THE MEANING OF 
‘MONEY’ IN THE UNCONSCIOUS 
 
What does ‘money’ symbolize in the unconscious? The first three chapters 
of this thesis have explored how classical Freudian psychoanalytic theory forged 
a symbolization of ‘money’ that saw it rooted in anality. The preceding stage of 
infantile development, orality, is one based on the quality of the primary 
nourishment and satisfaction received by the infant from its mother at the 
breast. It is Karl Abraham’s excellent theoretical thinking on orality that this 
chapter will mostly build on, showing Abraham’s clarity and in his aim of 
wanting to bring orality out from under the shadow of the dominance of anality 
in classical psychoanalytic thought. He succeeded in doing so. Freud’s definition 
of the oral phase occurs almost in passing in a densely written passage of his 
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905). He begins by defining ‘pregenital’ 
as the term to be used for “organizations of sexual life in which the genital zones 
have not yet taken over their predominant part”, and then states that: “The first 
of these is the oral or, as it might be called, cannibalistic pregenital sexual 
organization. Here sexual activity has not yet been separated from the ingestion 
of food” (Freud, 1905, p. 198). Aspects of classical psychoanalytic thinking 
around orality will be reviewed in this chapter in order to formulate an oral 
hypothesis on the relation between ‘money’ and the unconscious.  
Karl Abraham’s 1924 paper, ‘The Influence of Oral Erotism on Character-
Formation’, provides substantial theoretical support. It is interesting to note the 
reverberating, reversing echo in the shortened version of the title – ‘Oral Erotism 
and Character’ – with Freud’s seminal text ‘Character and Anal Erotism’ (Freud, 
1908), which, as has been discussed in the previous chapters, formed the 
theoretical core of the anal theory of ‘money’. Abraham’s aim, as Freud’s, was not 
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to examine ‘money’; but both texts are highly significant for the understanding of 
the impulses, ambivalences, and variations in the attitudes towards ‘money’, 
wealth, and the accumulation and retention of desirable objects. Abraham’s work 
confirms how deficiencies, disappointments, and ambivalence during the oral 
development stage lead to “the presence of the abnormally over-developed envy 
which is so common” (Abraham, 1924a, p. 398). Envy, wrote Abraham in his 
earlier paper on the anal character, originated in “the earlier, oral phase of 
libido-development” (Abraham, 1921, p. 383). Envy and greed are key factors in 
the exploration of the potential psychoanalytic roots of financial corruption, as 
shall be discussed in Chapter Five. For Abraham there existed “a great many 
people who have to pay a certain permanent tribute to their oral zone without 
actually forming any severe neurotic symptoms” (Abraham, 1916, p. 270). For 
example, the “orally gratified” soul can be a person with characteristics of 
generosity who identifies with “the bounteous mother” (Abraham, 1924a, p. 
403). 
Abraham’s ‘Oral Erotism and Character’ is also similar to Freud’s 1908 paper in 
being a relatively short text that contains acute insights. Abraham is informative 
about the implications of the oral development stage for an adult’s attitude 
towards earning a livelihood, towards ‘money’ and income, and towards 
becoming a “bread-winner”. In this chapter additional support for the 
importance of orality for an understanding of the impact of ‘money’ on the 
unconscious will also be derived from Abraham’s papers entitled, ‘The First Pre-
Genital Stage of the Libido’ (1916) and ‘A Short Study of the Development of the 
Libido, Viewed in the Light of Mental Disorders’ (1924b). Abraham’s work sheds 
light on how a theorist like Melanie Klein, one of his analysands in Berlin in the 
period leading up to Abraham’s death in 1925 (Bentinck van Schoonheten, 2015; 
Sanfeliu, 2014) was able to progress and further develop formulations on orality 
and the infant’s complex relations with the breast as a part object. One can assess 
Abraham’s work on the following basis: that Freud brings the theory of orality 
into existence; whilst Abraham writes about and extends its applications. And, in 
contrast to Freud’s emphasis on the primacy of the phallus, for Abraham it is the 
primacy of orality, as he states: “phenomena connected with the genital zone 
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cannot be as primary as those connected with the oral zone” (Abraham, 1924b, p. 
451). But before proceeding to the necessary outline of the nature of what is 
meant by ‘orality’ and what this might mean for relations with and attitudes 
towards ‘money’, it would be useful to set out first how the process of attempting 
to produce an oral hypothesis as an alternative to anality might be approached. 
1. On Formulating an Oral Hypothesis: Equating Anus and Mouth  
What ought to be the main building blocks in an attempt to construct an oral 
hypothesis on the meaning of ‘money’ in the unconscious? The approach that will 
be taken here will be to extrapolate from what was done theoretically on the 
relation of anality to ‘money’. In short, to follow through not a radical 
reconstruction, but rather, a reconceptualization, that is, for a shifting of the 
emphasis from one part of the body to another – from the back to the front, from 
the bottom to the top; and by highlighting the subsequent possible results and 
repercussions of such a shift. Therefore, in effect, the approach to be taken in this 
chapter will be to align with the nature of the thinking on the delineation for 
anality and ‘money’ formulated by the classical psychoanalysts, but to replace 
their structuring delineation with a structuring that rests upon orality. The 
disagreement centres on the usage of faeces as the symbolic object for the 
interest in and need for ‘money’, and not on the psychoanalytic principles and 
mechanisms involved in the delineation of anality. Abraham astutely notes the 
“particular significance” of how “the pleasure in sucking undertakes a kind of 
migration” in which the actions of the anal and urethral muscles become “the 
same as that of the lips in sucking, and is obviously modelled on it” (Abraham, 
1924a, p. 396). 
Some observations that are pertinent to the decision made for methodological 
connectivity – that is, that the construction of orality’s relation to ‘money’ can be 
built in a similar fashion to how anality was related to ‘money’ – can be noted at 
this junction. The first observation is this: In Chapter Two Ferenczi and the focus 
on the anal developmental stage were discussed, but Ferenczi had also written 
that for young children: “Of the sexually excitable parts of the body (erogenous 
zones), for instance, they are specially interested in the mouth, the anus, and the 
genitals” and that “within the sphere of the bodily organs themselves: Penis and 
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tooth, anus and mouth, become equated” (Ferenczi, 1913, p. 279). This analytic 
observation is important: “anus and mouth, become equated”.  
Children are aware that the two orifices are connected. Harnik (1924, p. 392) 
reported in a paper presented to the eighth psychoanalytic congress that: “A 
little girl related how in early childhood after eating quantities of currants, she 
and her two sisters would hold a competition as to who could count the largest 
number of undigested currants in the stools.” But such observations are not only 
child-related. One of Ferenczi’s adult male patients told him that he especially 
enjoyed possessing clean “brightly shining copper coins” and that to ensure this 
“he swallowed the piece of money, and then searched his faeces until he found 
the piece of money, which during its passage through the alimentary canal had 
become beautifully shining” (Ferenczi, 1914, p. 329). Ferenczi sources this 
behaviour and the patient’s pleasure to “satisfaction of the most primitive anal-
erotism” (Ferenczi, 1914, p. 330), but equally it could be argued that it 
substantiates the notion of a potential duality in the action taking place, in that it 
could also be argued that the patient wanted to, and was trying to, physically eat 
‘money’ in the form of copper coins. Thus, this behaviour could be analyzed as 
having demonstrable oral roots. Why did the patient want to try to digest 
‘money’ as food? Perhaps he unconsciously wanted to highlight that one could 
not actually eat money, but that ‘money’ is in a relation with clean food. ‘Money’ 
is not food; ‘money’ is access to food where there is food that can be bought. 
Thus, a rich man can potentially go hungry and even starve to death if he cannot 
attain the food that his ‘money’ has the potential to buy. The patient swallows 
the copper coins and then searches for the ‘money’ that has passed through his 
alimentary, food, canal. Is he not searching for ‘money’ to enable the purchase of 
more food amidst the contents of food that has already been eaten and digested? 
His actions could also, perhaps, be described as wanting to lodge ‘money’ 
permanently in his canal, to line his canal with the means, the access, and the 
gateway to clean (healthy) food. 
The second observation on the connectivity of methodological construction of 
the anal/oral hypotheses is concerned with the psychical mechanisms that are 
employed. In his paper on anal erotism Freud (1908, p. 171) refers to the scandal 
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that was caused by the publication in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality 
(Freud, 1905) of his proposition that there was a sexual nature, an erogeneity of 
the anus for the infant. But by 1918 Ernest Jones was writing about what he 
called “the facts of anal erotism” (Jones, 1918, p. 413), as established by Freud, 
which by then had become constituted into a doctrine of psychoanalytic theory 
and practice: 
 
The salient features as elucidated by psychoanalysis are: The mucous 
membrane lining the anus and anal canal possesses the capacity of 
giving rise, on excitation, to sexual sensations, just as does that lining 
the entrance to the alimentary tract. The sensations vary in intensity 
with the strength of the stimulus, a fact frequently exploited by 
infants, who will at times obstinately postpone the act of defaecation 
so as to heighten the pleasurable sensation when it occurs, thus 
forming a habit which may lead to chronic constipation in later life. 
The pleasure experienced in this way is one which, as a rule, becomes 
repressed in very early life, so completely that perhaps most adults 
are no longer capable of obtaining any conscious sexual pleasure from 
stimulation in this region, though there are a great many with whom 
this capacity is still retained. The psychical energy accompanying the 
wishes and sensations relating to the region is almost altogether 
deflected into other directions, leading to [the] sublimations and 
reaction-formations 
(Jones, 1918, p. 414)  
 
Jones here has summarized the premise of Freud’s work on the anal erotogenic 
zone very well, and brought to the fore the vital factor of the psychical 
mechanisms that would become influential subsequently: repression, 
displacement, sublimation, and counter-formations. These are standard 
psychoanalytic theoretical mechanisms, and thus will be in evidence in any 
discussion of orality. Abraham (1921) whilst congratulating Jones on his wide-
ranging study on anal erotism felt that there was a need to highlight the 
psychical impacts on the infant, the limiting of its impulses, and the injuries 
caused to narcissism. As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, Abraham’s 
detailed work on orality will provide indispensable guidance for an oral 
hypothesis on ‘money’.  
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Thirdly, in Ferenczi’s delineation of anality the critical notion of object-love and 
its introjection – that is, its being incorporated into the body – is made clear in 
this manner with regard to faeces: 
   
Faeces are also, however, one of the first toys of the child. The purely 
auto-erotic satisfaction afforded to the child by the pressing and 
squeezing of the faecal masses and the play of the sphincter muscles 
soon becomes – in part, at least – transformed into a sort of object-
love, in that the interest gets displaced from the neutral sensations of 
certain organs on to the material itself that caused these feelings. The 
faeces are thus “introjected”, and in this stage of development – 
which is essentially characterised by sharpening of the sense of smell 
and an increasingly adroit use of the hands, with at the same time an 
inability to walk upright (creeping on all fours) – they count as a 
valuable toy, from which the child is to be weaned only through 
deterrents and threats of punishment. 
(Ferenczi, 1914, pp. 321-322) 
 
Of course, there are a multitude of objects and part-objects that are subject to 
these processes of introjection and incorporation, but which  apply to orality? 
This question will be elaborated upon later in this chapter. But it can be 
observed here that in their identification of the symbolizing psychical processes, 
the processes of forming unconscious meanings in which the focus of an 
attention in adulthood can be sourced to an unconscious infantile generating 
factor, the classical theorists had pinpointed precisely and correctly the infantile 
mechanisms at work. 
2. Freud, Anality and the Promise of an Oral Discourse Pertaining to 
Attitudes Towards Money 
The fourth and final observation on the appropriateness of connecting how 
anality and ‘money’ were outlined to how orality and ‘money’ could also be 
outlined, is interesting to record mainly because it returns one to Freud, whose 
seminal work enabled and legitimized a pulling together of various strands for a 
discourse on anality. In hypothesizing the kind of psychical reactions that could 
be taking place as a result of anality, Freud (1908, p. 171) stated that 
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“orderliness, parsimony and obstinacy” were tendencies that demonstrated that 
a typically anal-erotic sublimation or reaction-formation had emerged among 
those who “refuse to empty their bowels” during childhood and “enjoyed holding 
back their stool”, and who remembered “doing all sorts of unseemly things with 
the faeces that had been passed” (Freud, 1908, p. 170). From listening to the 
stories told to him by his psychoanalytic patients and from the study of case 
history reports, Freud was able to “infer that such people are born with a sexual 
constitution in which the erotogenicity of the anal zone is exceptionally strong” 
(Freud, 1908, p. 170). Freud linked the disappearance of such expressions of 
childhood-type anal erotism among adults to the appearance of what he called 
“this triad of properties” (Freud, 1908, p. 170), that is, orderliness, parsimony 
and obstinacy. The assumption being put forward was that in adulthood this was 
how their anal erotism was being released. Considering how the resultant 
psychical mechanisms operated on adults with regard to ‘money’, Freud states 
that although much of his supporting evidence was based on language use, 
myths, symbolism, and folk-tales, (as has been explored in Chapter Two in 
relation to Ferenczi’s work), the initial relation was far simpler: 
  
The connections between the complexes of interest in money and of 
defaecation, which seem so dissimilar, appear to be the most 
extensive of all. Every doctor who has practised psychoanalysis knows 
that the most refractory and long-standing cases of what is described 
as habitual constipation in neurotics can be cured by that form of 
treatment. This is less surprising if we remember that that function 
has shown itself similarly amenable to hypnotic suggestion. But in 
psychoanalysis one only achieves this result if one deals with the 
patients’ money complex and induces them to bring it into 
consciousness with all its connections. It might be supposed that the 
neurosis is here only following an indication of common usage in 
speech, which calls a person who keeps too careful a hold on his 
money ‘dirty’ or ‘filthy’.  
(Freud, 1908, p. 173) 
 
It is fascinating that in the above citation that Freud himself refers to a “‘dirty’ or 
‘filthy’” person as actually being “a person who keeps too careful a hold on his 
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money”. Anality and ‘money’ in terms of possession and retention is an argument 
that deserves to be made and can be shown, as demonstrated in citations on 
anality, to have strong psychical foundations. This area will be returned to in 
Chapter Six. The argument being made in this thesis with regard to ‘money’ is 
that, in their attempt to theorize where the interest in ‘money’ and the need for 
‘money’ arose from, the classical theorists were looking at the wrong end of the 
body, so to speak: at what was coming out of the anus and not at what was going 
into the mouth first. Common language use (and myths, symbolisms etc.) would 
certainly have supported taking an oral approach. One example above all comes 
to the fore and that is the term “bread-winner” for the main income earner in a 
family. Common expressions for needing and getting ‘money’ repeatedly feature 
“bread” and “dough”.  
A further comment in relation to the opening up of a wider discourse that brings 
in orality is an affirmation of the belief that Freud had that psychical tendencies 
and aims with regard to ‘money’ emerge post-childhood. Again, it is necessary to 
set to one side that Freud is making this comment with respect to an anal 
psychical root, but the point is well-made nevertheless and is transferable to 
orality: 
 
The original erotic interest in defaecation is, as we know, destined to 
be extinguished in later years. In those years the interest in money 
makes its appearance as a new interest which had been absent in 
childhood. This makes it easier for the earlier impulsion, which is in 
process of losing its aim, to be carried over to the newly emerging 
aim. 
(Freud, 1908, p. 175) 
   
Freud states categorically and correctly that the interest in money “had been 
absent in childhood” and postulates that the aim, the direction, of the (anal) 
erotism is a reaction-formation following as a result of what would have been a 
repression of the original (anal) erotic tendency. This new (anal) compromise 
formation is later “carried over” to the “newly emerging aim” of interest in 
money.  
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The usefulness of attempting to map a reversal towards orality from the initial 
all encompassing anal perspective is that this opens up possibilities for further, 
wider enquiries into mankind’s relation to ‘money’. A discourse on orality can be 
undertaken that brings in attitudes to ‘money’ that could lead to financial 
corruption. Chapter Five will explore the terrain of the status of having ‘food’, of 
being hungry, and of being fed in the context of an emerging developing country. 
It is important that we should take into account the lesser-regarded factors that 
are still, however, forceful and essential, the: “significant but unconscious 
psychical contents” that are brought into play, “each for itself, indirect symbolic 
representatives in the unconsciousness of all men” (Ferenczi, 1912, pp. 265-
266). The psychoanalytic symbolization for ‘money’ should be more orally 
rooted in its eroticism and object cathectization abilities. It is proposed in this 
thesis that a more appropriate symbolic interpretation for the interest in and the 
need for ‘money’ be anything connected with and to food: the means of its 
attainability, its eating, and its availability. Food is taken orally, by the mouth, but 
what is meant psychoanalytically by ‘orality’ and the ‘oral development phase’? 
3. Freud’s Theory of Orality 
In Freudian psychoanalytic theory the developmental phases are 
organizations of sexuality, that is, organizations of the ‘sexual instinct’, also 
termed sexual ‘drive’, focused around a particular erotogenic zone: oral, anal, 
and genital. The brilliance of Freud’s thinking lay in the powerful realization and 
assertion that what was in the adult was what was in the child. In other words, 
that what was in the present was what was in the past, and therefore the 
progress to adult sexuality was grounded in the development of childhood 
sexuality. Freud states: 
 
We found from the study of neurotic disorders that beginnings of an 
organization of the sexual instinctual components can be detected in 
the sexual life of children from its very beginnings. During a first, very 
early phase, oral erotism occupies most of the picture. A second of 
these pregenital organizations is characterized by the predominance 
of sadism and anal erotism. It is not until a third phase has been 
reached that the genital zones proper contribute their share in 
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determining sexual life, and in children this last phase is developed 
only so far as to a primacy of the phallus. 
(Freud, 1905, p. 233) 
 
These phases of the development of sexuality – oral, anal, phallic/genital – 
possess their own sole aims, for example, oral impulses will be demanding 
satisfactions that are linked to oral erotogenicity, that is, nutrition, food, eating, 
the mouth, etc. But the instincts/drives are also formulated as being influenced 
by component parts, such as compulsions towards sadism and masochism. Thus, 
for example, sadistic impulses will be striving for cruel, aggressive, dominating 
satisfaction. When combined, as in the emergence of oral sadistic impulses, the 
main instinct/drive will be construed as taking the form of a cruel, attacking, 
humiliating, subjugating tendency towards its object, an object that will have 
strong oral connections. These separate “different, instinctual components” 
(Freud, 1905, p. 234) have to become synthesized. There has to be a unified, final 
organization, which is meant to take place following the interruption of 
development by a period of latency. Now, “a new sexual aim appears, and all the 
component instincts combine to attain it, while the erotogenic zones become 
subordinated to the primacy of the genital zone” (Freud, 1905, p. 207). But Freud 
warns: “Every step on this long path of development can become a point of 
fixation, every juncture in this involved combination can be an occasion for a 
dissociation of the sexual instinct” (Freud, 1905, p. 235).  
How is the energy that is invested in the sexual instinct/drive characterized? It 
seems that Freud means it to be a fundamental source of energy with a quality all 
its own, a driving force: ‘libido’, quantities of mental, psychical energy. Freud 
states that: “We have defined the concept of libido as a quantitatively variable 
force which could serve as a measure of processes and transformations 
occurring in the field of sexual excitation” (Freud, 1905, p. 217). The “special 
chemistry” (Freud, 1905, p. 217) that occurs in the erotogenic zones and in other 
organs of the body give rise to the production of libidinal energy, a special kind 
of energy that is connected to and derived from the sexual processes taking place 
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in the psyche. Libido was regarded as proceeding from and withdrawing back 
into the ego, and thus Freud spoke of ‘ego-libido’ and observed that: 
 
This ego-libido is, however, only conveniently accessible to analytic 
study when it has been put to the use of cathecting sexual objects, 
that is, when it has become object-libido. We can then perceive it 
concentrating upon objects, becoming fixed upon them or 
abandoning them, moving from one object to another and, from 
these situations, directing the subject’s sexual activity, which leads to 
the satisfaction, that is, to the partial and temporary extinction, of the 
libido. 
(Freud, 1905, p. 217)  
 
Libidinal energy is thus constructed as the fuel for life and life’s activities in 
relation to objects, because it is the fuel for the agencies that comprise the 
psychic, mental, apparatus.  
With regard to the instinct/drive and its libidinal relation to objects during the 
oral development phase, Freud wrote that: “At a time at which the first 
beginnings of sexual satisfaction are still linked with the taking of nourishment, 
the sexual instinct has a sexual object outside the infant’s own body in the shape 
of his mother’s breast” (Freud, 1905, p. 222). He describes this as: “this first and 
most significant of all sexual relations” (Freud, 1905, p. 222). The ramifications 
of Freud’s statement are critical for the underpinning of a potential hypothesis 
on orality and ‘money’, for it allows and supports the argument that ‘money’, 
which purchases foods, can therefore become a symbol for ‘food’ and an 
unconscious symbolization of the nutritious contents of the mother’s breast – 
that primary desire and that primary satisfaction. Freud’s statement further 
allows and supports the argument that ‘money’ could be regarded as being 
intrinsically locked-in to the unconscious as the only symbolization for food 
because it represents the contents of the breast and thus primary desire and 
primary satisfaction. However, for critics of Freud’s drive theory, it was essential 
to note that although “the infant may be satisfying its instinctual drives in 
relation to an object (e.g. pleasurably sucking at its mothers breast), it may have 
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no psychological knowledge or mental representation of the object from which 
its satisfaction is derived” (Sandler, Holder, Dare, and Dreher, 1997, p. 73). 
However, the fact that the infant is unaware or aware that the object from which 
he sucks is a ‘breast’ is not the point; what is relevant is the primary (and primal) 
nature of the infant’s need and desire for the nutrition being received from the 
object, whether that object is a  breast or bottle or hand, and the ensuing quality 
of satisfaction or dissatisfaction that is experienced. 
4. Karl Abraham and the Oral Development Phase 
In the 1920s, two very brief footnotes by Freud (1905, pp. 198-199) 
acknowledge that Karl Abraham carried out further work on the theory of an 
oral development stage. But why did Abraham feel the need to do this? This 
question can be answered by way of his papers on orality: the detail in them 
shows that Abraham clearly felt that the concept of the oral stage had been 
underdeveloped by Freud and orality’s influence on adulthood was 
underappreciated. Prior to the elaboration that will take place below, it can be 
stated overall that Abraham deduced, firstly, that orality has two levels: a) the 
primary level of sucking – where the drive’s energy “the libido of the infant is 
attached to the act of sucking” – and its manifestations on adulthood; followed by 
b) the secondary level of biting – where “the child exchanges its sucking activity 
for a biting one” – and its manifestations in adulthood (Abraham, 1924b, p. 450). 
Secondly, he determined that oral erotism and oral sadism produced psychical 
libidinal energies in adulthood with sexual aims limited by fixation in relation to 
objects that represented the breast-mother-milk configuration of infancy 
(Abraham, 1924b, 1916). Those were the psychoanalytic processes at stake.  
In ‘The First Pregenital Stage of the Libido’ (1916) Abraham affirms Freud’s 
1905 theory that it is with the important help of “pathological material” 
(Abraham, 1916, p. 251) that psychoanalysis has been able to assume the 
existence of an oral stage, its erotogenic zone, and its impacts, that is, the 
unconscious psychical transformations, developments, and progressions that are 
taking place in accordance with and alongside the organic, biological, physical 
developments of childhood. But, “the earliest, ‘oral’ stage of development of the 
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libido awaits further investigation” because of the problem “that we are 
concerned with developmental processes which are hardly accessible to direct 
observation in children. At this early period the child can give no information 
about the processes of its instinctual life” (Abraham, 1916, pp. 251-252). 
However it seems clear that something is taking place that could have psychic 
implications: 
 
We need only call to mind the intensity with which the child even 
from its earliest days indulges in ‘pleasure-sucking’. The zest with 
which it pushes both hands into its mouth, the impetuous way in 
which it catches at its fingers with its lips, its complete abandonment 
to the rhythmical motion of sucking and the final gratificatory effect 
of the whole process – all this shows what power is exercised by those 
early instinctual impulses. This power is clearly perceptible from the 
fact that many people remain subservient to it even in adult life. 
(Abraham, 1916, pp. 265-266) 
 
The oral stage is concerned with the consumption and the incorporation of the 
object into the body, the unconscious desire to “devour and demolish his object” 
(Abraham, 1916, p. 276). One patient, of whom Abraham (1916, p. 256) wrote 
that  “as an adult he still felt most intensely that form of gratification which bore 
the character of incorporation, it is clear that his libido had experienced a strong 
fixation”, was insightful enough to feel himself that “his longing to suck milk was 
his deepest and most primitive instinct” (Abraham, 1916, p. 255). The conflict 
between ambivalent feelings – love versus hate, hostility versus friendliness – 
together with the “destroy” or “control” sadistic tendencies that can be directed 
towards the object during the process of incorporation are elements that are 
highlighted by Abraham (1924b, p. 438, p. 428). The potentially destructive, 
sadistic oral relations in the life of the adult and its impacts on relations with 
objects both internal and external, that is, with the self and with society, became 
core to Klein’s developmental theories (e.g. see Segal, 1973). And such 
potentially orality-based ambivalent feelings and fears – and sadistic ‘destroy or 
control’ attitudes – also featured in the narrative accounts of Ferenczi and his 
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patients both in terms of their own relations and with regard to money and 
financial affairs, as discussed in Chapter Three. Fears such as fear of being eaten 
up, consumed, or devoured. 
5. Abraham’s ‘Oral Erotism and Character’ and ‘Money’.  
Attempting to outline the possible character traits that could be sourced to 
orality in his paper ‘The Influence of Oral Erotism on Character-Formation’ 
(1924a), Abraham states firmly early on that anality has to be understood on the 
basis that “the origin of the anal character is very closely connected with the 
history of oral erotism” (Abraham, 1924a, p. 395). Freud’s 1908 anal 
characteristics have to be referenced back even further to oral sources as it 
would seem that Abraham believed, correctly, that you cannot understand the 
one without the other. Thus orality is an earlier, primitive, phase with profound 
consequences on the unconscious that anality seems not to override. It is a phase 
that merits being investigated on its own terms, because, as Abraham justly 
writes: “the first and therefore perhaps the most important step the individual 
makes towards attaining a normal attitude in his final social and sexual 
relationships consists in dealing successfully with his oral erotism” (1924a, p. 
397).  
The argument being made in this thesis that a dual key is required to unlock the 
double doors to a deeper understanding of what ‘money’ might mean in the 
unconscious – and thus the possible unconscious motivations driving financial 
corruption – now receives strong support from Karl Abraham: underlying anality 
is orality. Sequentially and temporally orality precedes anality, but in addition 
and critically, they also overlap, as Abraham points out: “At about the time that 
the child is being weaned it is also being trained in habits of cleanliness” (1924a, 
p. 396). It is during this biting phase of orality that the baby demonstrates 
ambivalent and sadistic desires to not only incorporate the mother’s 
breast/body but also to attempt to devour and destroy it. Whilst the mother’s 
body is also incorporated via the breast milk during the toothless sucking period, 
she is not attacked in the same manner, her destruction is not sought after. 
According to Abraham variations in oral character-formation depend on whether 
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those character features are expressing “the earlier or the later oral stage; 
whether, in other words, it is the expression of an unconscious tendency to suck 
or to bite” (1924a, p. 402). An example of what Abraham means with regard to 
the biting stage is: “The covetous impulses which are derived from the second 
oral stage” (1924a, p. 403).  
But it is not only a matter of covetousness, the further example of “over-
developed envy”, which has already been alluded to at the beginning of this 
chapter. It is the compensatory activities that can result from the forgoing of and 
the repression of pleasures and satisfactions of infantile oral erotism that are 
most interesting. But such renunciations, reversals, sublimations, and 
displacements taking place in the unconscious are varied, with manifestations 
that are apparent psychoanalytically in adulthood. The question now becomes: 
What can the variations in oral erotism illuminate as to the roots of the interest in 
and need for ‘money’? With regard to parsimonious and avaricious adults – the 
character traits that Freud explored in 1908 – Abraham observes that these 
traits are “built up on the ruins of an oral erotism whose development has 
miscarried” (1924a, p. 398). One critical factor is the amount of anxiety that can 
be generated by these states of mind: 
Neurotic parsimony, which may be developed to the point of avarice, 
is often met with in people who are inhibited from properly earning a 
livelihood; and the anal sources of character-formation provide no 
explanation of it. It is in fact connected with an inhibition of the 
craving for objects, and this indicates that the libido has undergone 
some special vicissitude. The pleasure in acquiring desired objects 
seems in this case to have been repressed in favour of pleasure in 
holding fast to existing possessions. People in whom we find this 
inhibition are always haunted by a fear lest they should lose the 
smallest part of their possessions. This anxiety prevents them from 
trying to earn money, and renders them in many ways helpless in 
practical life. 
 (Abraham, 1924a, p. 399) 
 
Certain other people, Abraham charged, could be described as living a life in 
which their “entire character is under oral influence” (1924a, p. 399). These 
were people “in whom the sucking was undisturbed and highly pleasurable. They 
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have brought with them from this happy period a deeply-rooted conviction that 
everything will always be well with them” (1924a, p. 399). But such optimism 
did not always bode well for the purpose of earning an income for themselves by 
themselves. Here Abraham determines the shape oral influence takes in practice 
in these cases and brings out the financial implications: 
 
Some people are dominated by the belief that there will always be 
some kind of person – a representative of the mother, of course – to 
care for them and to give them everything they need. This optimistic 
belief condemns them to inactivity. We again recognize in them 
individuals who have been over-indulged in the sucking period. Their 
whole attitude towards life shows that they expect the mother’s 
breast to flow for them eternally, as it were. They make no kind of 
effort, and in some cases they even disdain to undertake a bread-
winning occupation. 
(Abraham, 1924a, pp. 399-400) 
 
For Abraham the highly optimistic unconscious desire for an eternally flowing 
mother’s breast milk – from “a representative of the mother” – acts against the 
conscious need to provide oneself with a “bread-winning occupation”, and in fact 
could prevent that conscious need from being realized. However, the reverse 
attitude of pessimism can also be sourced to orality: to disappointments in oral 
gratification. The resulting apprehensiveness means that: “To him the necessary 
condition of life is that his means of sustenance should be guaranteed to him up 
to the day of his death. He renounces all ideals of personal success in favour of 
receiving an assured and regular income” (1924a, p. 400).  
6. An Hypothesis on Orality and ‘Money’ 
It seems that it might now be possible on the basis of the discussion that 
has been carried out so far in this chapter to move towards forming an 
hypothesis on the meaning of ‘money’ in the unconscious that looks towards 
orality. The manifestations in adulthood from what takes place during the 
pregenital oral development phase have been discussed in the previous section 
in order to answer the initial important question of what orality can illuminate 
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about attitudes to ‘money’ and income. The examples of particular character 
traits that can be sourced to orality which Karl Abraham described in his clinical 
work, stand as very good theoretical and observational foundations upon which 
to proceed towards the formulation of an oral hypothesis on ‘money’.  
On the assumption, supported by the work of Freud and Abraham, that 
orality can be defined as being ultimately about the infant’s primary relationship 
with pleasure under the aegis of a primary object, then the first requirement 
appears to be to identify the status of the substance that is being incorporated by 
the infant: what is the infant’s desire for this substance and what is the infant’s  
satisfaction from this substance? From all accounts within Freudian 
psychoanalytic theory on orality the answer is that the infant desires to be 
nourished by and satisfied by ‘milk’, indeed by “the warm flow of milk”. Freud 
states that:  
 
It was the child’s first and most vital activity, his sucking at his 
mother’s breast, or at substitutes for it, that must have familiarized 
him with this pleasure. The child’s lips, in our view, behave like an 
erotogenic zone, and no doubt stimulation by the warm flow of milk is 
the cause of the pleasurable sensation. The satisfaction of the 
erotogenic zone is associated, in the first instance, with the 
satisfaction of the need for nourishment. 
(Freud, 1905, pp. 181-182) 
 
Pleasure given via the mouth, that is, to the oral erotogenic zone thus becomes 
associated with nourishment. But having satisfied “the need for nourishment” 
from the pleasure of imbibing warm milk, the infant’s mind later progresses to a 
desire to want to repeat such pleasurable sensations even when milk itself is not 
providing them. Thus the infant’s first ever search for pleasure, its primary 
libidinal search for satisfaction, is for a pleasure that he has already experienced 
as a result of the taking of food. Freud provides the apt illustration: 
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No one who has seen a baby sinking back satiated from the breast 
and falling asleep with flushed cheeks and a blissful smile can escape 
the reflection that this picture persists as a prototype of the 
expression of sexual satisfaction in later life. The need for repeating 
the sexual satisfaction now becomes detached from the need for 
taking nourishment  
(Freud, 1905, p. 182) 
 
This separation of the psychical, libidinal, demand for satisfaction from the 
physical, somatic, demand for it is a critical developmental turning point. The 
satiated, satisfied infant has retained an unconscious memory of this blissful, 
post-feeding state of affairs, which can drive its demand for a repeat:  
 
The state of being in need of a repetition of the satisfaction reveals 
itself in two ways: by a peculiar feeling of tension, possessing, rather, 
the character of unpleasure, and by a sensation of itching or 
stimulation which is centrally conditioned and projected on to the 
peripheral erotogenic zone. 
(Freud, 1905, p. 184) 
 
A patient of Abraham’s provides a study in how archaic is this unconscious 
desire, how located its memory is in the past, and how rooted it is in the orality 
of milk, mother’s milk, and the reconstitution of the pleasure of sucking from the 
breast: 
 
One day, filled with an intense dissatisfaction with life, feeling without 
energy and wanting nothing to eat, he went to bed. His mother 
brought him a cup of milk. As he put the cup to his mouth and his lips 
came in contact with the fluid, he had, as he expressed it, ‘a mingled 
sensation of warmth, softness, and sweetness.’ This sensation 
surprised him, and yet seemed to be something known to him in the 
distant past; and at the same time it had an inexplicably soothing 
effect on him. 
(Abraham, 1916, pp. 272-273) 
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Abraham’s explains the unconscious force that led his patient to find the solace 
he sought in such a manner: 
 
When now his attempt to get rid of his fixation had failed … and he 
began to suffer from a severe depression, he unconsciously turned 
again to his earliest source of pleasure. The milk brought him by his 
mother awakened the earliest traces of pleasurable memories, and he 
was able to alleviate his depression for the time being. 
(Abraham, 1916, p. 273) 
 
To reiterate what happens to the infant it can be stated that: the first demand is 
for the need of milk, nourishment, food; then follows the pleasure and 
satisfaction of receiving that food; then this is followed by the psychical urge to 
experience that pleasure and satisfaction again because it will represent the 
feelings of being and having been fed. Freud (1905, p. 184) writes that: “in the 
case of the labial zone: it is the simultaneous connection which links this part of 
the body with the taking in of food” that is now detached to stand on its own as 
the psychical representative. This critical developmental point is thus crucial for 
the progress towards the symbolic connection of ‘money’ to orality in the 
unconscious and for how ‘money’ might be represented in the unconscious. A 
simultaneous, spontaneous connection followed by a spontaneous detaching that 
cannot be construed as having been taught. This is the spontaneity of the forming 
of a symbolic equation that was argued earlier as missing from the theory of 
anality and ‘money’, because that theory rests upon how the infant is taught 
cleanliness during toilet training, whilst the forming of a truly symbolic equation 
(Jones, 1916) does not require tuition. It should be spontaneous, as Ferenczi 
(1914) himself pointed to and, as was argued in Chapter Two, he thus 
inadvertently also pointed to a deep fault line in his championing of anality’s 
unconscious symbolization with ‘money’. But here, with regard to the oral 
erotogenic zone, there is an act of unconscious spontaneity in the mechanism of 
the switching of the flow of the primary libidinal current from the demand of the 
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need for nourishment to the demand for the repetition of the representation – 
the blissful state – of the pleasure of having been fed. A spontaneous, 
unconscious, symbolizing process has taken place with regard to the connection 
between primary pleasure and satisfaction and food. 
As a result of the arguments that have been made in this chapter, it would now 
seem appropriate and feasible to attempt an hypothesis on orality, the 
unconscious, and ‘money’.  
Therefore, the hypothesis that can now be made in this thesis is that the 
prototype inner state of pleasure and satisfaction from being and having been 
fed as an infant is an archaic prototype that persists in the unconscious precisely 
because it is the prototype for primary satisfaction. Thus, it can be hypothesized 
that whatever represents and comes to symbolize the ability to provide food and 
nourishment will be equated unconsciously, symbolically, with the provision of 
basic, primary pleasure and satisfaction. And the hypothesis being made holds 
both for the pleasure and satisfaction received from food and any displeasure 
and dissatisfaction. Thus, it can be argued that what represents ‘money’, or the 
ability to purchase ‘food’, will come to stand in the unconscious for pleasure and 
satisfaction from food, or the anxiety and fear of hunger and possible starvation 
from the deprivation or non-availability of food. 
7. Displeasure and Dissatisfaction 
It is in Abraham’s work that not only the satisfactions but also the 
dissatisfactions, anxieties, and fears of not having enough food are detailed. It is 
the important reminder that pleasure is not always encountered during the oral 
phase’s sucking stage. “Given certain conditions of nourishment the sucking 
period can be an extremely displeasurable one for the child. In some cases its 
earliest pleasurable craving is imperfectly gratified, and it is deprived of the 
enjoyment of the sucking stage” (Abraham, 1924a, p. 397). It is important to 
bring out these details in order to highlight the contention that the hypothesis 
being made is relevant to both receiving and not receiving satisfaction from food:  
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we must bear in mind that the pleasure of the sucking period is to a 
great extent a pleasure in taking, in being given something. It then 
becomes apparent that any quantitative divergence from the usual 
degree of pleasure gained can give rise to disturbances. 
(Abraham, 1924a, p. 397) 
 
Writing of cases in which he states that there has been an “abnormally” 
pleasurable sucking period, Abraham warns that repercussions follow: 
 
In other cases the same period is abnormally rich in pleasure. It is well 
known how some mothers indulge the craving for pleasure in their 
infants by granting them every wish. The result is that it is 
extraordinary difficult to wean the child, and it sometimes takes two 
or three years to do it. In a few cases the child persists in taking food 
by sucking from a bottle until it is almost grown up. 
(Abraham, 1924a, p. 397) 
  
But both pleasurable and unpleasurable sucking period experiences leave the 
same mark: a pressing desire to obtain pleasure:  
 
Whether in this early period of life the child has had to go without 
pleasure or has been indulged with an excess of it, the effect is the 
same. It takes leave of the sucking stage under difficulties. Since its 
need for pleasure has either not been sufficiently gratified or has 
become too insistent 
(Abraham, 1924a, p. 397) 
 
The fear of disappointments in the search for pleasure can return the infant, 
force it to regress, to the level of orality during which biting is prevalent and 
during which the forces of sadistic attitudes prevail, such as envy, which 
deserves to be highlighted again:  
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In the child who has been disappointed or over-indulged in the 
sucking period the pleasure in biting, which is also the most primitive 
form of sadism, will be especially emphasized. Thus the formation of 
character in such a child begins under the influence of an abnormally 
pronounced ambivalence of feeling. In practice such a disturbance of 
the development of character expresses itself in pronounced 
characteristics of hostility and dislike. It accounts for the presence of 
the abnormally over-developed envy which is so common. 
(Abraham, 1924a, p. 398) 
  
8 . From Coprophilic to Gastronomic Objects 
It can now be stated that for anality, ‘money’ is faeces; for orality, ‘money’ is food. 
The theoretical psychoanalytic writings of Freud and Abraham provide a strong 
foundation to support the hypothesis being made that argues for the connection 
of food, and the symbolic representatives of food, to both primary satisfaction 
and primary pleasure, and primary dissatisfaction and displeasure in the 
unconscious. This chapter has discussed and provided examples of the work by 
Karl Abraham that have illustrated the displaced actions and the sublimated 
behaviour in adults influenced by oral erotism and oral sadism. But, as a final 
topic in closing, it is necessary to discuss that which in orality becomes akin to 
anality’s coprophilic objects, the equivalents to Ferenczi’s postulated coprophilic 
symbolizations with stones, sand, marbles, etc. Here, the term ‘gastronomic’ has 
been chosen as being the one best suited for the purpose of describing an object 
whose usage can be traced to its psychical linkage to ‘food’ in the unconscious. A 
gastronomic object stands symbolically for food-equating-money in the 
unconscious. But in the facts of everyday life ‘money’ is food and nutrition – the 
ability to buy and have food – thus ‘money’ is the ultimate gastronomic object. 
‘Money’ is itself food because of its prime access, but ‘money’ cannot be eaten as 
food. 
All metal representatives of cash would perform well in the conversion from 
staid, mundane, objective object to psychical symbol in the unconscious. Cash 
would be followed by paper bills and notes embossed with their actual values. 
These would then be followed by cheques, cheque books, and I.O.U.s, bills and 
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bonds. The ‘cashing in’ and ‘banking’ actions performed by individuals transform 
and convert the latter list from nondescript paper into, in a sense, superior 
gastronomic symbols more readily available to be realized into providing 
pleasure and satisfaction. Today the credit and debit card reign ubiquitously.     
The argument underlying the oral hypothesis is that ‘money’ is the primary 
symbolic representative of ‘food’. Therefore the final thought in this chapter 
concerns the gold coin. Arguably, the gold coin would still be the most celebrated 
gastronomic object. Ferenczi’s beautiful description provides a reminder of the 
perennial allure: 
 
The eye takes pleasure at the sight of their lustre and colour, the ear 
at their metallic clink, the sense of touch at play with the round 
smooth discs, only the sense of smell comes away empty, and the 
sense of taste also has to be satisfied with the weak, but peculiar 
taste of the coins. 
(Ferenczi, The Ontogenesis of the Interest in Money, 1914, p. 327) 
 
The alluring sensuality of this passage is encased in an orally erotically charged 
sexuality of language that Ferenczi appeared not to notice and certainly did not 
want to develop. The “weak, but peculiar” taste that one has to be “satisfied” with 
and, indeed, the need in the first place to “sense” the “taste of the coins” in the 
mouth are clearly highly oral with sexual overtones. Although one could argue 
that the sight and appreciation of the gold coin would seem to draw the 
unconscious in all kinds of directions, there is little doubting its oral (and 
gastronomic) symbolism.   
But what are the implications of this unconscious orality, and the psychoanalytic 
hypothesis that has been formed on orality in this chapter, for the narratives and 
discourses that feature mankind’s corrupt relations with ‘money’, particularly 
when those narratives concern specific localities and settings? Such an 
exploration is undertaken in Chapter Five.   
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Chapter Five 
ORALITY AND THE PSYCHOANALYTIC POSITIONING OF 
FINANCIAL CORRUPTION 
 
PART ONE: CORRUPTION AND ITS CONTEXTS 
1. Introduction 
Unconsciously and then consciously a young child appears unilaterally 
and spontaneously to believe that everything is free. Like mother’s milk; like ripe 
fruit hanging on a tree – ready for plucking and eating without any charge, 
without anything that is denominated as ‘money’ having to be handed over. It 
appears now, on the basis of the work that has preceded this present chapter, 
that one can with justification make such a statement. In effect, the research aim 
– an attempt at a psychoanalytic discourse on the roots of acts of financial 
corruption – in the course of the investigation had split into two aims – one could 
say in an entirely appropriate psychoanalytic manner. The initial main aim was 
the broaching of a theoretical psychoanalytic discourse on financial corruption 
within a specific historical and social context. When that work was first broached 
through a review of the psychoanalytic literature on ‘money’, the missing 
construction of possible oral theories with regard to ‘money’ created a second 
aim: the substantiation of the theoretical plausibility of a hypothesis on orality 
for the meaning of ‘money’ in the unconscious. It was essential for the work of 
this thesis that the possible orality of ‘money’ was hypothesized in order to join 
the anality theory and to fill the gap in theory that had been overlooked.  
It would now seem that the stage has been reached where certain statements can 
be asserted with strong theoretical psychoanalytic grounds to support them. 
Certain strands can now begin to be pulled together in the tentative progress 
towards a discourse on financial corruption that is based on psychoanalytic 
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theory. The journey that has been embarked upon in this thesis has reached the 
place where the psychoanalytic methodology outlined in earlier chapters can 
now be put to work. It can be asserted with some confidence that the oral 
hypothesis as set out in Chapter Four will become very useful in tanswering the 
further probing that will take place in this chapter. With the addition of an oral 
hypothesis, the role that ‘money’ can play in the unconscious can now be 
ascribed a duality of theoretical possibilities, in a sense, a duality of theoretical 
existences: orality can join anality as a representation for the meaning of ‘money’ 
in the unconscious.  
It is with an element of cautious relief that the statement can be made that the 
journey embarked upon at the outset has reached its destination point in this 
chapter despite, or rather because of, the detour, the infrastructural requirement 
of the formulation of an oral hypothesis. This formulation became necessary  for 
the continuation of the journey and the arrival at the destination. The research 
question that became paramount, that is, can a hypothesis be formed that 
postulates orality as a source for an unconscious equation with ‘money’ – has 
now been answered in the affirmative. This now means that the spotlight can 
now be directed firmly on the other strand of the enquiry, that is to say, how a 
psychoanalytic understanding of ‘money’ also based on orality can be relevant to 
acts of financial corruption, particularly in the societal and cultural contexts 
emerging and transitional economies. In other words, we will now turn to the 
exploration of how the process of unrepressing a need based on orality may give 
rise in particular circumstances to acts of excessive greed and theft.   
Following on from the discussions in Chapter Four it can be further asserted that 
fundamentally and primarily ‘money’ could exist in a repressed oral-erotically or 
oral-sadistically derived, sexual instinct charged, symbolic equation with ‘food’ 
and what ‘food’ means to mankind’s self-preservation and self image.  
Orality’s rootedness in primal need, primal pleasure, and primal satisfaction 
precedes anality. This decision to extend the concept of the drives/instincts to 
bring in and incorporate attitudes to ‘money’ and attitudes to wealth creation 
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can be said to have Freud’s overall backing as expressive of his general theory of 
sexuality. In ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ Freud writes that:   
 
Psychoanalysis, which could not escape making some assumptions 
about the instincts, kept at first to the popular division of instincts 
typified in the phrase ‘hunger and love’. At least there was nothing 
arbitrary in this; and by its help the analysis of the psychoneuroses 
was carried forward quite a distance. The concept of ‘sexuality’, and 
at the same time of the sexual instinct, had, it is true, to be extended 
so as to cover many things which could not be classed under the 
reproductive function; and this caused no little hubbub in an austere, 
respectable or merely hypocritical world. 
(Freud S. , Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 1920, p. 51) 
 
In the end the choices that the pioneering psychoanalysts made regarding the 
drives/instincts were at the same time both fundamental and arbitrary: only 
‘hunger and love’ and not ‘money’ to provide protection from hunger and to 
provide for loved ones. Freud’s own observations – both clinical and personal – 
should have revealed to him that it was highly likely that there was a ‘need’ to 
have ‘money’, a ‘need’ to make ‘money’. But in psychoanalysis ‘money’ was 
relegated to being of only minor theoretical importance. While Freud was 
endeavouring to construct his disturbing theorisation of the death drive, there 
was still no reconsideration or reworking of his earlier passing theoretical 
statements on ‘money’. However, in the same paper, Freud proceeds to make an 
apt general point about the validity and worthiness of theoretical constructions 
and the particular importance of observed material:  
 
I do not dispute the fact that the third step in the theory of the 
instincts, which I have taken here, cannot lay claim to the same 
degree of certainty as the two earlier ones – the extension of the 
concept of sexuality and the hypothesis of narcissism. These two 
innovations were a direct translation of observation into theory and 
were no more open to sources of error than is inevitable in all such 
cases. It is true that my assertion of the regressive character of 
instincts also rests upon observed material – namely on the facts of 
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the compulsion to repeat. It may be, however, that I have 
overestimated their significance. It is perfectly legitimate to reject 
remorselessly theories which are contradicted by the very first steps 
in the analysis of observed facts, while yet being aware at the same 
time that the validity of one’s own theory is only a provisional one. 
(Freud S. , Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 1920, pp. 59-60) 
 
Otto Fenichel in ‘The Drive to Amass Wealth’ asked: “Is there an instinctual drive 
to amass wealth?” (Fenichel, 1938, p. 69). As already discussed in Chapter One, 
this direct question was asked in the context of the division between the impact 
of ideological processes, such as ‘market forces’ and capitalism, and the 
“biological”, but it remains essential to any probing of and thinking about 
financial corruption. The excessive greed and rapid increase in corrupt acts that 
are characteristic of former communist countries, for example, could be 
expressions of an oral instinct that was not previously given sufficient or any 
outlet for discharge. As previously mentioned, this was effectively observed by 
Mazin with regard to post-communist Russia: “Man was turned into a biological 
organism with an instinctive love of money, itself transfigured into a kind of 
mother’s milk for adults” (Mazin, 2012, p. 155).   
With the construction of a dual key, the formulation of an oral hypothesis to add 
to the standard classical anal theory of ‘money’, attempts to unlock the doors 
leading to the possible psychoanalytic unconscious motivations underlying acts 
of financial corruption are likely to be less daunting. A discourse that brings in 
repressed orality can now be considered with strong psychoanalytic theoretical 
support as being feasible, warranted, and even necessary. When considering 
psychoanalytic theories of ‘money’, a broader psychoanalytic discourse on 
probable unconscious meanings can be undertaken.  What will be presented now 
is that with the addition and alternative of orality – which, as argued, was 
ignored and unexplored because of the entrenchment of anality – it is highly 
likely that: the possible existence of a drive to accumulate ‘money’ and wealth 
could be sourced to orality. And as a result: it could be possible that an act of 
financial corruption could be positioned as a derivative or a fixation or a 
perversion of an oral drive.  
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2. Repressions and the Ego  
In attempting to fill in the gap that psychoanalytic theory on ‘money’ has left 
over the decades and extending the sexual instinct via the oral drive and its 
repressions into the realm of ‘money’ and financial wealth creation, a question 
arises as to the nature of the repressions that could be taking place. Although this 
chapter takes into consideration the more traditional Freudian psychoanalytic 
forms of repression that involve the mechanisms of displacement of sadistic and 
erotic tendencies, another more general repression, one that is more 
phylogenetic in its nature, and more social in scope, is worth noting at this 
junction and provides further justification for the decision to maintain the 
anality theory whilst also adding the new oral hypothesis. The question that 
could be posed is this: Was there a repression of the importance of food to 
mankind?  It will be argued that this links to a repression of a sense of 
humiliation at being held ransom by biological need. It may be that human 
beings repressed their humiliation at the recognition of the fact that despite their 
evolution, despite all their technological progress, they still had a dependency on 
food for survival. Humiliation could be sparked by the realization of the extent of 
their dependency: an almost infantilizing necessity to be assured of food 
security. They needed food whatever the cost. What a humiliation that there was 
still one thing that they could not do without! They could manage to live without 
sex. But there was something even more fundamental than the ability to breed 
and reproduce that they were not able to master going without. Repressed 
humiliation at extreme dependency could be discharged as contempt. That is, the 
affect of severe anxiety surrounding this dependency on food, and thus on 
‘money’ the means of its acquirement, could be transformed into a contempt that 
was displaced and transferred onto something that would be deemed as 
worthless: faeces. Something as important as ‘money’, must, has to become 
meaningless and rendered as nothing, as shit. Was not, and is not, the use of the 
symbolizing of faeces as ‘money’ also in connection with the shame, guilt, and 
humiliation of the repressed knowledge of the craving, need, and desire for 
‘money’? There will be further reflections on this matter in Chapter Six. 
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The construction of an oral hypothesis allows the possibility of an underlying 
repression of this kind and its accompanying state of repressed fear of hunger, 
starvation, and famine. It also allows for its unrepression. With an oral 
hypothesis for the meaning of ‘money’ in the unconscious, the agency of the ego 
in particular may strive to operate actively as loving the chosen object that 
constitutes itself as ‘money’ or ‘money’-related instead of despising or dismissing 
it. On the relation between repression and the ego, Freud writes that: 
 
Repression, we have said, proceeds from the ego; we might say with 
greater precision that it proceeds from the self-respect of the ego. 
The same impressions, experiences, impulses and desires that one 
man indulges or at least works over consciously will be rejected with 
the utmost indignation by another, or even stifled before they enter 
consciousness. The difference between the two, which contains the 
conditioning factor of repression, can easily be expressed in terms 
which enable it to be explained by the libido theory. We can say that 
the one man has set up an ideal in himself by which he measures his 
actual ego, while the other has formed no such ideal. For the ego the 
formation of an ideal would be the conditioning factor of repression. 
(Freud, 1914, pp. 93-94) 
   
With the ego (Freud, 1923) being one’s relationship with the outside world or 
the impact of the outside world’s relationship with you, repression would 
operate as a pathogenic conflict of cultural and moral ideas with the human 
being’s charged, cathected, instinctual drives. The proposition of the 
unrepression of an oral-related need for ‘money’ allows an urge for, a love for, 
‘money’ to be characterized as love and “love is assessed like any other activity of 
the ego” (Freud, 1914, p. 99): 
 
Loving in itself, in so far as it involves longing and deprivation, lowers 
self-regard; whereas being loved, having one’s love returned, and 
possessing the loved object, raises it once more. When libido is 
repressed, the erotic cathexis is felt as a severe depletion of the ego, 
the satisfaction of love is impossible, and the re-enrichment of the 
ego can be effected only by a withdrawal of libido from its objects. 
 137 
The return of the object-libido to the ego and its transformation into 
narcissism represents, as it were, a happy love once more 
(Freud, 1914, pp. 99-100) 
 
Freud proceeds to make this crucial point: “Being in love consists in a flowing-
over of ego-libido on to the object. It has the power to remove repressions and 
re-instate perversions. It exalts the sexual object into a sexual ideal” (Freud, 
1914, p. 100). And further: “The ego ideal opens up an important avenue for the 
understanding of group psychology. In addition to its individual side, this ideal 
has a social side; it is also the common ideal of a family, a class or a nation” 
(Freud, 1914, p. 101).     
3. Defining ‘Money’ and ‘Food’  
 
In preceding chapters the term ‘money’ has been kept in inverted commas. In 
Chapter One the traditional meanings and usages of the terms ‘money’ and 
wealth were examined though an engagement with thinkers such as Adam Smith 
(1776), Marx (1844), and Keynes (1936). But given the symbolic connection that 
has been hypothesized between ‘money’ and orality, it is now necessary to probe 
further the question of why people need and want something called ‘money’. 
With the link to primal orality, it is possible to answer the question ‘Why do you 
need money?’ by the statement ‘money’ is needed to maximize pleasure. It is also 
possible now to offer a first definition of ‘money’ as being what is necessary for 
the maximization of pleasure. This would encompass the necessity of acquiring 
food. Although food is grown and is inherently free as a free good, food products  
have to be paid for. For example, apples are ‘free’: a tree in the garden or in an 
orchard can be picked at will, but a bottle of cider or apple vinegar or a carton of 
apple juice are products of apples that have to be made out of the processing of 
apples. Using a definition of ‘money’ that includes the maximization of pleasures, 
in addition to the traditional definitions of ‘money’ that centre on its role as the 
means of exchange and means of valuation, allows for the following assumption 
to be made with regard to what constitutes ‘food’. If ‘money’ is maximizing 
pleasure, and ‘money’ under the orality hypothesis symbolically represents 
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‘food’, the assumption would follow that whatever ‘money’ is able to purchase 
also represents ‘food’ and also provides pleasures. In other words,  the 
unconscious meanings of ‘food’ could be a far wider group of products and 
activities that provide sustenance than merely edible products.  
This assumption has important ramifications for what could be considered as 
‘food’ other than food to eat.  In this chapter a wider definition of ‘food’ will be 
used’, one where it will be defined and approached as not only what is consumed 
in order to maintain the physical body and its biological functioning, but also, 
and almost as importantly, as anything that feeds one’s ego, one’s psychic self, and 
thus mental functioning. In this definition, therefore, a new car or an expensive 
watch or a designer dress or the most fashionable pair of trainers or a 36-
bedroomed villa or the latest mobile phone may be, and often is, as sustenance 
providing to particular people, and as absolutely vital to have, as a loaf of bread, 
a T-bone steak, or a three-course meal. As is observable from these examples, 
what is already apparent is the question of excess, overconsumption, and even 
greed. Should one know when one has enough ‘food’ in this broader definition? 
The answer to that is both yes and no, in that what is ‘enough’ pertains to the 
unconscious as much as to what is conscious, and furthermore prey to pressure 
from socio-political structures.  
Indeed, when forced to have just common food, as in basic food provisions 
purchased to eat for physical health and biological wellbeing, and having to forgo 
other ego-feeding ‘food’ products, or the ability to acquire them, would not 
resentment, anger, trouble and even violence be the result? A good example of 
such occurrences would be during times of economic depressions and austerity 
cuts. Even some of those not forced by necessity to use ‘food banks’ – an 
interestingly gastronomic term in itself – generally seem to bemoan vociferously 
the drop in their “living standards”. The need to access the abstracted, 
gastronomic forms and representations of ‘money’ – paper notes, coins, credit 
and debit cards, wage and salary rises – becomes dangerously paramount during 
such “depressed” times in order to purchase derivatives of ‘food’ in as many 
concrete and abstracted forms as possible.  
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This stretched, flexible definition of what constitutes ‘food’ and the preceding 
orality-infused definition of ‘money’ means that the inverted commas can now be 
removed, as now the terms in which those words are going to be used in this 
chapter have been stated. The most important contextual consequence of the 
definitions is that if money is defined as the necessity for the maximization of 
pleasures, and life is about the pursuit of pleasures, then money is necessary in 
order to have the ability to live life to its maximum capacities for the realization 
of pleasures: Money then becomes necessary for life. Happiness, love, food 
security, stable living environment, peace – these are just some things that could 
be said to be pleasures which one seeks to enjoy in life. To have the money to do 
so then becomes necessary to enable people to achieve their satisfactions. Thus, 
acquiring money becomes an aim that has to be satisfied to achieve these pleasure 
goals. That would have an impact on any discussion of financial corruption. But 
so too, would the following consideration: corrupted, that is, as a corrupted aim 
or a perverted aim, money could be pursued for itself as a satisfaction: it could 
become an aim in itself.  
4. Man Corrupt – or Corrupted?  
Let us return to a quote already deployed in the first chapter of this thesis, one 
by Joseph Nye, the academic and writer on corruption and national affairs: 
Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role 
because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or 
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-
regarding influence. 
(Nye, 1967) 
In the same chapter a definition of financial corruption was articulated in the 
following way: ‘Financial corruption: the abuse of power, privilege, influence, 
or legal access, for personal monetary gain’. But, as we proceed to discuss 
psychoanalysis and financial corruption the following point needs to be made 
clear at the outset: the investigation’s focus is not on the economic 
developmental, social, and cultural crises manifested by the surge in acts of 
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financial corruption today, (although of course they hover implicitly as they were 
the impetus to the preoccupations tthat led to the research recorded in these 
pages). The focus in the remaining chapters will be on investigating how 
psychoanalysis might contribute possible explanations into an individual’s 
unconscious motivations for such acts. Furthermore, it will centre on what impact 
the historical situation could have had on people living at a particular time, in the 
1960’s in certain African countries, at a time when acts of financial corruption 
began to dominate economic, social, and cultural spheres in the region. A return 
to the past to explain what is in effect the beginnings of a contemporary illness 
that has been likened to a “cancer” (Wolfensohn, 1996), a cancer that has kept on 
growing and whose beginnings need to be examined in order to try to determine 
the probable causations of the growth. What kind of forces in a society could give 
rise to a corrupt relationship between an individual and money?  
Developing countries in particular, and those who live in them, have come to 
embody financial corruption in much popular discourse. The contexts in which 
such critiques have arisen have to be examined,  in order to explore the possible 
psychoanalytic impacts of sudden wealth availability in developing or 
transitional countries. What is to be attempted in this chapter is an analysis of 
how certain key psychoanalytic theories – what could be termed ‘blueprint’ 
Freudian psychoanalytic theories for their architectural and foundational aspects 
might be useful in the examination of the individual and the roots of financial 
corruption, and the interaction between new wealth and new power in a 1960s 
newly independent African country. Nigeria is chosen as exemplary here, as that 
country had been the object of serious early research. With the benefit of the 
newly forged second key to enable the unlocking of the door leading to a 
discussion of  the role of money in the unconscious, the question of financial 
corruption briefly touched upon in Chapter One, will take on a new dimension 
and an added fullness. With the aid of an oral hypothesis a real engagement is 
brought into being with what could be at the source of a subject’s given 
unconscious mental processes and their interactions with the complex social 
issues emanating from both the group and the society to which that he belongs. 
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The portals through which entry is gained on the theme of financial corruption 
and through which discussions are brought to bear on how psychoanalytic 
theoretical formulations can bring understandings to these difficult and 
problematic issues are four texts by leading corruption analysts written during 
the 1960s on corruption and Africa. They comprise the book Corruption in 
Developing Countries by Wraith and Simpkins, and three papers: Kenneth T. 
Young’s 1961 paper, ‘New Politics in New States’; Colin Leys (1965) ‘What is the 
Problem about Corruption?’; and David Bayley (1966) ‘The Effects of Corruption 
in a Developing Nation’. They were chosen as representative for their clarity, 
their identification of the issues at stake in both broad and narrow terms, their 
detail, their acknowledgement of  the novelty of the situation and the accuracy of 
their historically abstracted observations and predictions. The papers of David 
Bayley and Colin Leys will form the backbone of an attempt to ‘analyze’ financial 
corruption psychoanalytically – in terms of the individual subject’s psyche within 
the complexities of social arrangements.  They will be assessed together in a 
later section of this chapter, with an additional rationale for their choice. Further, 
it was a deliberate intention that these authors were western observers, because 
in the period under examination – the 1960s – both the study of corruption 
academically and the discourse of psychoanalysis were inherently western 
discourses.  A critique of this (western) aspect of these disciplines lies beyond 
the immediate scope of this thesis but needs nevertheless to be stated, even 
though the overall  perspective I have taken throughout is that of a return to 
Freud. Thus the emphasis and the approach chosen aim for a simplified but 
substantive citing of blueprint classical Freudian theoretical writings in order to 
sketch some of the key thinking that could be useful in forming the basis of 
distinctive psychoanalytic Freudian narratives on what could potentially 
underlie an individual’s act of financial corruption.  
5. Starving The Ego, Feeding The Ego 
We are now in the Africa of the 1960s and money is tempting the soul of a 
given individual in a newly independent country. This section stands as an 
attempt to draw an initial sketch of the landscape that was in existence in, say 
Nigeria, at that time. We will try to provide an initial insight into the probable 
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situation of people both ordinary and those in position of leadership. It is 
apposite to begin by recalling the general scene described by Wraith and 
Simpkins in Corruption in Developing Countries, as they opened the door to a 
study of the rise of financial corruption in Africa:  
   
In Africa corruption flourishes as luxuriantly as the bush and the 
weeds which it so much resembles, taking the goodness from the soil 
and suffocating the growth of plants which have been carefully, and 
expensively, bred and tended. The forces ranged against it are 
negligible; not negligible in fire or indignation or idealism, but quite 
simply negligible in weight.  
(Wraith & Simpkins, 1963, pp. 12-13) 
 
Importantly, as they set the scene they state that: 
The new African countries are poor, and are trying to pull themselves 
up by their own bootstraps. The public men on whom wealth has 
descended in a sudden and unimaginable torrent are not heirs to a 
tradition of comfortable bank balances and public responsibility; they 
are nouveaux riches tycoons of public administration. Those who 
happened to be in the right place at the right time were not all of 
them cultivated, educated or upright men. They are not to be 
compared with the men on whom public responsibility descended, in 
Cabinet, civil service or town hall, in the rising tide of Victorian 
prosperity in Britain. 
(Wraith & Simpkins, 1963, p. 13) 
 
In these new African countries new social conditions were being created due to 
the deep transformations that were taking place. As a result new types of African 
men were coming into existence who were in stark contrast to a landscape 
dominated by poverty. They are the newly enriched: the bourgeoisie to be with 
access to power, public position, and money. They are the nouveaux riches who 
wanted money and were striving to amass wealth while surrounded by poverty.  
The portal that Wraith and Simpkins provide in their book to this landscape of 
the 1960s is invaluable. They were based in Nigeria in West Africa, which 
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provides a focus for a closer examination of what was happening on the ground 
in an African country with respect to corrupt acts. In the following long but 
excellently detailed citation they linguistically and visually unveil at necessary 
length the historical epoch that prevailed and the actions that were common and 
routine on a daily level lower down the scale of financial enrichment activities.  
For while some of the corruption of which one hears in high places 
has at least a robust and buccaneering flavour, the corruption which 
one experiences oneself, or learns of at first hand through the 
tribulations of African dependants, is depressingly mean and squalid; 
and it is all-pervasive. It is distressing that people who in the life of 
family, clan or tribe are generous with one another to the point of 
destitution should in the world of cash services, and among strangers, 
become so mean that the simplest service is extorted, quite illicitly, 
for a ‘dash’ or rake-off. It is incongruous that in the merciful 
professions of nursing and medicine the out-patient must find his 
two-pence for admission, at the head of the queue, to his rightful 
place; that in the most ignominious of human emergencies the bed-
pan can only be secured for a penny; that the pound note is looked 
for under the pillow of the consulting room of the Government 
doctor. To put a man in the way of a job at £5 a month ought, one 
would have supposed, to be a simple human kindness among people 
so underprivileged that to have a job at all is to be an aristocrat. To 
spoil it by the demand of a rake-off of several shillings a week for a 
year seems grasping and callous. To learn of the messenger who 
admits the ‘applicant’ to the presence of the clerk who may help him 
onwards to the boss, but only in return for a series of illicit tolls, is not 
to learn of human nature at its best. 
(Wraith & Simpkins, 1963, p. 17) 
 
The factors pointed out acutely in the above citation are the social relations and 
structural dependencies that are at the same time both evolving and entrenched 
in the society. The Nigerian slang word of “dash” for a bribe or underhand 
payment is still very much in use today.  
At the other end of the scale of money, power, and influence were the acts 
committed by bureaucrats, councillors, and politicians, particularly bribes for 
contracts. A “post”, a “position of power”, or an “office” seemed to be held with 
the knowledge and expectation that the particular post, position, or office, would 
provide opportunities for self-enrichment whether in an overtly corrupt manner 
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or not. But, perhaps, instead of asking what the “holder” does to the status and 
moral claim of the “office” with his or her corrupt actions, one could question 
what the office might be doing to its incumbent with its potentially corrupting 
embodiment of high achievement, rich reward, and promising provision of 
satisfaction of whatever the ego desires and wants. The common saying “power 
corrupts” could be noted here as being related significantly to the conscious and 
unconscious power embedded within and emanating from an all-powerful office 
that envelopes the new office-holder’s mind. Corruption as “an abuse” of public 
office is a standard assessment. But is the ‘corrupt man’ abusing his office or is 
the office abusing the man? Is man corrupt – or is man corrupted? There will be 
further reflection on “the office” in Chapter Six.   
Turning to Kenneth Young’s ‘New Politics in New States’ frames the fraught 
nature of what is happening in Nigeria and other African nations during the 
1960s in terms that reveal that these critical societal transformations were 
taking place in a complicated and competitive global context with intense geo-
political implications. Young observes that around the world “over a billion 
people are experiencing the difficulties and trials of new nation-hood” (Young, 
1961, p. 494) and that:   
 
At the very time that the governments of these new states are 
struggling to get on their own feet and set their own course, they are 
overwhelmed by competing ideas, people and organizations 
descending upon them from the Atlantic and Soviet worlds. They have 
little or no time to reflect upon issues of national policy or to study 
new programs. Of course, the contest of which they are the object is 
also advantageous to them. It gives them an importance out of 
proportion to their strength; they can play one side off against the 
other to get more aid and to increase their own freedom of 
manoeuvre in foreign and domestic policies. Nevertheless, this 
contest as to who shall aid them complicates their political 
development; they are compelled to make basic political decisions in 
conditions of tension and turmoil. 
(Young, 1961, p. 494) 
 
 145 
Wraith and Simpkins focus eyes  the necessary historical background and 
colonial contextualization for the situation in Nigeria by the time the 1960s 
arrived:  
 
For fifty or sixty years Nigeria was a British colony ruled by foreigners, 
with the result that government was always ‘they’, and never ‘we’; a 
friend up to a point, it was an enemy at the deepest level; 
commanding respect and esteem, it never won loyalty or affection. It 
was legitimate field for plunder, though the precautions which it took 
against being plundered were usually adequate. Its greatest fault was 
an inability to delegate, trust or train; to the very end colonial service 
officers worked themselves into the ground with a conscientiousness 
that would have been awe-inspiring if it had been directed towards 
producing capable successors; as it was, it was often pointless. The 
results of this were, first, and somewhat nebulously no doubt, a habit 
of African irresponsibility towards those in power, carried over into 
the days when power came to Africans themselves; and second, an 
almost total absence of senior African civil servants who had 
themselves been trained in honest and responsible attitudes to public 
business. 
(Wraith & Simpkins, 1963, p. 46) 
 
Such negative colonial legacies that Wraith and Simpkins describe as being 
“carried over” must have meant that among the newly-empowered senior civil 
servants in the new offices of the now independent nation would be people who 
had dishonest and irresponsible attitudes towards how the affairs of state should 
be conducted with regard to finance. Wraith and Simpkins imply that corruption 
was inevitable among bureaucrats and government ministers because of “a 
missing generation of Africans” (1963, p. 47) that was capable of acting without 
ulterior financial motives in many public posts of responsibility, power, and 
influence. The situation with councillors and council staff was even worse 
because they were “ill-paid poor relations of the civil service, were even more 
pliable, subject to the will of ill-qualified and frequently unscrupulous 
councillors” (1963, p. 47).  
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One particular Nigerian report cited is entitled “Perverseness in Awarding 
Contracts” and includes this account:  
 
A charming case of ‘perverseness’ is quoted over the award of a 
tailoring contract, the total value of which was £16 7s Od. A certain 
councillor extracted £3, or over 20 per cent, from a tailor for the 
promise of this contract, in blissful ignorance of the fact that two of 
his colleagues on the Council had done the same in respect of other 
tailors. The resultant necessary division of this contract into three, to 
the value of £5 12s 0d for each part, was scarcely worth the layout of 
£3, as the tailors bitterly complained. 
(Wraith & Simpkins, 1963, p. 24) 
 
The contemporary view of the Nigerian academic, Nierum Okogbule, writing in 
the Journal of Financial Crime, places in their societal context these attitudes and 
behaviours that clearly prevailed among both senior and lower civil servants.  
 
While a number of factors may give rise to a situation where a person 
saddled with a particular responsibility would deviate from the 
acceptable conduct, the point remains that such conduct is inherently 
detrimental to the interests of the larger society. Indeed, a 
fundamental understanding of the ramifications of corruption can 
only be feasible if these socio-economic factors are adequately taken 
into consideration. 
 
(Okogbule, 2006, p. 95) 
 
But Okogbule is speaking about the present and not the historical. In other 
words, the negative attitudes and behaviours that Wraith and Simpkins portray 
of those newly in office during the 1960s are still observable today. The fact that 
such observations can be made now reveals the extent to which financial 
corruption has developed and spread. It had, indeed, behaved like a “cancer”. The 
roots of acts of financial corruption – including socio-economic, political, and 
psychoanalytic forces – were being planted and already taking root during the 
early years of nationhood. By the time that Okogbule and other Nigerian 
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academics were publishing their analyses and responses, their country had 
already become virtually synonymous with corrupt practices, as recounted by 
Daniel Jordan Smith (2007) in A Culture of Corruption – Everyday Deception and 
Popular Discontent in Nigeria. Smith provides examples of how even the language 
of communication itself becomes corrupted, with the true meaning of what is 
actually being said or asked for consciously hidden and codified: “Typical ways 
Nigerian police ask for money include: ‘Any weekend for us?’, ‘We are loyal, sir’, 
‘Give us something for cigarettes’, ‘Any ‘pure water?’, ‘Any ‘roger’ today?’ or 
simply ‘I salute you’, followed by a look of expectation” (Smith, 2007, p. 62). 
Corrupt acts when carried out in broad daylight by “everyday” common, 
ordinary people are still carried out using secretive, manipulative conduct and 
language.  
Frantz Fanon, who witnessed the struggles for African countries’ liberation and 
nationhood at first hand in Africa both as a psychiatrist and as a political and 
social theorist (Macey, 2000), took a deeper journey into the minds of members 
of the African bourgeoisie who were entering public posts and gaining power 
and influence. In The Wretched of the Earth Fanon focuses directly on the 
emerging, transitional African states that are being born out of previous colonial 
domination. He paints stark, excoriating pictures of the emerging bourgeoisie’s 
attitudes, behaviours, and relations with their own people. The potentially 
malign exercise of power and influence over the people of a new nation is put 
under a microscopic examination and there are corrosive denunciations of 
leadership and the leader as immoral, co-opted, and ineffective, or at best 
disillusioned. Money and corruption are never far away from what Fanon 
structures as the capitalistically induced ills of society. The leader can be a 
person who “knowingly becomes the aider and abettor of the young bourgeoisie 
which is plunging into the mire of corruption and pleasure” (Fanon, 1961, p. 
134). 
 
The national bourgeoisie turns its back more and more on the interior 
and on the real facts of its undeveloped country, and tends to look 
towards the former mother country and the foreign capitalists who 
count on its obliging compliance. As it does not share its profits with 
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the people, and in no way allows them to enjoy any of the dues that 
are paid to it by the big foreign companies, it will discover the need 
for a popular leader to whom will fall the dual role of stabilizing the 
regime and of perpetuating the domination of the bourgeoisie. The 
bourgeois dictatorship of under-developed countries draws its 
strength from the existence of a leader. We know that in the well-
developed countries the bourgeois dictatorship is the result of the 
economic power of the bourgeoisie. In the under-developed countries 
on the contrary the leader stands for moral power, in whose shelter 
the thin and poverty-stricken bourgeoisie of the young nation decides 
to get rich. 
(Fanon, 1961, p. 133)  
 
Western sovereign powers’ central aim was to acquire money and wealth and, 
during imperialism and colonization, to seize territories and countries that 
would enable that aim to be successfully realized (Kwarteng, 2011; Ferguson, 
2003). In Kwasi Kwarteng’s Ghosts of Empire it is made explicit that the focus of 
the British state, and of the men who formed the cadres who expanded and 
administered the territories acquired during colonialism, was mercantilism, 
trade, and making money. Kwarteng sets out how in 19th and early 20th century 
Nigeria British troops were sent to back up mercantile desires for more trading 
posts. Europe’s colonizing capitalism was based on economic and financial 
power and was backed by military might. The former colonial power’s 
technologically superior military weapons would also have created desire among 
the African elites. But that military power was ultimately deployed for the aim of 
creating economic superiority via trade. The European male Other, after the 
independence of African countries, revealed in his financial, trade, industrial, and 
developmental dealings with the Africans newly in charge of their own countries 
and national treasuries that the former western powers would still work to 
retain the upper hand by putting western interests first. Africans might be 
unable to fulfil their desires as Africans, be those desires financial, personal, 
political, or developmental. Fanon observed that this capitalistic process would 
end in the production of consumers. Consumers filled with desires who, 
presumably, would require money to buy the goods. 
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Capitalism, in its early days, saw in the colonies a source of raw 
materials which, once turned into manufactured goods, could be 
distributed on the European market. After a phase of accumulation of 
capital, capitalism has today come to modify its conception of the 
profit-earning capacity of a commercial enterprise. The colonies have 
become a market. The colonial population is a customer who is ready 
to buy goods. … What the factory-owners and finance magnates of 
the mother country expect from their government is not that it 
should decimate the colonial peoples, but that it should safeguard 
with the help of economic conventions their own ‘legitimate 
interests’. 
(Fanon, 1961, p. 51) 
 
The African male would clearly have been observing the operations of this male 
Other with so much power and wealth and with his own priorities. He would not 
have been able to escape these observations of the capitalistic European man 
because the African man had been a colonial subject: living on his own soil but 
under the command of another man. Without money, the African would come to 
feel, you had nothing, you were nothing. It seemed that so much depended upon 
having access to money, including physical survival. It is apt to recall here the 
humiliation spoken of earlier in respect of man’s inability to rid himself of his 
biologically dependent relation to food. But the anxieties and humiliation caused 
by lack of money would be devastatingly deep because they would extend 
further to bring in our widened definition of food. Thus lack of money could lead 
to the annihilation of personal desires and ambitions and the failure to fulfil or 
implement personal and national needs. Leadership at the very top of 
government would be critical in setting the agenda to implement new social 
conditions, but so, too, would be the new men in the new nations who were in 
charge in other important, influential posts and offices. They would be forming, 
in a sense that we shall explore later in this chapter, the new ego ideals.  
But as Young observes there were serious problems in removing the “dead hand 
of the past” (Young, 1961, p. 496) as colonialism in most countries had “left the 
new nations such a paucity of trained nationals that they found themselves with 
only a handful of competent planners, administrators, engineers, businessmen, 
economists, doctors and other specialists” (Young, 1961, p. 495). This recalls 
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Wraith and Simpkins note earlier of a missing, uncreated, untrained generation 
of Africans. Young’s dead hand of the past was reaching further into the present 
of the 1960s and handicapping the work that needed to be done on the national 
level and, for many groups in society, curtailing individual and group dreams of 
progress into a prosperous future: 
 
Neither the Western-trained leaders nor their Western advisors fully 
understood the nature of the profound changes they were launching. 
Sooner or later the rhythm of modernization broke into different 
tempos. The radical changes produced new social groups; there were 
university graduates without jobs, factories without technicians, and 
plans without managers. The new leaders were operating in different 
decades or even centuries from the mentality of nearly the whole 
population. 
(Young, 1961, pp. 497-498) 
 
But the dizzying and disorientating experiences caused by the “profound 
changes” that Young speaks of can be experienced by all. The leaders and the 
people alike are living dual, evolving existences as formerly colonized and newly 
liberated people. It has to be interjected that the new nations’ leaders perhaps do 
not deserve to have to bear all the harshness of the critiques from writers like 
Fanon, for despite being leaders they, too, are coming into an existence that is 
blurry and unfocused, untried and undesigned. Although Fanon’s following 
points are made with regard to the subjects who live ordinary lives, he begins 
with a statement that could apply equally to the men now ruling over those very 
same subjects: 
  
everything seemed to be so simple before: the bad people were on 
one side, and the good on the other. The clear, unreal, idyllic light of 
the beginning is followed by a semi-darkness that bewilders the 
senses. The people find out that the iniquitous fact of exploitation can 
wear a black face, or an Arab one; and they raise the cry of ‘Treason!’ 
But the cry is mistaken; and the mistake must be corrected. The 
treason is not national, it is social. The people must be taught to cry 
‘Stop thief!’” 
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(Fanon, 1961, p. 116) 
 
But the “thieving” African man desired that very same thing, those very same 
possessions as the Europeans who had been in charge had also possessed. Why 
would he not say “I want”? Indeed, perhaps he would even try to obtain his 
desires via illegitimate means, such as theft. If that thing, especially money, was 
so important to the European male Other, then he, the African, should be in 
possession of this thing, too. What Otto Fenichel brings into contention in ‘The 
Drive to Amass Wealth’ (1938) is that social structuring forces play an important 
role in structuring the comprehension, desire for, and meanings of money. There 
is “reciprocal action between basic instincts and social system, the latter 
modifying the former, and in turn the altered instinct structure influencing the 
social system” (Fenichel, 1938, p. 85). Such social forces would thus impact and 
influence how what he terms ‘money-mindedness’ was developed, as: “The 
instincts represent the general tendency, while matters of money and the desire 
to become wealthy represent a specific form which the general tendency can 
assume only in the presence of certain definite social conditions” (Fenichel, 
1938, p. 85). The historian Irene Gendzier observes that: “What Fanon did with 
extraordinary power and effectiveness was to expose the psychic dimension of 
exploitation and to erase thereby the notion that the private individual could be 
isolated from his social context” (Gendzier, 1976, p. 504). She explains Fanon’s 
work as a psychiatrist as helping “his patients reintegrate themselves into 
society, a society that was often diagnosed as exploitative and oppressive. This 
diagnosis affected therapy if only to raise the contradictions involved to the level 
of consciousness” (Gendzier, 1976, p. 504).  
What we have attempted so far in this first part of Chapter Five , is to put forward 
an initial portrayal of the national and psychic landscape observable in an 
African country during the 1960s. Many people would have been left in the 
position of being largely starved of money and having suffered the humiliation of 
being forced to live as an inferior subject under the rule of a foreign power. As 
indicated at the beginning, we will ultimately undertake a psychoanalytic 
analysis of financial corruption.  However, in order to conduct such an analysis it 
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is necessary to once again set out the classical Freudian psychoanalytic notions 
that will underpin it, here, narcissism and castration in relation to the ego. 
However, it is important here to provide a reminder that, in adherence with the 
stipulated remit of a return to Freud, what will be outlined are not debates over 
psychoanalytic tenets; what is to be extracted from relevant classical texts are 
certain principles as Freud himself outlined them at the time. As we saw, Freud 
may have created the tools and mechanisms himself that would have been 
necessary for further work on money but did not use them. What is accordingly 
set in motion below is a dialogue with Freud’s theory-making in two specific areas 
– narcissism and castration, drawing upon their usefulness for the particular 
circumstances that we are now looking at. Thus, only the straightforward 
reminders of what was available theoretically to Freud – substantively extracted 
– are necessary for the central purpose of this thesis, which is that of progressing 
towards a psychoanalytic theoretical discourse on financial corruption.  
6. Feeding the Ego with Narcissism 
We return to Freud as he continues to develop his thinking on instincts/drives 
and the ibido. Let us start with Freud admitting that “the hypothesis of separate 
ego-instincts and sexual instincts (that is to say, the libido theory) rests scarcely 
at all upon a psychological basis, but derives its principal support from biology” 
(Freud, 1914, p. 79), and that, “It may turn out that, most basically and on the 
longest view, sexual energy – libido – is only the product of a differentiation in 
the energy at work generally in the mind” (Freud, 1914, p. 79).  
Freud has already told us (as cited at the very beginning of this chapter) that the 
instincts of hunger and love were the two basic assumptions made at the 
foundational moments of psychoanalysis. This thinking formed the backbone of 
our elaboration in Chapter Four on the possibilities that emerge with an oral 
hypothesis on money: that money is food and thus the target of the oral drive, a 
“sexual”, sexualized, hunger for money instinct/drive. The individual, hungry to 
have many things, is trying to feed himself. The ego (wounded, humiliated, 
depleted in self-regard) is focused on its narcissistic needs. The processes of 
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repression and unrepression of these libidinal forces are in full sway. How can 
we try to envisage what could be taking place? 
As explored in Chapter Four, the earliest satisfaction is gained by the infant from 
being fed. The infant’s primary state of auto-erotism proceeds to narcissistic 
activities that are pleasurable to the ego. “We say that a human being has 
originally two sexual objects – himself and the woman who nurses him – and in 
doing so we are postulating a primary narcissism in everyone” (Freud, 1914, p. 
88). But what is ‘narcissism’ and why would the ego need to be supplied with it? 
Freud writes that: 
 
The term narcissism is derived from clinical description and was 
chosen by Paul Nacke in 1899 to denote the attitude of a person who 
treats his own body in the same way in which the body of a sexual 
object is ordinarily treated – who looks at it, that is to say, strokes it 
and fondles it till he obtains complete satisfaction through these 
activities. Developed to this degree, narcissism has the significance of 
a perversion that has absorbed the whole of the subject’s sexual life, 
and it will consequently exhibit the characteristics which we expect to 
meet with in the study of all perversions. 
(Freud, 1914, p. 73) 
 
In her classic book The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence Anna Freud (1936) 
confirms that the ego’s narcissistic need to increase such primary pleasure and 
satisfaction is vital in order to ward off and defend against pain and bad feelings, 
particularly the affects that occur during situations of conflict with the 
instincts/drives when it is striving to attain pleasure.  
 
So far, the reasons for the defence against affect lie quite simply in 
the conflict between ego and instinct. There is, however, another and 
more primitive relation between the ego and the affects which has no 
counterpart in that of the ego to the instincts. Instinctual gratification 
is always primarily something pleasurable. But an affect may be 
primarily pleasurable or painful, according to its nature. If the ego has 
nothing to object to in a particular instinctual process and so does not 
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ward off an affect on that ground, its attitude towards it will be 
determined entirely by the pleasure-principle: it will welcome 
pleasurable affects and defend itself against painful ones. Indeed, 
even if owing to the repression of an instinct the ego is impelled by 
anxiety and a sense of guilt to defend itself against the accompanying 
affect, we can still see traces of selection in accordance with the 
pleasure-principle. 
(Freud A. , 1936, p. 66) 
 
Freud directly connected narcissism with the “psychology of the ego” (1914, p. 
82).  He determined a similarity to organic pain in that when in such pain the 
focus of attention of the subject became concentrated on the self and the source 
of the pain, in other words, one was not interested in the external world, even to 
the extent of withdrawing love from objects. 
Freud poses two questions in relation to the kind of energies that are being 
utilized – particularly that which emanate from the ego – which are relevant to 
this discussion because the questions help to clarify what kind of energy would 
potentially be driving the seeking of pleasurable narcissistic food – for example, 
money – from the environmental surroundings: 
 
In the first place, what is the relation of the narcissism of which we 
are now speaking to auto-erotism, which we have described as an 
early state of the libido? Secondly, if we grant the ego a primary 
cathexis of libido, why is there any necessity for further distinguishing 
a sexual libido from a non-sexual energy of the ego-instincts? Would 
not the postulation of a single kind of psychical energy save us all the 
difficulties of differentiating an energy of the ego-instincts from ego-
libido, and ego-libido from object-libido?  
(Freud, 1914, p. 76) 
 
Freud was defining the libido as being sexual energy and as being separate from 
the energy emanating from the ego-instincts. Freud proposes that the ego comes 
into existence with narcissism: the ego comes into existence with subjectivity, 
the recognition of self-love or alienation from the self.  
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As regards the first question, I may point out that we are bound to 
suppose that a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the 
individual from the start; the ego has to be developed. The auto-
erotic instincts, however, are there from the very first; so there must 
be something added to auto-erotism – a new psychical action – in 
order to bring about narcissism. 
(Freud, 1914, pp. 76-77) 
 
Freud does not specify what this “new psychical action” actually is, but his 
statement that auto-erotic instincts are there from “the very first” is a categorical 
one, and it is a danger to confuse auto-erotism with narcissism, although they 
both imply self-love. The implication is that without the development of an ego 
and a narcissistic identification with the self not only does one not fully exist as a 
subject, but one also does not exist as a fully sexually energised subject. And, if 
one has not developed an ego, then, presumably, one has not developed ego 
libido.  
Drive energy and what the ego’s energy is interested in can become one and the 
same. Ego instincts and sexual instincts can become aligned particularly during 
times of negative impacts: “Here libido and ego-interest share the same fate and 
are once more indistinguishable from each other. The familiar egoism of the sick 
person covers both” (Freud, 1914, p. 82). Karl Abraham (1911) worked 
extensively on depressive illnesses and brings an understanding of what takes 
place regarding the feelings of “the frequent ideas of impoverishment”, as he 
connects these feelings closely to loss of libido: 
 
Certain features commonly present in states of depression become 
comprehensible if we accept the well-founded conclusions of 
psychoanalytic experience. Take, for instance, the frequent ideas of 
impoverishment. The patient complains, let us say, that he and his 
family are exposed to starvation. If a pecuniary loss has actually 
preceded the onset of his illness, he will assert that he cannot possibly 
endure the blow and that he is completely ruined. These strange 
ideas, which often entirely dominate the patient’s thoughts, are 
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explicable from the identification of libido and money – of sexual and 
pecuniary ‘power’ – with which we are so familiar. The patient’s libido 
has disappeared from the world, as it were. Whereas other people 
can invest their libido in the objects of the external world he has no 
such capital to expend. His feeling of poverty springs from a repressed 
perception of his own incapacity to love. 
(Abraham, Notes on the Psycho-Analytical Investigation and 
Treatment of Manic-Depressive Insanity and Allied Conditions, 1911, 
p. 148) 
 
Lack of money would feed directly into and correspond itself to  the lack of 
libidinal energy emanating from the ego – and also connect itself to lack of 
sexually charged libidinal energy: for example, orality, as we have been arguing. 
Freud’s exposition of narcissistic pain as analogous with organic pain in that an 
alignment takes place between egotistic and biological needs, and allows for the 
following statement: feeding the body and feeding the ego could become as one: 
money as food will be seen as doing both consciously and unconsciously. There 
would be no separation of the desires of the ego and the desires of the sexual 
instincts. Money could be considered as legitimate food for the welfare of both.  
With the oral hypothesis of money as food and thus of primary pleasure and 
satisfaction, narcissistic activities that seek for whatever reasons to take the self 
as foremost and to increase self-regard for the ego could involve or circulate 
around money. But what does Freud consider to be ‘self-regard’? 
 
self-regard appears to us to be an expression of the size of the ego; 
what the various elements are which go to determine that size is 
irrelevant. Everything a person possesses or achieves, every remnant 
of the primitive feeling of omnipotence which his experience has 
confirmed, helps to increase his self-regard. 
(Freud, 1914, p. 98) 
 
Here, a point on castration should be mentioned prior to its own sub-section 
below: if castration is positioned as ‘being made to go without’, then the wound, 
the injury, the aftermath of castration would leave their damages in the ego. We 
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have seen that Freud has indicated that possessions are important to self-regard, 
thus depriving someone of possessions or preventing them from having the 
means to acquire ‘things’ would create wounds that would affect self-regard 
negatively. Within his societal, environmental situation the newly independent 
African would be trying to acquire the things he desired but his means have been 
severely limited. He could be situated as feeling that he possessed a drastically 
reduced self-regard as he was personally being told the following things as he 
emerged into his own nationhood, consciously or unconsciously, because he was 
having to experience actual real situations in his society: “You will go without 
money”, “You will go without food”, “You will go without electric light”, “You will 
go without work ”, “You will go without agency: disabled!”. Surely he feels 
distinctly, psychically, egotistically unloved? Neglected, even unregarded.  
 
Applying our distinction between sexual and ego-instincts, we must 
recognize that self-regard has a specially intimate dependence on 
narcissistic libido. Here we are supported by two fundamental facts: 
that in paraphrenics self-regard is increased, while in the transference 
neuroses it is diminished; and that in love-relations not being loved 
lowers the self-regarding feelings, while being loved raises them. As 
we have indicated, the aim and the satisfaction in a narcissistic object-
choice is to be loved. 
(Freud, 1914, p. 98)  
 
Money is an “object-choice” and Fenichel (1938) states that money can be 
regarded as a supply of narcissism from the environment for the benefit of the 
ego’s self-regard. In the process, despite his paper’s basis upon anality, Fenichel 
provides valuable support for the usefulness of an orality hypothesis with his 
reference to the infant and food:  
 
In so far as the drive to amass wealth appears to be a means of the 
ego for increasing self-regard, or for preventing a lowering of its level, 
this desire can be looked upon first as a derivative of that primitive 
form of regulation of self-regard in which the individual requires a 
‘narcissistic supply’ from the environment in the same way as the 
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infant requires an external supply of food. Money is just such a 
supply. 
(Fenichel, 1938, p. 78) 
 
Money can thus feed the ego for narcissistic reasons.  
The ego’s narcissistic need for a self-preserving self-regard – to restore a status 
prior to castration, injury, and fracture – would be working hand in hand with 
the physical biological drive for self-preservation – prevention from starvation 
and death. It is a return to the infantile primal state of affairs whereby: “The 
sexual instincts are at the outset attached to the satisfaction of the ego-instincts” 
(Freud, 1914, p. 87).  
In his ground-breaking ‘On Narcissism’ Freud (1914) set out what he describes 
as the “twofold existence” that individuals live in because of these two categories 
of instinct – sexual and ego – and thus two categories of libidinal energies: 
hunger (sexual) and love (ego).  
 
There are various points in favour of the hypothesis of there having 
been from the first a separation between sexual instincts and others, 
ego-instincts, besides the serviceability of such a hypothesis in the 
analysis of the transference neuroses. I admit that this latter 
consideration alone would not be unambiguous, for it might be a 
question of an indifferent psychical energy which only becomes libido 
through the act of cathecting an object. But, in the first place, the 
distinction made in this concept corresponds to the common, popular 
distinction between hunger and love. In the second place, there are 
biological considerations in its favour. The individual does actually 
carry on a twofold existence: one to serve his own purposes and the 
other as a link in a chain, which he serves against his will, or at least 
involuntarily. 
(Freud, 1914, p. 78) 
 
The concept of ‘hunger’ (sexual) and, or versus, ‘love’ (ego) is met with 
frequently in relation to the maintenance of one’s subjectivity and those of 
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others. For example, an African in an emerging independent nation during the 
1960s was situated in what could be characterized as a Freudian “twofold 
existence” that simultaneously compelled and enabled him to look at himself and 
his society and to wonder about how he felt about himself and how he felt about 
these other groups and people. We break from our stipulated return to Freud’s 
classical theory-making to note that in a paper on the crises of ‘post-capitalism’, 
‘Violence as a Response to Choice’, the Lacanian psychoanalyst Renata Salecl 
(2012) makes a necessary point that implies that the mirror in which an 
individual regards his self-regard via his ego is subject to major social 
transformations: 
 
When societies experience radical changes, we can also observe a 
change in the way people start looking at themselves. It is as if the 
mirror in which they have been observing themselves has changed. 
And as a result people start looking at themselves in a different way. 
 
(Salecl, 2012, p. 2278) 
 
 
An example of how this changed mirrored subjectivity could operate would 
occur when, in particular ideological circumstances, some people could take 
themselves “as the ultimate master, we might become indifferent toward what 
others think about us and might also become indifferent to how our behaviour 
affects others” (Salecl, 2012, p. 2278). According to Freudian principles, an 
African man in 1960s Africa, whether an ordinary subject or occupying a senior 
or low-level post of influence and access, could be living a “twofold”, double 
existence and be asserting his resistance to being merely an involuntary “link in 
a chain” as he was hungry for certain things and he was in want of certain things.  
For our purposes, the following question is the one that has to now be 
addressed: what is the status of subjectivity and agency, libidinal action, when 
one has a depleted ego, lowered self-regard? The psychic situation of an 
individual in a newly emerging African country of the 1960s is likely to be one 
where he is psychically castrated.  
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7. The Subject Castrated 
If one characterizes the psychoanalytic tenet of castration (Freud, 1905) as being 
without, going without some ‘thing’ that one wants to have, it can be conjectured 
that the African man was symbolically castrated, removed from his desires by 
the European colonizing Other because he was left, during and after colonization, 
to go without what the European had enjoyed in terms of money, wealth, status, 
and standard of living. We have already noted in the previous sub-section on 
narcissism the relation between the depletion in narcissism of the ego, the 
wounds of the ego, and castration. Now, Freud writes on narcissism and 
castration that: 
 
The disturbances to which a child’s original narcissism is exposed, the 
reactions with which he seeks to protect himself from them and the 
paths into which he is forced in doing so – these are themes which I 
propose to leave on one side, as an important field of work which still 
awaits exploration. The most significant portion of it, however, can be 
singled out in the shape of the ‘castration complex’ (in boys, anxiety 
about the penis – in girls, envy for the penis) and treated in 
connection with the effect of early deterrence from sexual activity. 
Psycho-analytic research ordinarily enables us to trace the vicissitudes 
undergone by the libidinal instincts when these, isolated from the 
ego-instincts, are placed in opposition to them; but in the particular 
field of the castration complex, it allows us to infer the existence of an 
epoch and a psychical situation in which the two groups of instincts, 
still operating in unison and inseparably mingled, make their 
appearance as narcissistic interests.  
(Freud, 1914, p. 92)  
 
It is important to highlight what we regard as the crucial point that Freud ends 
with above by singling it out: it is the castration complex that allows for the 
consideration of “the existence of an epoch and a psychical situation in which the 
two groups of instincts, still operating in unison and inseparably mingled, make 
their appearance as narcissistic interests”. Therefore there exists an “epoch” when 
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two separate groups of instincts – ego and libidinal sexual – are joined and 
operate narcissistically. In the newly emergent, newly independent nations 
about to start fending for themselves, it would be feasible to make the 
assumption of a theoretical correlation: that is, that the societal and individual 
situations that would pertain would be akin to such an epoch coming into 
existence.  
Further, during such a period of history, having been previously under colonial 
rule, there would be people within African nations such as Nigeria and other 
African countries who suffered from feelings of ‘not having’, that is, suffering 
from a conscious and unconscious castration that had prevented the attainment 
of desires and the maximization of pleasures and satisfaction. This thesis argues 
that their libidinal and ego-related energies, now joined together during the kind 
of “epoch” and “psychical situation” that Freud stipulates in the above citation, 
would have a single focus: money. Money to feed both physical needs and the 
ego’s narcissistic demands, and to operate under the pleasure-principle by 
warding off painful affects as Anna Freud (1936) suggested in our previous 
discussion on narcissism. It was in that discussion that Sigmund Freud brought 
forward the notion that a wounded, unloved ego could join narcissistic and 
sexual libidinal forces to seek out what would feed and satisfy both kinds of 
demands: self-regard and self-preservation.  
Our argument that money as an object choice can serve the purpose of joined 
libidinal and narcissistic needs in specific situations of injury, wounding, and 
suffering can also be argued with support from another perspective. Although 
clearly not a paper written during the classical period (and thus breaking our 
remit that Freud could have made use of its theoretical contents), with the 
construction of the oral hypothesis there now seems to be justification to return 
to Peter Subkowski’s ‘On the Psychodynamics of Collecting’ (2006), an anality-
based paper that we noted in Chapter One, in order to support the operating of 
an orality-linked mechanism with regard to the role that castration could play in 
collecting objects, which was given a strong oral overtone by him but was left 
unexpanded. Subkowski had pointed out that the castration complex was 
experienced in a variety of ways that called for restoration and repair. 
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This can elucidate the special proximity of collecting to the 
perversions in men. In the unconscious, the object of collection can 
represent the phallus for the man, or, at an earlier stage of 
development, the phallic, omnipotent and magically endowed breast-
object, which could be lost and thus must be protected, hoarded and 
hidden because of its greater vulnerability. 
 
(Subkowski, 2006, p. 386)  
 
Thus, collecting is in relation to orality albeit via a potentially-to-be-castrated 
phallic symbolization to heighten and emphasize the breast’s vulnerability as the 
store of what is being desired. One could think in both Freudian and Kleinian 
terms of the breast being the ultimate store of that most highly valued and highly 
desired warm milk. It should be remembered that the relation of collecting to 
anal erotism – on the plausible Freudian basis that the faeces in the “potty” are 
the infant’s collection, its hoard of goods – was contested, and that Borneman 
(1976) and Fenichel (1938) were among the select few who chastised that what 
is collected is the important factor. A particular object, for example, money, could 
have nothing to do with anality. Bearing that in mind, it is to be noted that 
Subkowski states correctly that there always exists “a close and mostly 
unconscious relationship between the concrete object of collection and an 
individual’s life history” and that: “The choice of object for collection, therefore, 
has great meaning in the analysis of a collector” (Subkowski, 2006, pp. 386-387). 
The Freudian ‘individual’ and his hostile impulses is our focus, and it could be 
considered that this “great meaning” that should be awarded to object-choice can 
be found via the necessary linkage that has to be made to the past, to history, to a 
particular epoch.  
Money was a highly visible object of possession of Europeans in Africa during 
colonialism particularly through its purchasing power that was displayed in 
various forms, for example, in the quality of ‘European’ living standards. 
Narcissism demands that one must take care of one’s ego. How would an African 
symbolically castrated during colonialism, removed from his ability to possess 
similar quantities of money, respond at national independence to acquiring the 
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money and wealth that the Europeans had enjoyed? With regard to narcissism 
and the object of collection, Subkowski asserts: 
 
The unconscious aim here is to define and secure one’s own ‘ego’ via 
concrete possessions, and to delineate oneself from others. By for 
instance collecting special objects, the collector equally defines 
himself as standing out and special. Objects of collection are here 
understood to be extensions of one’s own self which help to maintain 
the illusion of narcissistic omnipotence. 
(Subkowski, 2006, p. 387) 
 
It is important to note that Subkowski speaks of the underlying factor as an 
“unconscious aim” in relation to securing and building the collector’s ego. On the 
question of collecting money in a corrupt fashion – that is by secretly stealing 
money or by using other illegal practices to obtain money – a crucial area is this 
seeking to unconsciously secure, repair, or re-build a previously fractured or 
depleted ego. Or even the seeking to form an ego of one’s own in the first place.  
The colonized ego would be a wounded ego, a castrated ego, an unloved ego with 
acute narcissistic deficits. Here, Gendzier’s tactful reminder should be noted 
regarding “oppression, in the colonial setting” and its two-way transformations 
impacting on “the psychology of both colonizer and colonized, affecting the self 
image of each and the relations of both. There is then no inherent oppressor or 
oppressed; it is the historical situation which makes him so” (Gendzier, 1976, p. 
502). To which Fanon would respond that: “The effect consciously sought by 
colonialism was to drive into the natives’ heads the idea that if the settlers were 
to leave, they would at once fall back into barbarism, degradation and bestiality” 
(Fanon, 1961, p. 169), and that colonialism’s cultural project had its own “kind of 
perverted logic” (Fanon, 1961, p. 169) that was designed to go even further 
unconsciously: 
 
On the unconscious plane, colonialism therefore did not seek to be 
considered by the native as a gentle, loving mother who protects her 
child from a hostile environment, but rather as a mother who 
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unceasingly restrains her fundamentally perverse offspring from 
managing to commit suicide and from giving free rein to its evil 
instincts. The colonial mother protects her child from itself, from its 
ego, and from its physiology, its biology and its own unhappiness 
which is its very essence. 
(Fanon, 1961, pp. 169-170) 
 
For Young (1961, p. 495) “the aftermath of the past” means that “the new politics 
begin with the nation’s effort to recover intellectually and spiritually from the 
painful effects of colonialism, imitation and tradition.” It is in the individual 
situation that the previously colonized African finds himself during the 1960s in 
his society that is the focus of this investigation. The negative dialectics (Adorno, 
1966) of the still suffering man who is about to face new kinds of tyrannical, ego-
sapping behaviour from among his own people comes under the remit of the 
work carried out by the Frankfurt School theorists and we discuss this later in 
the second half of this chapter.    
A characterization and understanding of an African who could be prone to 
commit an act of financial corruption as potentially feeling himself to be a 
suffering, castrated man in terms of access to money, wealth, and status and 
seeking to remedy that situation and to restore himself in his own eyes and in 
the eyes of other people is useful here.  It serves to illuminate the place of money 
within the psyche of the African living in a newly decolonised country at the 
birth of nationhood. With respect to the wider definition of money as food, it 
would all be food because it was all joined together biologically and psychically 
as food, feeding both the mind and the body simultaneously and spontaneously. 
The means for acquiring both physical and psychic primary satisfactions and 
pleasures would come from one sole source: access to, getting, and having 
money, and feeding oneself with it in all manner of ways:   
 
The facts that the retinue of politician or District Head must resemble 
those of an oriental potentate; that the graduate on his first job must 
possess a motor car that his counterpart in Britain might aspire to on 
retirement; that the labourer must possess a wrist watch and a 
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fountain pen – with every intermediate gradation among the classes – 
these represent financial burdens which were appropriate, mutatis 
mutandis, to a society which did not have to live on cash salaries, but 
which in modern West Africa lead many to corruption 
(Wraith & Simpkins, 1963, pp. 40-41) 
 
It seems that when money is accessed and available for spending then letting 
other people know that you have it and they do not was also important. The 
holder of money – the possible equivalent of the anality theory’s hoarder of 
possessions – is in possession of something that he and other people both crave 
and it seems that they have to be made very much aware of that. Could this be an 
effort to castrate by somebody who had been previously castrated and is 
attempting to repair his ego? Without other people knowing and seeing that one 
is in possession of money, or that one is making substantial money and spending 
it freely, even recklessly, how valuable is that possession of money, is that ability 
to make and to have money to repair the harm done by castration? For Fenichel, 
the type of attitudinal responses that Wraith and Simpkins gave examples of 
above, can be even further drawn psychoanalytically: 
The varieties of irrational attitudes towards money, arising from 
unsolved anal-erotic conflicts, have been so aptly portrayed by Freud, 
Jones, and Abraham in the classical descriptions of the anal character, 
that nothing can be added, except a reminder that not only the 
unconscious attitude towards faeces but also the attitude towards 
introjections of every kind can be projected on to money. One thinks 
of kleptomaniacs, or of the women who drain men of their resources, 
to whom money, which they are always striving to take away 
symbolizes a whole series of introjected objects that have been 
withheld from them; or of depressive characters who from fear of 
starvation regard money as potential food. There are too those men 
to whom money signifies their potency, who experience any loss of 
money as a castration, or who are inclined, when in danger, to 
sacrifice money in a sort of ‘prophylactic self-castration’. 
(Fenichel, 1938, pp. 83-84) 
 
The attempt has been made to illustrate in the previous chapter and this one, 
that the apt examples that Fenichel provides above can equally be attributed and 
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sourced to orality and oral-erotic and oral-sadistic conflicts. For example, 
Fenichel argues in the citation that “the attitude towards introjections of every 
kind can be projected on to money” (Fenichel, 1938, p. 83), a statement that 
implicitly acknowledges orality because of orality’s central role in introjection 
and incorporation, as discussed in Chapter Four. Further, with regard to ‘the anal 
character’ and his having fear of starvation, such an idea would seem rather 
incongruous were it not for the notion of a potential desire to hoard food. This 
would be connected to the exclusivity of the infant’s relationship with its mother 
and its desire for something that the mother has or has access to that the infant 
feels he or she is not receiving. And desire for what the mother desires that the 
infant cannot attain. Financial corruption can be connected to desiring, wanting, 
loving, collecting and hoarding money. Squirreling, hiding money away in foreign 
bank accounts is a very good instance of this kind of money hoarding. However, 
with the involvement of the concept of orality and an oral hypothesis more 
headway can be made in understanding the mental processes taking place.  
Let us connect the above to the self-regard of the putative individual who might 
commit an act of financial corruption at the dawn of the entering into nationhood 
of his newly independent country during the 1960s. What it seems can be stated 
at this junction follows upon our attempt to outline and to clarify how the 
feelings of psychic castration and narcissistic depletion of the ego could impact 
on an individual in particular social and historical circumstances, in this instance 
following the period of colonialism. It seems that one can argue with justification 
and psychoanalytic theoretical support that an individual who does ‘not have’, an 
individual who is having to go without things that he desires, could make strong 
efforts to repair those feelings narcissistically in order to replenish or 
reconstruct the depleted or fractured ego. He could perhaps commit an act of 
financial corruption in order to repair his colonially castrated, wounded ego with 
a supply of money as narcissistic food from the environment for his ego. 
The Freudian psychoanalytic theories of castration and narcissism taken 
together and utilized together in this particular historical and social context 
make considerable progress towards a psychoanalytic understanding of how an 
individual could be situated psychically and what could make an individual start 
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thinking of acts of financial corruption, given the contexts of the kind of society 
that he lived in. There is some further probing to be done about the nature of his 
impoverished country undergoing tremendous political and social 
transformations. There are questions to be discussed about the individual’s 
social environment and his psychological attitudes and behaviour, because the 
poverty in African countries during the 1960s represented a particular kind of 
poverty in which extraordinary extremes between the rich and the poor could be 
observed side by side. 
 
PART TWO: A PARTICULA KIND OF POVERTY 
8. A Particular Kind Of Poverty 
Here we will go on to trace the emergence of corruption in Africa in the 
public spotlight during the 1960s and to engage with the narratives and 
discourses that enabled that emergence.  We will be looking to the potential 
contributions that psychoanalysis could bring to that discourse. Here were the 
newly independent countries about to be ridden, it seemed, or already ridden 
with corrupt acts and practices and, at the same time, here was an emerging 
academic discipline, ‘corruption’ (rooted in Western cultures that had historical 
and contemporary experiences of various types of corruption), finding itself with 
a new arena in which to launch new investigations into the age-old question: 
What is the nature of man and the nature of the society he is to create? How is 
man influenced by his external environmental pressures, including peer and 
group pressures? In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego Freud sums up 
this problematic by reflecting upon man’s need to construct an ego ideal based 
upon other members of humanity: 
 
Each individual is a component part of numerous groups, he is bound 
by ties of identification in many directions, and he has built up his ego 
ideal upon the most various models. Each individual therefore has a 
share in numerous group minds – those of his race, of his class, of his 
creed, of his nationality, etc. – and he can also raise himself above 
them to the extent of having a scrap of independence and originality. 
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(Freud, 1921, p. 129) 
 
Let us proceed from Freud’s psychoanalytic eye to the writers on the African 
ground during the 1960s, such as Wraith and Simpkins, in order to provide the 
expressive painting on a large canvass of the acutely contrasting, often fractured, 
often simultaneously layered, details of the existences of many individuals and 
groups during this epoch. This section is named ‘A Particular Kind of Poverty’ but 
what was the particular kind, or indeed kinds, of poverty in which they lived 
during the 1960s?  
 
A characteristic feature of developing countries, in comparison with 
the more developed world, is that they are having to live in several 
centuries simultaneously. There are admittedly great extremes of 
wealth in Britain, great differences in education, and, perhaps 
greatest of all, differences in culture and styles of living. It is doubtful, 
however, whether any of these differences are as fundamental as 
those between the huge mass of family farmers, living very like the 
English peasant of the middle ages, illiterate, superstitious, handling 
very little money, their world bounded by the family or clan; the 
wage-earners and urban proletariat, living like their counterparts in 
nineteenth century Britain, semi-literate, underpaid, badly housed, 
but beginning to understand their rights and to feel their power; the 
growing middle class of traders, teachers and officials, whose styles 
and standards of living approximate to those of the privileged classes 
of the twentieth century; and the top professional and business men, 
whose material and often professional standards equal or exceed 
those of the western world. It is metaphorically possible in many parts 
of Africa to span the centuries in the course of a short walk. 
(Wraith & Simpkins, 1963, pp. 196-197) 
 
Young (1961) argues that the efforts to develop and modernize can create new 
forms of chaos and disruptions that are deeply destabilizing. Psychoanalytically 
one could argue that in such instances it could be possible to consider the nation 
as possessing a societal ego that has been fractured by colonialism in much the 
same manner that one can consider an individual’s ego as having disintegrated. 
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The pressures on society in the new nations – within and between groups, 
economic interests, and different generations – are effectively drawn by Young.  
 
Unfortunately, most of the new states cannot start off as cohesive, 
homogeneous societies in which some popular consensus is feasible, 
because they are ripped up by so many centrifugal forces – racial, 
ethnic, linguistic, regional, tribal and economic. All the energy and 
resourcefulness of the political leadership must often concentrate just 
on keeping the nation from disintegrating. The processes of 
modernization add new social strains to the old. Traditional and 
modern groups clash. The feudal, landed interests in the old 
countryside oppose the new economic interests of the city. Old-guard 
officials resent the influx of young administrators and technicians. The 
professional elite are torn from their cultural past and removed from 
the people, disoriented to an extent Westerners seldom realize. 
Corruption and nepotism rot good intentions and retard progressive 
policies. 
(Young, 1961, p. 498) 
 
Psychoanalytically, is it not possible that these societal pressures and tensions 
are emanating from conflicted states of mind?   
9. Society and the Individual.  
Social theorists such as those belonging to the Frankfurt School, with their 
understanding of classical Freudian psychoanalysis, bring much to this 
discussion of fractured societal states that are being further disintegrated under 
ideological and economic pressures. On continental Europe during this same 
period these intellectual figures from non-psychoanalytic fields were raising 
critical issues concerning man’s innate needs and behaviour and the 
confrontation with structures such as capitalism and communism. It is useful to 
briefly mention the Frankfurt School and their contribution to the debate on the 
ideological versus the instinctual-biological, bearing in mind the debate that it 
was also considered by critics such as Jameson not to be theoretical enough in 
psychoanalytic terms.  
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Concerns about man’s dialectical relations with society informed the output of 
the sociologists and philosophers at the Frankfurt School and the Institute of 
Social Research, and they, too, were Freudian-inspired: Max Horkheimer, 
Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse, among others, took into account Freud’s 
influence within their critical theory and critical philosophy. The Frankfurt 
School sociologists and philosophers established themselves in the 1930s and 
post-World War Two world of the left as the premier radical leftists disillusioned 
about the possibilities of the individual’s power and ability to assert a liberating 
agency in opposition to and in confrontation with authoritarian or oppressive 
state structures.  
While capitalism’s advocates clearly recognized and to a large extent approved of 
an individual’s ‘love of money’ as an entrepreneurial stimulus and a necessity for 
the prosperous functioning of a capitalist economy, the Frankfurt School’s Max 
Horkheimer was concerned with how the individual conceptualized himself and 
navigated himself in such capitalistic structures where the allure of money 
positioned itself as a “paradise” (Horkheimer, 1957). The theorists’ engagement 
with Freud was sophisticated and genuine: from Marcuse’s lectures and inquiries 
into Freud (e.g. Marcuse, 1969) and work on utopian idealism and the impacts of 
externally imposed change; to Adorno’s philosophy of and critique of the 
suffering man, the ‘negative dynamics’ of damaged man (Adorno, 1966). Whilst 
the following questions arise ‘Where does his suffering come from? How does he 
experience it? How does he express his reaction to suffering?’, the  Frankfurt 
School’s focus of questioning centres on this: ‘What happens to man’s being and 
conception of himself when utopia appears to be forever out of reach?’.  
However, the School’s work was controversial and open to important criticisms. 
An example of criticisms that are relevant to this thesis is made by the Yale 
university academic, Fredric Jameson, who is no fan of the Frankfurt School’s 
output on what he terms “late capitalism” and their usage of “the synthesis of 
Marx and Freud”. He finds jarring their attempts at the application of 
psychoanalysis in the form of “drive, repressive mechanism, and anxiety” 
(Jameson, 1982, p. 344) to their analyses of history, culture and society. But he 
admits that he has to acknowledge that: 
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What remains powerful in this part of their work, however, is a more 
global model of repression which, borrowed from psychoanalysis, 
provides the underpinnings for their sociological vision of the total 
system or “verwaltete Welt” (the bureaucratically “administered” 
world system) of late capitalism. 
 (Jameson, 1982, p. 345) 
 
Jameson blames what he describes as the awkwardness of the Frankfurt School’s 
psychological explanations of society on the allegedly small radius of their 
psychoanalytic focus: they are not theoretical enough, it seems: 
 
The adaptation of clinical Freudianism proves awkward at best 
precisely because the fundamental psychoanalytic inspiration of the 
Frankfurt School derives, not from diagnostic texts, but rather from 
Civilization and Its Discontents, with its eschatological vision of an 
irreversible link between development (or “Kultur” in the classical 
German sense of the word as technological and bureaucratic 
“progress”) and ever-increasing instinctual renunciation and misery. 
(Jameson, 1982, p. 345) 
 
Jameson’s charge regarding the alleged lack of scrutiny of “diagnostic texts” and 
failure to base claims, assumptions, and suppositions on theoretical grounds is of 
concern and of relevance as it chimes with the rationale underlying the decision 
made at the start of the work of this thesis: to endeavour to root its premises and 
arguments in selected, relevant, key Freudian classical psychoanalytic theoretical 
fundamentals and principles, and thus also allowing an engagement with clinical 
factors where necessary.   
Richard Lichtman’s book The Production of Desire is pertinent to the critique of 
the way societies struggle to find possible solutions or compromises between the 
demands of ideology and the needs of individual subjectivities. His work is 
deserving of attention as it progresses further the ideas of the Frankfurt School 
theorists on the critical relationship between the work of Karl Marx on wealth, 
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capital accumulation, and the nation state and that of Freud on the unconscious 
motivations and psychic energies, repressed and unrepressed, of the human 
species. With regard to individual desires versus ideological pressures, Lichtman 
makes the point that: 
 
Marx no more denied the existence of individuals than Freud denied 
the existence of society. The question for him was the origin and the 
status of individuality. Individuals make history only insofar as they 
intersect with historical forces that are fundamentally beyond their 
personal control. Marx was concerned with individual persons in the 
mode of their interpersonal contact and as the manifestations of 
social forces. … For Marx, as opposed to Freud, individuals are 
derivatives of the social system rather than primary elements from 
which the system is itself constructed. 
(Lichtman, 1982, p. 7) 
 
Man is because man becomes through his labour, is one potential summary of 
Karl Marx’s view of who man, objectified and alienated, is. Man is a producer, but 
man is also a product: man produces himself as a product. Man is a product of 
organic social transformations, but man is also producing those social 
transformations. He is responsible for what he produces: society and himself, 
society and the individual. Out of those social transformations come new social 
relations, new societies, new social realities. Both Marx and Freud placed crucial 
importance on human developmental stages, phases, and epochs. But for Marx 
these developmental stages occur in the context of how the world and its nations 
move from historical period to historical period and the consequences for human 
beings in being part of and subject to such historically determined movements of 
world history. For Freud it is the psychological developmental stages of 
childhood which he theorizes and casts as determining not only the later adult 
character and psychical behaviour, but in addition, the pattern of the regressive 
nature of an adult’s symptomatological structuring during pathogenic illnesses. 
Society changes but, crucially, how much does, has, individual man, collected into 
a group, changed psychically? Despite Lichtman’s assertion above, Marx seems to 
have left a gap in thinking that the (natural?) historical progress of transitional 
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class positions was the major factor and covered all gaps and pitfalls, including 
perhaps even psychological, intrapersonal, ones. Lichtman has to take this 
criticism on board: 
 
Marx had paid insufficient attention to the mediating institutions 
through which the mode of economic production and the mode of 
human production were joined. The family, in particular, was viewed 
more as a “reflection” of social relations of production than as a 
training ground in human pathology. Freud focused on this institution 
as the source of human stultification 
(Lichtman, 1982, p. 11) 
 
Freud took into account the psychical developmental changes in the individual 
and the collective brought about by social transformations. One could state that 
Freud is all about such psychical changes and developments in the individual and 
the group. Lichtman writes that: “Both Freud and Marx severely limit the 
credibility that can be assigned to the ‘rational’ accounts that men and women 
provide of their own activity” and both “regard men and women as driven by 
forces they do not comprehend and cannot control”  (Lichtman, 1982, p. 20). For 
Freud man is a product of his unconscious instinctual impulses, drives, and 
phantasies. However, this could be yet another transitional stage towards the 
Marxist classless society, as opposed to being the end of historical development 
without the production of a “human” classless society. Freud studiously, as this 
thesis argues, tried to ignore the impact of money, and given that his field was 
psychoanalysis, there was a particular avoidance of the psychical impact of the 
lack of money on human behaviour. But access to money and the accumulation of 
money are critical factors in life. Money as a constructed object of satisfaction. 
Constructed by man for his enjoyment and pleasure and an object of satisfaction 
without which man is forever pitted against man.   
 
Money, since it has the property of being able to buy anything, and to 
appropriate all objects to itself, is thus the object par excellence. It is 
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the universal character of this property that creates the omnipotence 
of money; this is the reason for its being regarded as an almighty 
being … money is the pander between need and its object, between 
man’s life and his means of subsistence. But what mediates my life 
also mediates the existence of other men for me, it is for me the 
other person. 
(Marx, 1844, p. 179) 
 
Marx was trying to grapple with what can now be acknowledged as being 
psychoanalytic concepts before they were thus known, for example “money is 
the pander between need and its object” in the above citation; whilst at the same 
time considering the object alienated and itself objectified by money’s elusive 
and overwhelming power of valuation and purchase. Other fundamental tenets 
of economic theory such as Keynes’s ‘animal spirits’ and Adam Smith’s the 
‘invisible hand’ can also be put forward as sharing the same conceptual field as 
psychoanalysis, although clearly, as explored in Chapter One with regard to 
Keynes’s relation to Freud’s writings on anality, it is simply that psychoanalytic 
terminology was not used; and in Adam Smith’s era it had yet to emerge. 
 
Marx saw human beings as the manifestations of social class forces. 
But if we grasp the external world of capitalism as alienated, brutal, 
and pathologically weighted with the burden of its own constricted 
energy, how can we avoid attributing these characteristics to the men 
and women who are reproduced through this system and who 
reproduce it in turn? Freud provided the prism through which the 
destructiveness of the bourgeois world could be viewed in the 
spectrum of its individual malignancy. 
(Lichtman, 1982, p. 12)  
 
We would suggest that Freud exposed the potential destructiveness in the 
relationship between what we do and what we want in our material lives and 
what we do and want in our psychic existence. Lichtman notes that, “Marxism 
understood the irrationality, wastefulness, violence and self-destruction of the 
external social system. Freud promised an understanding of how this process 
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had become deeply rooted in the psyche of men and women” (Lichtman, 1982, p. 
10). Instinct and desire can be directly linked with Marx and Freud as, “From 
Freud we can derive an understanding of how the process noted in Marx’s 
account is reproduced internally in the psyche of the labourer”, whilst within 
Marx’s work “we acquire illumination about the social circumstances around 
which the renunciation of instinctual desire is originally created” (Lichtman, 
1982, p. 28).  
 
What people take themselves to be doing, the reasons they assign to 
their own activity, is no more than the surface manifestations of 
underlying forces of which the purported “agents” are almost wholly 
unaware. Ordinary consciousness is revelatory, but not to the “actors” 
who are consciously the subjects of their own experience. Human 
existence can only be grasped from the vantage point of a theory at 
odds with the conceptions that people commonly entertain. This 
shared comprehension of the illusion of rational consciousness is one 
of the fundamental propositions that unite the work of Marx and 
Freud, and is perhaps the basic ground for the view that finds them 
ultimately compatible. 
(Lichtman, 1982, p. 20) 
 
Underscoring the writings on wealth by the masters of economic thought – from 
the right to the left of the ideological spectrum – are the notions of unconscious 
motives and the driving force of psychic energies. Psychic drives. This thesis is 
making the argument, with a foundation based on psychoanalytic theory, that 
what is missing from analyses of money and people’s relationships with money, 
is psychoanalysis: particularly the unconscious desires of people and how such 
unconscious desires would manifest themselves in certain situations and certain 
periods of time. The recurring question of what is the relation between the self-
preservation instincts/drives and Marx’s the “means of subsistence”, as cited 
above, leads to the observation that, arguably, money is the connection. In 
respect of this point it would be important to state again one of the main 
arguments that this thesis makes: that the buying and the greed that appear to 
be characteristic of newly independent or newly emergent or transitional 
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societies could be expressions of an instinct that was not previously given 
sufficient, or any, outlet for discharge. 
If an individual is forced to the sudden realization that they cannot have ‘that 
thing’, an object of their desire or their need, on the basis that they do not have 
money, what then becomes of their relationship to money? The ‘thing’ that is 
desired becomes unattainable and thus one does not have, one lacks, and one is 
left desiring and dissatisfied. One cannot have because one does not have money, 
so that even if one professes to despise money or to dismiss it as an irrelevance 
or as a material thing unworthy of consideration, as despicable, money wields its 
own revenge with its power over the satisfaction of desire and need. Money 
enters into a metaphoric, symbolic, existential relationship with desire. 
Moreover, what if others have and you do not have? 
There was a lack of recognition for the possibility that people from the working 
class, ‘ordinary’ working people, might themselves be inclined towards money 
and wealth accumulation, and that this was not just a characteristic – or should 
one say a property – of the bourgeoisie alone. One could argue that the process of 
class structuring that Marx described as historical developmental is still 
continuing in that the transition to a classless society could still be taking place, 
but that what was not predicted was that the proletariat would want to take the 
place of the bourgeoisie and want what the bourgeoisie had previously 
possessed. As has happened in Russia and Eastern Europe, and as is taking place 
in present-day China, it would seem that working class people wanted to be 
middle class and to desire, buy and possess the things associated with belonging 
to such a class. And, if need be, to obtain these objects as a result of acts of 
corruption.  
Gordon White (1996) outlines in his paper, ‘Corruption and the Transition from 
Socialism in China’, that in China during the late 1980s and the 1990s it was 
“widely recognized that corruption extends well beyond the politico-
bureaucratic apparatus proper, to include professionals such as doctors and 
accountants, and petty functionaries such as bank-tellers, ticket-sellers, and shop 
assistants” (White, 1996, p.151). Further, “the range of phenomena included 
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varies enormously” (White, 1996, p.152). But there was still a deep lack of clarity 
about what corruption entailed despite the fact that “the vague notion of abuse 
of some form of institutional power for private ends underlies all perceptions” 
(White, 1996, p. 152).  
Gordon White’s comment written in 1996 regarding the “vague notion” of 
corruption is an opportune point at which to now turn to two papers on 
corruption, written three decades earlier during the historical period under 
discussion, that will allow for an in-depth psychoanalytic focus on financial 
corruption during the 1960s in Africa. 
 
10. Corruption in a New State: Colin Leys and David Bayley.  
It would be worthwhile at this junction to consolidate some of the factors that we 
have been discussing regarding the structuring of conscious and unconscious 
thoughts about money, wealth, and the acquiring of wealth by asking again the 
question that was put forward in Chapter One on the motivations of someone 
either intent on committing or ambivalent about committing an act of financial 
corruption: What is at work psychoanalytically when a bureaucrat or a politician 
or a businessman in an “emerging”, “developing” country is confronted with the 
sudden availability of a huge amount of money? We now have a clearer idea of 
what could be at the root of his desire for that money following our discussions 
of the conscious and unconscious processes that are taking place, particularly 
narcissistic deficits, lack of self-regard, and the perceived necessity of feeding the 
ego with our widened definition of food. We have the oral hypothesis and, thus, 
we can now also make the assumption based on the oral hypothesis that the urge 
that he is attempting to satisfy is an oral drive for money that has been 
unrepressed in his newly emerging independent nation. We have tried to 
establish that his unconscious relationship to the thought of such a large sum of 
money is complex but is essentially based on his libidinal needs – sexual and ego 
(hunger and love) – joined together to find the object called money that will 
satisfy both force-filled demands: physiological and narcissistic. Libidinal forces 
tare prevailing upon him to commit what amounts to an act of aggression.  
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The papers we now turn to in order to probe even deeper into the above areas 
are Colin Leys’s ‘What is the Problem about Corruption?’ (1965), and David 
Bayley’s ‘The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation’ (1966). There is still a 
need to understand the processes of corruption during the historical period that 
is being studied, that is, the 1960s, and these two papers provide the opportunity 
to conduct that analytic examination. The detailed extracts from them should be 
viewed as a form of narrative accounting.  
Let us start with an overview of the papers.  In section 8 of this chapter, we 
discussed the particular kind, or particular kinds, of extremes of poverty extant 
in many African countries following their independence during the 1960s. Leys 
affirms this notion because he argues that corruption and inequality, corruption 
and deep levels of poverty, do not merely coincide, they are tied together:  
 
The incentive to corrupt whatever official purposes public institutions 
are agreed to have is especially great in conditions of extreme 
inequality and considerable absolute poverty. The benefits of holding 
an office—any office—are relatively enormous; by comparison the 
penalties for attempting to obtain one by bribery are fairly modest, in 
relation to the low standard of living of the would-be office holder, or 
in relation to the pressure of relatives' claims on his existing standard 
of living. Generally, corruption seems likely to be inseparable from 
great inequality. 
 
(Leys, 1965, p. 225) 
 
 
It is through Leys’s eyes that one begins to see clearly how deeply endemic 
corruption could become, was likely to become, in the future, as he predicts the 
weak spots in the governing elites’ patterns of behaviour that are challenged by 
the scarce and desirable commodities and the monies that the state could 
bestow: “Neither politicians nor civil servants are usually drawn from a class 
brought up for public service from an early age, or insulated from corrupting 
pressures by the established aloofness of a mandarin class” (Leys, 1965, p. 225). 
Thus: 
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to the extent that the official public morality of a society is more or 
less systematically subverted, especially if the leadership is involved in 
it, it becomes useless as a tool for getting things done, and this is 
expensive in any society where other resources are scarce. What is 
involved here is the idea of a 'corrupted society'. 
 
(Leys, 1965, p. 228) 
 
 
Further, his paper allows a discussion of corruption that brings in notions of the 
possible manifestations of a superego (or superegos) at work through the state’s 
“sacrosanct”, “perplexing” institutions and laws, and complex, complicated and 
“alien” regulations that could be regarded as a foreign, imposed superego 
demanding obedience:  
 
 
The idea of the national interest is weak because the idea of a nation 
is new. And the institutions and offices of the state are, for most 
people, remote and perplexing. Even to the civil servants and 
politicians directly involved in them they are new; they are aware of 
the 'official purposes' which are attached to them by importation, but 
they scarcely regard them as 'hallowed' and hence they do not 
necessarily regard them as sacrosant. On the contrary their western 
origin makes them suspect. To many people the 'state' and its organs 
were identified with alien rule and were proper objects of plunder, 
and they have not yet been re-identified fully as instruments for the 
promotion of common interests. Meanwhile to the illiterate peasant 
the 'state' and its organs continue to be the source of a web of largely 
unknowable and complicated regulations, and hence of a permanent 
threat of punishment; against this threat it is very reasonable to take 
any available precaution, such as offering bribes. 
(Leys, 1965, pp. 224-225)  
 
Morality and the imposition of a national moral code of behaviour that is allied 
with “the promotion of common interests” could be related to the function of a 
superego, in particular that of a ‘national superego’. Leys states that public 
morality and private morality are intimately connected but, critically, he makes 
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the observation that both are endangered by being “weakened by the hammer 
blows delivered to all moral rules by rapid social and economic change” (Leys, 
1965, p. 225). The “permanent threat of punishment”, cited above, emanating 
from the institutions of the state and the “largely unknowable and complicated” 
laws of the land could, psychoanalytically, echo the moralistic laws – often 
equally unknowable and complicated – of the reprimanding, censoring, psychic 
superego father-figure or god-like substitutive agent.  
Both papers challenge the dominant perspective that corruption is a ‘bad’ thing, 
but it is David Bayley who truly takes up this mantle. His paper is of critical 
importance because of its direct and determined focus on what he calls the “both 
positive and negative” (Bayley, 1966, p. 719, his emphasis) effects of corruption. 
His stated purpose is “to show that corruption in developing nations is not 
necessarily antipathetic to the development of modern economic and social 
systems; that corruption serves in part at least a beneficial function in 
developing societies” (Bayley, 1966, p. 719). This was not an observation that 
could generally be extracted from most writers at the time with reference to 
Africa, thus Bayley’s paper is also important because he thus complements and 
serves to bring an alternative perspective to the events being observed by 
writers in Africa during the same epoch. He is to be commended for his attempt 
to frame hypotheses on the possible positive future effects of corruption. His 
text’s attempt to construct a positive critique of acts of corruption that extends to 
all emerging states is in contrast to the generally prevailing tone of 
condemnation, moralistic negativity, and lukewarm hopes that corruption would 
be a passing phase of growing-pains behaviour, as typified by Wraith and 
Simpkins’s book on African corruption, to which Bayley also refers.  
Moreover, illustrations are provided from Bayley’s experiences in India and they 
serve to support the general observation made by writers on corruption during 
this period, (such as Colin Leys), that acts of corruption were taking place in all 
the emerging nation states not just in the new African nations. As Bayley notes 
correctly about the material that he uses to illustrate some points: “I am sure, 
however, that the Indian situation is not atypical” (Bayley, 1966, pp. 719-720). In 
fact the close international alliances struck during this period by the new nations 
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emerging globally in the so-called ‘Third World’ (for example, such as the Non-
Aligned Movement) only serves to strengthen this observation. An example of 
these interconnections is highlighted thus: 
 
The hero of the African novel, No Longer at Ease, which portrays the 
tension between the demands of traditional society and standards of 
a Western civil service, finally capitulates to the pressures upon him 
and accepts gratuities but salves his conscience with the thought that 
he only takes money from those whom he approves on their merits 
anyhow. A variation of this is the civil servant who takes money from 
all applicants impartially but still goes ahead and decides the matter 
on merits. Rumour in India would have it that this is not an 
exceptional situation. Are such people corrupt? 
(Bayley, 1966, p. 720) 
 
To Bayley’s question: “Are such people corrupt?” can be posited the question: 
What, then is corruption? Leys responded by questioning why only certain 
writers he describes as moralists (and he cites Wraith and Simpkins) have 
approached this question: 
 
This is curious when one considers the word itself (corruption=to 
change from good to bad; to debase; to pervert); it denotes patterns 
of action which derive their significance from the role of value-
systems in social behaviour. Similar phenomena, such as suicide, 
crime, or religious fanaticism, have intrigued sociologists greatly. 
However, the question of corruption in the contemporary world has 
so far been taken up almost solely by moralists. 
(Leys, 1965, p. 216) 
 
Leys stipulates that for something to be called “corrupt” there has to be in 
existence a “rule” together with “the sense in which it is said to have been 
perverted” (Leys, 1965, p. 221). But he questions: “Who regards the purpose 
which is being perverted as the proper or ‘official' purpose? It may be so 
regarded by most people in the society, including those who pervert it; or it may 
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be so regarded by only a few people” (Leys, 1965, p. 221-222). Leys’s 
fundamental question is framed in the following manner: 
 
Under what circumstances are actions called corrupt? What is at issue 
… is the existence of a standard of behaviour according to which the 
action in question breaks some rule, written or unwritten, about the 
proper purposes to which a public office or a public institution may be 
put. The moralist has his own idea of what the rule should be. The 
actors in the situations concerned have theirs. It may be the same as 
the moralists' (they may regard themselves as corrupt); or quite 
different (they may regard themselves as behaving honourably 
according to their standards, and regard their critics' standards as 
irrelevant); or they may be 'men of two worlds', partly adhering to 
two standards which are incompatible, and ending up exasperated 
and indifferent (they may recognise no particular moral implications 
of the acts in question at all—this is fairly obviously quite common). 
And in addition to the actors there are the other members—more or 
less directly affected—of their own society; all these positions are 
possible for them too. 
(Leys, 1965, p. 221) 
 
Of particular note in the above citation is how “men of two worlds” echoes, 
unknowingly, Freud’s psychoanalytic perspective of living in two worlds – “The 
individual does actually carry on a twofold existence: one to serve his own 
purposes and the other as a link in a chain, which he serves against his will, or at 
least involuntarily” (Freud, 1914, p. 78) – and echoes the basic psychoanalytic 
dualism between conscious and unconscious states of mind. A state of being that 
Leys, importantly, acknowledges as being not only part of the individual’s 
character but also forming that of his fellow members of society.  
Bayley comments that the results of corrupt practices by those lower down the 
social ladder can be of considerable monetary value: 
 
It should also be noted that although corruption at the top attracts 
the most attention in public forums, and involves the largest amount 
of money in separate transactions, corruption at the very bottom 
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levels is the more apparent and obvious and in total amounts of 
money involved may very well rival corruption at the top. 
(Bayley, 1966, p. 724) 
 
For David Bayley ‘corruption’ and ‘bribery’ are linked: “Corruption, then, while 
being tied particularly to the act of bribery, is a general term covering misuse of 
authority as a result of considerations of personal gain, which need not be 
monetary”, and, “A bribe is then defined as ‘a price, reward, gift or favour 
bestowed or promised with a view to pervert the judgment or corrupt the 
conduct especially of a person in a position of trust’”(Bayley, 1966, p. 720). Leys, 
as cited above, spoke of a “rule” that was “perverted” in his elaboration of the 
term ‘corruption’ and now Bayley uses “to pervert” in relation to a sense of 
corroding someone’s judgement. It is interesting that both writers have chosen 
to use this term, ‘pervert’, as a characterizing factor in acts of corruption. For 
Bayley, in its essence the committing of an act of corruption means: “(a) a 
decision to depart from government-established criteria for decisions of the 
relevant class and (b) a monetary reward benefiting either the official directly or 
those related to him” (Bayley, 1966, p. 724). In this succinct elaboration of the 
essentials of an act of corruption Bayley uses the phrase “to depart from”. 
Psychoanalytically this would suggest that a new direction, a new aim has come 
into being and has been set in the mind of the individual as an alternative to the 
original, pre-destined aim set by the government authorities.  
Leys (1965, p. 223) asks what he correctly describes as a “central” question: “In 
any society, under what conditions is behaviour most likely to occur which a 
significant section of the population will regard as corrupt?” Leys’s forward-
thinking and freshness is clear in the framing of the question to include the use 
of the phrase “in any society”, to which could be added ‘at a particular time’ to 
make it even more timely and relevant. Complex and of concern with regard to 
people’s “attitudes” is: “The extent to which action which perverts or 
contravenes such official purposes is seen as doing so” (Leys, 1965, p. 223).    
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Bayley sets out a good listing of the typical areas in which the urge to commit an 
act of corruption might be awakened or provoked in an individual: 
 
Corruption comes in innumerable shapes, forms, and sizes. There are 
as many reasons for corrupting as there are ways in which 
government affects individuals; there are as many avenues for 
corruption as there are roles to be played in government. Corruption 
may be involved in the issuance of export licenses, a decision to 
investigate in a criminal case, obtaining of a copy of court 
proceedings, appointment of candidates to universities, choice of 
men for civil service jobs, inspection of building specifications in new 
housing developments, avoiding of arrest by people with defective 
motor vehicles, granting of contracts, and in the expediting of 
anything. 
(Bayley, 1966, p. 724) 
 
It should be remembered that an act of corruption can be initiated in the mind of 
the individual himself. There is no necessity for the presence of what Bayley calls 
“the corruptor” (1966, p. 724) in his listing of the “three classes of mediating 
actors: the corrupted, the corruptor, and the non-participating audience,” 
although such a person is of necessity in the extremely frequent incidences of 
bribery. The corruptor’s tempting hand may also be present in the other highly 
typical form of corrupt practice: the “kickback”, that is, the monetary slicing off 
of a percentage from the total sum of an official contract: “a civil servant may let 
a contract for a certain sum, but get 10 per cent back for the favour of giving the 
contract: 90 per cent of the allocated amount goes for the public purpose, 10 per 
cent goes into personal gains” (Bayley, 1966, p. 725). The important point is 
made with respect to the type of atmosphere created by acts of corruption, that 
corruption itself creates a corrupting atmosphere that “feeds” on and eats up 
itself and its surroundings: 
 
Corruption exerts a corrupting influence on other members of the 
administrative apparatus. This is a function of its persistence, its 
perceived rewards, and the impunity with which it is done. Corruption 
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feeds upon itself and erodes the courage necessary to adhere to high 
standards of propriety. Morale declines, each man asking himself why 
he should be the sole custodian of morality. 
(Bayley, 1966, p. 725) 
 
11. Imposing a ‘National’ Superego  
We must return to our dialogue with Freud’s theory-making in order for him to 
establish the premise of his concept of the superego, which will then enable us to 
enquire whether, in such a potentially corrosive, ‘feeding’ atmosphere of corrupt 
acts, the possibility of a superego that could be considered as a ‘national’ 
superego could be constructed and have any agency. On the individual superego 
Freud states that: 
 
The superego owes its special position in the ego, or in relation to the 
ego, to a factor which must be considered from two sides: on the one 
hand it was the first identification and one which took place while the 
ego was still feeble, and on the other hand it is the heir to the 
Oedipus complex and has thus introduced the most momentous 
objects into the ego. The superego’s relation to the later alterations of 
the ego is roughly similar to that of the primary sexual phase of 
childhood to later sexual life after puberty. Although it is accessible to 
all later influences, it nevertheless preserves throughout life the 
character given to it by its derivation from the father-complex – 
namely, the capacity to stand apart from the ego and to master it. It is 
a memorial of the former weakness and dependence of the ego, and 
the mature ego remains subject to its domination. As the child was 
once under a compulsion to obey its parents, so the ego submits to 
the categorical imperative of its superego. 
(Freud , 1923, p. 48) 
 
Psychoanalytically, therefore, the superego represents, constitutes, the 
prohibiting, often punishing, law-giver; the conscience that sets the rules and 
demands adherence and obedience. The superego’s ability to reach and maintain 
a level of severe criticism that amounts to persecution can turn into a great 
source of misery for the individual. It is the censoring agency constructed to 
 186 
form an exterior and interior conscience (and an interior guilt), brought together 
and framed as the literal overseer of the ego. Freud’s delineation of the 
superego’s function then turns to its archaeological formation from the egos and 
the ids of historical past ancestors. The id is, of course, for Freud – in his 1923 
structural determination of the mind’s agencies as ego, id, and superego – the 
psychical entity that behaves unconsciously, is unknown, and subject to the 
instincts, passions, and the pleasure principle (Freud, 1923, pp. 23-25). 
 
But the derivation of the superego from the first object-cathexes of 
the id, from the Oedipus complex, signifies even more for it. This 
derivation … brings it into relation with the phylogenetic acquisitions 
of the id and makes it a reincarnation of former ego-structures which 
have left their precipitates behind in the id. Thus the superego is 
always close to the id and can act as its representative vis-à-vis the 
ego. It reaches deep down into the id and for that reason is farther 
from consciousness than the ego is. 
(Freud , 1923, pp. 48-49) 
 
It would be possible to extract from Freud’s principles with regard to the 
individual’s superego in order to enable comparable elements to potentially 
constitute what would be in effect a ‘national’ superego. One would be 
proceeding from the smallest unit of a group (the individual) to its largest 
extrapolation (the nation). There would certainly be a requirement for Bayley’s 
“high standards of propriety”, “custodian of morality” (1966, p. 725) from those 
considered to be leaders and ‘founding fathers’ of the nation, but whether that 
would be enough is uncertain. What would be the national (superego’s) attitude 
to the transgression of the committing of an act of corruption? Colin Leys 
addresses how an individual could be torn between the morals of western 
countries and African moralities: 
 
there is likely to be much behaviour in new states that will be called 
corrupt. It is not to say anything about the 'level' of morality of the 
citizens of these countries. It is only to say that, poised as they are 
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between the inherited public morality of the western nation-state and 
the disappearing public morality of the tribe, they are subject to very 
considerable cross-pressures which make it unlikely that the western 
state morality, at least in its refined and detailed forms, will emerge 
as the new public morality of these countries; meantime, however, 
the criteria of the west have sufficient standing in some quarters to 
ensure that the accusation of corruption is freely leveled against all 
behaviour which does not conform to them. 
 
(Leys, 1965, p. 226) 
 
What Leys terms “the inherited public morality of the western nation-state” 
(emphasis added) in Africa is strongly suggestive of the imposition of a foreign, 
alien, moral code. He is not speaking of an African inheritance in an African 
country of the residual structures of past public moralities and conduct, but of 
inheritances that have been imported. The newly imported moral codes were 
regarded as precisely that: new and foreign. Freud’s notion of a superego 
aligning itself with the similarly inherited down the generations “phylogenetic 
acquisitions of the id” could be found problematical if attempts were made to use 
such a formulation to enable a ‘national’ superego in the circumstances of 
imported codes of conduct. If one were to consider ‘morality’, ‘conduct’, and ‘the 
law’ as formative structures of a potential nationally embodied superego in 
action, then one would have to consider what Leys calls in the above citation the 
“very considerable cross-pressure” that would bear down quite heavily upon the 
mental states of both individuals and groups within the populace if they felt that 
such moralities, conduct, and laws had been sourced externally and imposed. But 
the new African bourgeoisie who came into power were in psychic terms, 
according to a psychoanalytical outlook, put into a position where they had to 
accept the imposition of the moral codes of a foreign, alien, superego to 
supervise and censor their ways of behaving in the form of Leys’s stated 
“inherited public morality of the western nation-state”.   
The conflicts between the old and the new, between the individual and the 
group, and between groups could give rise to an evolving, constructed, more 
malleable superego or a more rigid, less malleable superego in the form of “the 
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new public morality of these countries” (Leys, 1965, p. 266). But it would be a 
superego that had not developed over time in an African context in relation to 
the matters of modernization that it was being asked to rule upon. Leys states 
that: “It seems impossible to declare that a society without an effective public 
morality cannot develop economically. On the other hand, there do seem to be 
reasons for doubting whether in African conditions this is likely to happen” 
(1965, p. 228). However, what does seem probable is that “a society without an 
effective public morality” would be akin to not having an effective national 
superego. How would people approach and handle morally debatable behaviour 
like financial corruption?  
In his paper Leys discusses Britain’s road during the 19th century to the changing 
and adapting of moral conducts that lead to the committing of fewer acts of 
corruption, noting that Wraith and Simpkins devoted a large section of their 
book to this area, too. All of them are aware that some form of structure had to 
be superimposed on the nation, the national mind, and national forms of 
behaviour in order to ensure the sustainability of moral behaviour in public 
office. In psychoanalysis this realization would take us to the fundamental role of 
the superego in critical judgment and regulation, as we have been discussing. It 
is illuminating to have an input into the discussion that illustrates a western 
country’s perspective because it clarifies and confirms that a superego would be 
in operation irrespective of nationality or hemisphere. The important 
observation made by Leys is that in contrast to the newly emerging countries on 
the African continent, Britain already had a ruling class who were in possession 
of their own “previously obtaining moral code” (Leys, 1965, p. 226) and with 
their own clear conceptions of the nature, role, and vital contributions played by 
public institutions and public offices. But how did the British change their 
standards and their moralities so that acts of corruption became acts that would 
be condemned and punished? 
 
 
What seems to have happened is that the ruling classes were induced 
to accept an altered perception of the nature of the public interest 
and so to redefine the purposes of the public offices and state 
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institutions which remained, during most of this period, still under 
their control. It was precisely because they already had a clear notion 
of the public interest that the assertion of the new notion was 
established with such completeness. What was involved was not the 
establishment for the first time of a set of ideas about how public 
offices and institutions were to serve the public interest, but the 
adaptation of an established set. Britain did not, in other words, pass 
from a corrupt condition to a very pure one; rather it passed from one 
set of standards to another, through a period in which behaviour 
patterns which were acceptable by the old standards came to be 
regarded as corrupt according to the new. 
(Leys, 1965, p. 227) 
 
In psychoanalytic terms, it would seem that within the context of our discussion 
of the possibility of the conceptualization of a national superego, that the older, 
more developed countries, such as Britain, could be said to be already in 
possession of a working, active national superego in the form of “an established 
set” of ideas before they began their reforms, although these ideas had been ones 
that had not frowned upon corruption seriously. Further, such a 
conceptualization would allow for the national reforms that took place to be 
considered as processes of remoulding, reframing, and adapting of that national 
superego to embed new laws and new regulations. As Leys stated above: “What 
was involved was not the establishment for the first time of a set of ideas about 
how public offices and institutions were to serve the public interest, but the 
adaptation of an established set.” The remnants of the old and of the past could 
be merged into, managed alongside, or rejected and discarded for the new. It is 
also important to note that these changes and adaptations from the old accepted 
ways of doing things and conducting oneself, although enacted during the 
passage through a particular period of historical time (in Britain’s case, the 19th 
century), had evolved from their roots in the past and would be subject through 
time to further evolutions and adaptations.    
 
By contrast the ruling classes of Africa are new classes, exercising a 
new rule. Only a minority have been brought up in ruling-class circles. 
The idea contained in the phrase, noblesse oblige, scarcely applies. 
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There is no previous experience, and so no prior ideology, of the roles 
of public offices and institutions in relation to the public interest, in 
terms of which the private exploitation of public office could be 
rationalised. There is a prevailing conception of the national interest 
and dedication to popular welfare. But it is precisely this idea that 
may be called into question by the way in which public office is 
actually exploited by those who occupy it. They have publicly 
accepted, at least by implication, the official purposes officially 
attached to public offices and institutions by the colonial powers. 
(Leys, 1965, pp. 227-228)  
 
To the question, did the new African countries of the 1960s become sites for the 
importation of “alien” laws, rules, regulations, and codes of conduct? The answer 
would appear to be in the affirmative, particularly because there was no 
previously existing institutional frameworks as was the case in developed 
countries. Leys telling comment above reveals his outlook on the situation: 
“There is no previous experience, and so no prior ideology, of the roles of public 
offices and institutions in relation to the public interest”. New institutions, new 
ways of working were a foreign intrusion. An unwanted critical influence, an 
external judgmental reality, and an invasion of the individual ego – and an 
obstruction of a national superego – by something unwanted, remote, 
perplexing, and literally unfamiliar and unrelated. Denunciations of financial 
corruption by such imported moral codes could fall on deaf ears. 
 
It is clear that new states are very likely to be the scene of a great deal 
of behaviour that will be called corrupt. Neither attitudes nor material 
conditions in these countries are focused on the support of a single 
concept of the national interest or of the official purposes of state and 
local officers and institutions which would promote that interest. 
(Leys, 1965, p. 224)  
 
We would argue that on the basis of our discussion Leys’s notion above of “a 
single concept of the national interest” would draw psychoanalytic comparison 
and affinity with a national superego or at the very least a major part of its 
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components. He is correct to lament the lack of support for such an overarching 
national concept for the following reason: If, as Leys put it (as cited at the 
beginning of Section 2.), “the idea of a corrupted society” (Leys, 1965, p. 228) 
takes firm root, particularly in the absence of a conceived group of ideas focused 
on the national interest, then the notion of the members of the elite being and 
becoming the providers of ego ideals becomes endangered. In terms of 
psychoanalysis, ego ideals become tarnished and fail to fulfill their functions as 
the setters of standards and as role models to be copied. An ego ideal becomes a 
corrupt and corrupting ego ideal. Bayley writes that: 
 
Politicians and civil servants constitute an elite. Their function is to 
give purpose to national effort. In so doing they cannot avoid setting 
an example others will emulate. If the elite is believed to be widely 
and thoroughly corrupt, the man-in-the-street will see little reason 
why he too should not gather what he can for himself and his loved 
ones. 
(Bayley, 1966, p. 725) 
 
A corrupted society could come into being because a corrupted and corrupting 
elite “not only debases standards popularly perceived, it forces people to 
undertake the underhanded approach out of self-defence. They feel they must 
resort to corrupt practices just to get their due” (Bayley, 1966, 726). Leys 
confirms that: 
 
 
if this is the pattern of behaviour of the elite and if this is fairly well 
known, it is likely to rob them of much of their authority both with 
subordinates in the government and with political followers in the 
countryside. The country will be apt to forfeit whatever benefits can 
be derived by the output of effort not solely motivated by the hope of 
personal gain.  
 
(Leys, 1965, p. 229) 
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Ordinary people would copy and act out their own minor versions of what those 
higher up the rungs of power were doing and not being punished for, or they 
would be actively involved in helping those more powerful than they were to 
commit the crimes. There would be those among the ‘elite’ who could actively 
encourage acts of corruption because such acts bolster and cement their hold on 
power. With the use of a psychoanalytic lens Leys emerges as being in agreement 
with the points raised on corruption and the negative functioning of ego ideals, 
as he observes that corrupt behaviour that spreads from individuals to the group 
could clearly provide negative impacts nationally on development: 
 
the wealth improperly accumulated by the top elite may be modest 
by world standards, but still large in relation to the level of 
investment on which the economic development of the country 
depends. In this case much will turn on how such wealth is 
redeployed. If political leaders try to buy security by depositing their 
wealth in numbered accounts in Swiss banks it represents a wholly 
negative drain on the economy. (But perhaps they will buy farms and 
make them very productive.)  
 
(Leys, 1965, p. 229) 
 
When Leys wrote above of Swiss bank accounts and “a wholly negative drain on 
the economy”, how unfortunate that he could not transport himself into the 
future to see how accurate he would be! Despite Leys own doubts, this, indeed, 
turned out to be a very important prediction of the future, as large amounts of 
money were deposited in Swiss and other European bank accounts after having 
been drained from national treasuries, for example, as in the case of the Nigerian 
head of state, Sani Abacha, during the 1990s. In the 1960s Leys felt surest about 
the eventuality of a failure to fulfill development plans. A failure that would be 
caused by a bureaucratic culture that was more focused on becoming rich than 
on delivering economic development. Such lack of development was a possibility 
which “seems most solid and even obvious” (1965, p. 229). This was because:  
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most African states are extremely dependent upon government 
action for their development. Their development prospects largely 
depend on attaining the targets chartered in development plans, and 
by very fine margins. This requires single-minded hard work from all 
holders of public office. If the top political elite of a country consumes 
its time and energy in trying to get rich by corrupt means, it is not 
likely that the development plans will be fulfilled. 
(Leys, 1965, pp. 228-229) 
 
Leys’s thoughts on corruption’s effects on the state’s development planning were 
yet another correct prediction of what the future would hold (for example, see 
Mauro, 1995). The strong focus on African economies and the problem of 
corruption is a reflection of the extraordinary sums of money involved in the 
looting from state enterprises and national treasuries in conjunction with the 
still continuing struggle for infrastructural development and poverty reduction. 
Colin Leys’s point about where stolen money would go – into secret Swiss bank 
accounts or perhaps into farming – was highly acute and relevant. His 
observation about the “perfectly plain differences” in “public spirit and devotion 
to duty” (1965, p. 229) in the behaviour and attitudes of the elites in different 
developing states is equally pertinent. It would confirm again psychoanalytically, 
that superegos could be established and be representative of the nation’s 
interests and of their elites’ functions and abilities to operate and influence in 
myriad ways according to the national interests of the particular state.  
In summary, in acknowledging the requirements for duty, a public spirit, a 
national interest, a set of ideas, etc., in order to instil nationally anti-corruption 
attitudes and feelings, we return to the central conflict of such national 
requirements and turn to Bayley to sum up the potentially disorientating 
dynamics that surrounded the role that corruption played in society: 
 
The intelligentsia, and especially top-level civil servants, in most 
underdeveloped nations are familiar with the Western label 
“corruption”, and they apply it to their own countries. Since 
modernization around the world is most often Westernization, the 
standards the intelligentsia and opinion-leaders of these countries are 
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trying to inculcate are Western ones. … in Africa the conflict in the 
hearts of civil servants is precisely over which standard of morality 
should prevail, the Western or the traditional. Non-Westerners are 
acutely conscious of the Western meaning of corruption; they use it 
among themselves. And they are painfully aware that Western 
standards of governmental conduct condemn it. 
(Bayley, 1966, p. 722) 
 
With respect to personal gain and what psychoanalysis would term narcissism 
and self-regard, it is Bayley who makes the very important point on corruption 
that the corrupt individual puts himself first: “A corrupt official or politician is a 
self-centred individual. Can such a person be expected to put country before self, 
to jeopardize his prospects for the sake of prosperity for the whole country in 
the remote future?” (Bayley, 1966, p. 726). Putting “country before self”, that is 
putting the needs of the “self” second, could be argued as being against the 
intrinsic narcissistic notion of providing for “the self” and how that is supposed 
to operate in a world of an external reality of situations of impoverishment, 
hunger, and need.  
 
12. Defending Corruption as ‘Positive’  
Western condemnation of corruption in African states was taking place during 
the 1960s, but could those same corrupt practices ever be viewed as a ‘positive’ 
phenomenon? Both Bayley and Leys believe that there are circumstances in 
which this could certainly be the case. Leys (1965, p. 222) asserts that: “It is 
natural but wrong to assume that the results of corruption are always both bad 
and important.” He makes the startling point that corruption can provide “strong 
personal incentives” to make the development of commerce in the new states 
quicker and even less “inefficient”: 
 
For instance it is usually assumed that a corrupt civil service is an 
impediment to the establishment of foreign private enterprise, which 
has enough difficulties to contend with without in addition having to 
 195 
pay bribes. This may be clearly the case, but sometimes also the 
reverse appears to be true. Where bureaucracy is both elaborate and 
inefficient, the provision of strong personal incentives to bureaucrats 
to cut red tape may be the only way of speeding the establishment of 
the new firm. In such a case it is certainly reasonable to wish that the 
bureaucracy were simpler and more efficient, but not to argue that 
bribery per se is an obstacle to private economic initiative. 
(Leys, 1965, pp. 222-223)  
 
Leys takes this questioning of bribery perhaps not being an obstacle further: 
“Even in the case of petty bribery or extortion, it is relevant to ask, What is the 
alternative?” (Leys, 1965, p. 220). However, as indicated at the beginning of this 
analytical exploration of Colin Leys and David Bayley on corruption, it is Bayley 
who most strongly makes the case for ‘positive’ corruption. As stated, Bayley’s 
position is that “corruption serves in part at least a beneficial function in 
developing societies” and that its effects are “both positive and negative” (Bayley, 
1966, p. 719).  
 
the effects of corruption may be beneficial in nature. I do not pretend 
that they always are, simply that it would not be unreasonable to find 
that they are. Nor does it follow that because the effects are good the 
means are either desirable or blameless. 
(Bayley, 1966, p. 726) 
 
It is interesting that this statement by Bayley is still striking when read today, 
fifty years after it was published. Although Bayley does not separate the “act” 
from the “effects”, the “effects of corruption may be beneficial in nature” and “it 
would not be unreasonable to find that they are”.  Even its last sentence, which 
no doubt is supposed to act as a form of disclaimer, does not detract from the 
power contained in what has gone before, perhaps because it contains the 
phrase “because the effects are good”. Half a century later Ruggiero (2015, p. 42) 
notes that those in power can turn a blind eye and “opportunities are granted to 
ordinary citizens to benefit from minor episodes of corruption. In such societies 
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ordinary citizens may be led to condone large-scale corruption enacted by the 
elite”. Acts of corruption are allowed to occur and to be beneficial to those 
citizens who carry them out in return for their loyalty, or their silence with 
regard to financial corruption carried out by those in political power or 
organized in powerful groups.   
Bayley observes that “in both Africa and India the man who uses his official 
position to obtain jobs for his relatives is not considered immoral: in traditional 
terms, he is only doing what every loyal member of an extended family is 
expected to do” (1966, p. 721). Custom and tradition would act upon this man’s 
conscience to dictate that he carry out an act newly seen to be ‘corrupt’. In fact: 
“He would be censured if he did not act in this way” (1966, p. 721). These 
expectations, traditions, guilt, and censures observed by Bayley are fascinating 
and compelling: this could be the traditional, inherited, superego that is being 
observed in conflict with the new morality and the newly imported rules and 
regulations of a newly imported, emerging superego, a superego that is in the 
process of being constructed.  
Emerging attitudes to acts such as bribery would have to be confronted, and here 
Bayley is in agreement with Leys that bribery could be a positive economic 
indicator of efficiency and should not automatically attract condemnation.  
 
For example, government may desire to build a strong fertilizer 
industry and toward this end may have established certain 
requirements for the selection of firms to receive the concession. If 
government economists have not selected the proper indicators of 
efficiency, it is not far-fetched to assume that ability to offer massive 
bribes – bribes at least bigger than anyone else’s – could be 
correlated with entrepreneurial efficiency. Bribes represent a peculiar 
element of cost, applying to all competing firms; the ability to meet it 
may not be unrelated to efficiency. 
(Bayley, 1966, p. 727) 
 
Bayley seems to be suggesting here that one has to be in a position to corrupt. 
And to be in such a position that would enable one to be able to corrupt another 
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individual would be making statements about the power, expertise, and ability 
held by that potential corruptor.  
 
Corruption, then, is not an inherently defective means of arriving at 
decisions among competing claimants. The satisfactoriness of the 
inducement offered may correlate with features among claimants 
government would choose if it had better information or greater 
expertise in selecting criteria for decision-making. 
(Bayley, 1966, p. 727) 
 
Psychoanalysis reminds us of the kind of power held over the infant by the adult 
or, indeed, by the superego over the ego. This is in essence an attack on the 
decision-making abilities and powers of the new bureaucrats in the new states. 
However Bayley does proceed to add the sweetener that: 
 
It may even be that government servants as a whole, especially at the 
upper levels, representing an educated elite with unique access to 
information about prospects for economic development, may have a 
greater propensity to invest in productive enterprises of a modern 
kind than do a cross-section of the people who seek to bribe them. 
(Bayley, 1966, p. 728) 
 
Bayley appears to be arguing that corruption does not necessarily take 
investment money from the hands of ‘forward-thinking’ modernizing 
entrepreneurs in order to put money into the hands of the more traditionally-
minded, less outward-looking. In other words, those who receive corrupt funds 
may be better placed to use that money in the best interests of the nation at 
large. It is an extraordinary thought and it accompanies and incorporates 
Bayley’s positive sentiments regarding the superior in education government 
elites with their insider knowledge of the best government investment 
opportunities. Bayley feels sure enough about his overall position to make this 
cogent general statement: 
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There is a common assumption that corrupt acts produce effects 
worse than those which would have followed from an untainted 
decision. This assumption is only true to the extent that the 
government-established – or system-established – criteria for choices 
are better than those served by corruption. Governments have no 
monopoly upon correct solutions; governments are simply one among 
many bureaucratic institutions which may do stupid things. Both the 
ends and the means served by government-constricted choices may 
be worse than those freely chosen and finding expression through 
corruption.  
(Bayley, 1966, p. 727) 
 
One would have to pause here to insert the caveat that Bayley’s propositions and 
positive assertions regarding corruption could only work if corruption is actually 
taking place. He continues with his general statement: 
 
Corruption may serve as a means for impelling better choices, even in 
terms of government’s expressed goals. Nor do I think it necessary to 
say that corruption only occasionally, and by chance, operates in this 
direction. It could systematically do so, not perhaps across the board 
in all decisions but certainly in all decisions of a certain kind. 
(Bayley, 1966, p. 727) 
 
Moreover in terms of a developing, emerging or radically changing nation: 
 
A transitional people may have more faith in a system they can 
influence in some degree through personal action than one they do 
not know how to manipulate by means of the institutional 
mechanisms provided. The human contact provided in a corrupt act 
may be a necessary transitional device to insure the loyalty to the 
new of a tradition-bound people. Perhaps it is better that people in 
developing nations misuse modern agencies to their own ends than 
that they reject the new because they cannot work the handles. 
(Bayley, 1966, p. 729) 
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In fact corruption could actually bring people together positively to form 
networks of “self-interest” (1966, p.730). Conflicts between the bureaucracy and 
the politicians on how best to run and administer the state can be lessened by 
the entwining of both in acts of corruption: 
 
Politicians accuse the bureaucrats of running a closed corporation; 
bureaucrats argue that politicians divert attention and resources from 
essential tasks. The practice of corruption may lessen this potentially 
crippling strain. It is one means of increasing the responsiveness of 
bureaucrats to individual and group needs. It also links the bureaucrat 
and the politician in an easily discerned network of self-interest. 
(Bayley, 1966, p. 730) 
 
As for the development of the individual and individual abilities and talent, 
Bayley argues that the impact of an “opportunity for corruption” could make a 
positive contribution towards the necessity of attracting the most talented: the 
calibre of potential government employees could improve: 
 
The opportunity for corruption may actually serve to increase the 
quality of public servants. If wages in government service are 
insufficient to meet a talented man’s needs, and he has an alternate 
choice, he will be tempted to choose the other. On the other hand, a 
man anxious to serve his country through government service might 
opt away from non-government employment if he knew that means 
existed to supplement a meagre salary. Even for the man with no 
alternative prospects for employment, security in meeting his 
unavoidable obligations may enhance his willingness to serve ably and 
loyally. 
(Bayley, 1966, p. 728) 
 
However Bayley’s statement raises questions about the role in financial 
corruption of greed and why it can seem often to play a dominant role in the 
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individual’s motivation to commit an act of corruption. At what point does 
insecurity in meeting needs and obligations on an “insufficient” and “meager 
salary” turn into extraordinary greed? A greed that could be described 
psychoanalytically as sadistic greed. The terms “kleptocrat” and “kleptocracy” 
(people who use their political power to steal from the state), according to 
dictionaries dates from the 1960s and is derived from the Greek ‘kleptēs’ 
meaning “thief”.  
13. A Particular Kind of Greed 
But how did the greed develop and what is its significance in this particular 
context? Melanie Klein writes that: “Envy is the angry feeling that another person 
possesses and enjoys something desirable – the envious impulse being to take it 
away or to spoil it”; and that: “Jealousy is based on envy, but involves a relation 
to at least two people” (Klein, 1957, p. 181). Further, with regard to greed itself:  
   
Greed is an impetuous and insatiable craving, exceeding what the 
subject needs and what the object is able and willing to give. At the 
unconscious level, greed aims primarily at completely scooping out, 
sucking dry, and devouring the breast: that is to say, its aim is 
destructive introjection; whereas envy not only seeks to rob in this 
way, but also to put badness, primarily bad excrements and bad parts 
of the self, into the mother, and first of all into her breast, in order to 
spoil and destroy her. 
(Klein, Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963, 1957, p. 181) 
 
A potentially destructive greed, as Klein explained whose aim is to devour 
anything and anybody. To want, to desire, for the sake of ‘to have’. Sometimes to 
want and to desire just to have in order to say “I’ve got this, now”. To take away 
from other people what other people may have. To leave other people depleted 
or with nothing at all in a reversal of colonialism and the ‘thief’ who has not been 
stopped with everything. Hence the destructiveness of extraordinary acts of 
corruption. Other people are destroyed and prevented from causing the hunger, 
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the pain, the lack of what was desired by the greed of the taker. It is the infantile 
ravenous greed of the child who refuses to give or share anything. 
At hand in a developing country is a potential situation of greed versus need 
versus economic development, as, arguably, at its core financial corruption is 
about greed but it is a greed that is based on the orality of the need for food, as 
we have set out earlier in this chapter using our own definition of what ‘food’ 
would constitute. Freud did not define greed in his theories, but above 
assessment Klein’s assessment, as “an impetuous and insatiable craving” that 
“aims primarily at completely scooping out, sucking dry, and devouring the 
breast” (Klein, 1957, p. 181) is strongly supportive of our premise of an orality-
based, food desiring greed. Following on from Chapter Four, this chapter 
supported its deployments  of key 1960s texts on corruption with key basic 
concepts of psychoanalysis. These have been central in leading up to the 
argument that is being made here that the greed that underpins financial 
corruption is a greed that interplays closely with the repression of primary 
needs and primary satisfactions. Also involved are narcissistic needs, a fractured 
or depleted ego, aggressive and sadistic impulses, and envy which in these terms, 
could even be regarded as a kind of factory for producing desire.  
14. The Psychoanalytic Positioning of Financial Corruption.  
Earlier in this chapter, the ways in which symbolic castration  and narcissistic 
deficits could impact on the individual’s ego, particularly in the vital area of the 
amount of self-regard that the ego needs in order to function. The proposition 
being made was that an ego fractured by colonial domination would try to repair 
the damage to self-regard and the wounds caused by symbolic castration by 
attempting to feed itself psychically in order to build itself up again. Using the 
wider definition of money, as outlined in that section, this feeding could take 
many forms, that is, ‘feeding’ would mean not merely guaranteeing food for the 
physical body’s survival, but also searching for food in the form of desirable 
objects that could be considered as feeding the ego. However, money could still 
be considered as being the primary desirable object and the most desirable food 
for the ego. This would be because the ego’s narcissistic need for food would be 
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aligned with the oral sexual drive’s need for food, which unconsciously would be 
aligned with money. Under the oral hypothesis – to which we will return shortly 
– both the ego’s libidinal need and the oral sexual drive would turn to the search 
for money as food, legally and illegally. The widespread and deep poverty in 
many new African nations could be regarded as providing a fertile seed-bed for 
the rooting of corrupt acts and practices, and an analytical dissection of what 
corruption actively entailed during the 1960s brought out problematics and 
complexities such as the contention that one could not rule out a discussion that 
argued for the positive outcomes and intentions of some corrupt acts.  
In conjunction with the elaboration of the oral hypothesis in Chapter Four, what 
can be said about the possible psychical situating of ‘the corrupt man’ in an 
emerging nation adapting to an economy in which previously unimaginable new 
found wealth is on display and potentially to hand? In other words: What can be 
attempted tentatively regarding the possible psychoanalytic positioning of those 
who commit an act of financial corruption? This might be a good junction at 
which to provide a restating of the primary hypothesis on orality, money, and the 
unconscious that was reached in Chapter Four as a result of the psychoanalytic 
premises set out in that chapter. The following was put forward.  The hypothesis 
that can now be made in this thesis is that the prototype inner state of pleasure 
and satisfaction from being and having been fed as an infant is an archaic 
prototype that persists in the unconscious permanently precisely because it is 
the prototype for primary satisfaction. Thus, it can be hypothesized that 
whatever represents and comes to symbolize the ability to provide food and 
nourishment will be equated unconsciously, symbolically, with the provision of 
basic, primary pleasure and satisfaction. And the hypothesis being made holds 
both for the pleasure and satisfaction received from food and any displeasure 
and dissatisfaction. Thus, it can be argued that what represents ‘money’, or the 
ability to purchase ‘food’, will come to stand in the unconscious for pleasure and 
satisfaction from food, or the anxiety and fear of hunger and possible starvation 
from the deprivation or non-availability of food. 
Following and deriving from this main, primary hypothesis on orality, it was 
further hypothesized (at the beginning of this chapter, as well as in Chapter Four) 
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that: ‘Money’ could exist in a repressed oral-erotically or oral-sadistically derived, 
sexual instinct charged, symbolic equation with ‘food’ and what ‘food’ means to 
mankind’s self-preservation and self image. This chapter has attempted to map 
the realities confronting the individual and his relations to others, and the 
dilemmas and the complexities confronting those challenged by the 
potentialities of corrupt monetary gains. There are strong indications that there 
is, indeed, support for the making of both the primary and the secondary 
hypothesis. Further, progress towards orality-based theoretical formulations 
regarding the committing of an act of financial corruption would follow from the 
primary hypothesis.   
But one could ask: Is any psychical positioning with regard to money a ‘wrong’ or 
a ‘right’ position in which to be psychically situated in a developing country 
context? Psychoanalysis does not think in terms of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ but in 
terms of attempting to find out and understand ‘why’. If there is ambivalence 
towards attempts to ‘position’ financial corruption psychoanalytically, then it has 
to be said that surely in the light of the work of psychoanalytic classical theory – 
particularly the writings by Freud and Abraham on anality and orality – there are 
certain psychoanalytic theoretical possibilities that can be put forward as part of 
a process of dialogue, discourse, and understanding of the ‘why’. Indeed, 
following on the strong arguments put forward by David Bayley (1966) the 
‘right’ and the ‘wrong’ can become somewhat blurred to absolute judgment, 
bringing forth the suggestion that in some instances there might not be anything 
absolutely negative with being a ‘corrupt’ person. However, writers like Wraith 
and Simpkins (1963) believed that financial corruption was not only totally 
immoral but also a social pathology and a ‘wrong’. But it would be legitimate to 
attempt to explain social pathology by using theoretical tools and constructs 
given the tools and constructs conceptualized by Freud. Flexibility and openness 
with regards to a repressed and then unrepressed instinctual causation for an 
act of corruption should be maintained. Also the ambivalence of love and hate 
towards money – perhaps sometimes at the same time – should not be ruled out. 
Freud himself regarded the life and death instinct theory as  “this pre-eminently 
dualistic view of instinctual life” (Freud, 1920, p. 49), and it should be asserted 
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that that would also be applicable to the component instincts of sadism and 
masochism. Love and hate are not always opposites or alternatives but 
sometimes literally on the same side of the coin. 
There is little doubt that oral sadistic and oral erotic conflicts emerged in 
relation to the acquiring of money after independence in Nigeria and other 
African countries. Substantiated by the writers on the ground at the time is what 
psychoanalysis would be able to determine as being demonstrations of oral 
erotically charged behaviour and orally sadistic greed – both were involved in 
financially corrupt acts. The argument was made that a developing, newly 
emerging nation could be in a position where, as outlined in Freud’s classical 
theory on ego instincts and sexual instincts, both libidinal currents were joined in 
pursuit of the same object, in this instance money. But a perspective that would 
consider financial corruption as a wholly sadistic activity could position an act of 
financial corruption not as a joint effort by the joined ego instincts and sexual 
instincts to replenish the symbolically castrated man’s ego with a narcissistic 
supply of money from the environment – that is, an act of oral erotism, an act of 
feeding, and thus of life – but, rather, an act of financial corruption could be one 
carried out by an aggressive, attacking, death instinct. Money itself, that prized 
object of both the rich Europeans and the minority comprising ‘the haves’ in 
African countries, could be being attacked for not being as available to the ‘have 
not’. Thus, this thesis also argues that an act of financial corruption could be 
committed narcissistically and oral-erotically to restore the status of the ego or 
could be an act committed to inflict oral-sadistic wounding upon the money itself 
or its original owner.  
In the final chapter, Chapter Six, the discussion on how financial corruption can 
potentially be positioned psychoanalytically is continued. The discussion turns 
to concluding reflections in the context of the overall narrative on orality that 
has been taking place in this thesis and will look towards the possible areas of 
inquiry that can be opened up to new and further dialogues.   
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Chapter Six 
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
 
 
 The final chapter of my thesis has been entitled Concluding Reflections for 
the following reason: in the course of this journey of investigation into how one 
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can begin to think about the root causes of financial corruption in a 
psychoanalytic way, there were some further intriguing and notable strands of 
thought that deserved to be included in this investigation, but, in order to justify 
their inclusion and to comprehend them better, they would need to be discussed 
following the establishment of the overall narrative of an attempted discourse on 
psychoanalysis and financial corruption. As we reach this concluding chapter, it 
would seem fair to claim that a narrative has indeed come to the fore, one that 
has brought into relation with each other certain key ideas, in particular the key 
thematic areas of orality and its primacy, the narcissistic need for money that 
widens the definition of what food can become, the various motives for financial 
corruption that highlight an underlying orality and encompass that broader 
definition of what food is, and the probabilities of an individual’s psychoanalytic 
disposition during the committing of financially corrupt acts. The reflections 
being highlighted in this chapter enter into this discourse at this point because 
they help to shed further light on why it was important to construct that dual 
carriageway that allowed us to travel with orality, and not only anality by our 
side, as we journeyed into discussions on the unconscious and money. The 
potential of the discussions that can now be embarked upon now appear to be 
richer and more free-flowing.  
The reflections in this chapter begin with pursuing a line of thinking on the 
notion of ‘the office’ and its status as the central object being abused by corrupt 
practices, something which was already touched upon in the first part of Chapter 
Five. This is then followed by a discussion as to whether money should be 
considered as an object of perversion; a section on retaining the theory of anality 
alongside the oral hypothesis; and an engagement with the potential of 
separating out the unconscious causations of the interest in money and the 
spending of money. This chapter and the thesis then ends with some thoughts on 
Freud and the lacunae around the important topic money within psychoanalysis 
generally. Thus, the preceding contents of Chapter Four and Chapter Five on 
orality and financial corruption form the theoretical underlying contributions to 
this chapter whose reflections may suggest potential for future dialogue and for 
other discourses to emerge.  
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1. The ‘Office’ and Financially Corrupt Practices 
Following the observations and critiques by writers on corruption and 
Africa in Chapter Five, the subject of financial corruption in Africa during the 
1960s has been addressed quite expansively. But there is still something 
enigmatic and elusive to grasp about the status of ‘the office’ and why it has been 
so critical to the prevailing discourse on financial corruption. As suggested in 
Chapter Five a prestigious or powerful office on its own merits, that is without 
any occupant installed, commands considerable powers that are already 
embedded and enshrined. The office itself wields the ability to corrupt 
independently of the corrupt nature, or potentially corruptible nature, of any 
occupant of that office. One can enter “office” expecting to behave corruptly, to 
act out, to satisfy the urge, instinct, impulse, craving to achieve great wealth, or 
the surroundings and environment of the post, the position, and the office itself 
could unrepress the urge, the need, the love for money, wealth, and even more 
power.   
A suggestion that could be made here is that perhaps there should be less of a 
strong focus on the notion of ‘the office’, which many definitions position as the 
central entity that is to be abused. However, as we have seen in Africa and Asia, 
particularly in the 1960s, corruption and “politics” and political office-holders 
appeared from the prevailing discourse to go hand in hand.  
Politics was access to ‘power’ – particularly in a developing society, and ‘power’ 
provided opportunities for corrupt practices, that is, the ‘abuse’ of that power. 
Political power is thus, it would seem, a necessary conduit for corruption. And at 
its very highest level there are the claims of absolute power corrupting 
absolutely. But to state that would be to suggest that no politics and no political 
power would equal no corruption, which would be incorrect. Corruption can 
pervade every sphere of life (as was examined in Chapter Five), not just politics: 
from the most top-level jobs to the most ordinary and relatively low-level 
occupations. It is not necessary to be in politics and in power, that is, in an 
‘office’, to be corrupt.  
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It seems clear that it is possible to argue that the ‘offices’ and the ‘institutions’ 
that are “abused” – as in the standard definitions of financial corruption – for 
personal monetary gain are offices and institutions that had no connection with 
an African unconscious reality, because the modern western notions of ‘power’, 
‘the law’, and ‘the office’ had little historical context and relation. For example, 
one could ask what was the notion of ‘the Treasury’ in an African historical 
context in the minds of the individuals involved in acts of theft? The act of 
“stealing from the Treasury” or “looting the Treasury” becomes less infused with 
moral outrage and illegitimacy if the notion and concept of ‘the state Treasury’ is 
not one that is rooted in an African historical, social, or cultural narrative. As we 
have seen in Chapter Five, it can be argued that certain notions of the power of 
the bureaucracy and the law have been imported into Africa and what is 
operating on the ground are western concepts that are still unfamiliar and 
perhaps unconsciously unwanted by Africans even to the present day.    
It is a challenge to the constitution of what ‘power’ is and the constitution of ‘the 
law’ in an African context, that the ideas and philosophies contained in them 
were formed outside of Africa over hundreds of years. And yet the concepts and 
philosophies underlying an African exercise of those laws have been adopted 
virtually wholesale in most African countries almost like a psychoanalytic 
acceptance of a command from the ‘law of the Father’. It is a commonplace today, 
for instance, to see lawyers in African countries in sweltering heat attired in the 
wigs and gowns of lawyers and judges in the United Kingdom. A battered, 
fractured, depleted ego might welcome the exterior adornment of the apparel of 
the former colonial master, (particularly in the roles, such as the law, in which 
such master had wielded enormous powers), but what of the unconscious? What 
of the id? There might well be a rebellion brewing in the interior. With regard to 
the cases of national or state politicians looting from national or local state 
treasuries, financial corruption might be considered as an unconscious attack on 
the imposition of such ‘foreign’ concepts. Financial corruption could be regarded 
as the unconscious refusal to take on board what are deemed to be foreign 
concepts and, thus, financially corrupt acts could be construed as a rebellion 
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against the ‘law of the Father’ and the conscious implementation of the directives 
of powerful institutions.  
Is there really harm being done by corruption? The “harm” done by the attaining 
of money through illegitimate means could be a mere perception, the 
manifestation of envy and greed on the part of those who do not have access to 
the same amount of wealth and influence or the same access to the means to 
attain equivalent amounts of wealth. The negative economic developmental 
impacts and poverty said to be caused by corruption could be the responsibility 
of other inhibiting and restricting factors that prevent positive development. 
‘Corruption’ and ‘corrupt acts’ can become comparatively easier targets for 
blame and finger-pointing in order to avoid dealing with what could be closer to 
the real underlying problems. There is no logical causal linkage between 
corruption and lack of, or poor, economic development as some countries with 
proven corruption have managed to develop their countries as well, providing 
good infrastructure, for example, in Asia and, in particular, China where 
development has proceeded apace and efficiently without the effective stamping 
out of corruption. It is also possible that the enforced ‘ free market’ reforms of 
the 1980s and 1990s – for example, structural economic adjustment policies and 
privatizations – created conditions in which office-holders in developing 
countries, particularly in Africa, found financial temptation difficult to resist. As 
in the 1960s, there was a stark contrast between ‘office’ incomes and what other 
people and officials in the private sector were set to earn through the 
internationally demanded, heavily promoted privatization and sales of assets 
and resources previously held by the state. Thus, despite their stringent 
criticisms of corruption, it could be said that international financial institutions 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund hold some 
responsibility for corrupt practices. It could be argued that their policies during 
the 1980s and 1990s of enforcing highly controversial structural adjustment 
policies with the ensuing belt tightening and sharp cost of living increases helped 
to create conscious and unconscious climates of resentment and retaliation that 
led to what could be characterized as retaliations and attacks on the relevant 
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state’s finances, resources, and newly privatized industries via theft, bribery and 
embezzlement. 
Let us return to the notion of a particularly stark kind of poverty that is engulfing 
an emerging, developing, or transitional people. In the 1960s financial 
corruption could be seen as a correlate of poverty, and, or, a correlate of the 
perception of being poor when compared to, (in the eyes of), the Other. The 
preferred focus taken by this study was on the ‘individual’: on the abuser and the 
abused, in the sense of human victims, human personalities with their human 
conscious and unconscious motivations and reactions. Africa appeared to have a 
specific problem of corruption, both individual and systemic, and low economic 
development giving rise to the possibility of there being in the future the hidden, 
private, institutionalization of corruption in subtle forms in some countries. 
Accompanied by the emergence, perhaps, of the perception of normal corruption, 
when corrupt practices have become so prevalent that they are almost taken for 
granted, making the rooting out of corruption an equally almost idealistic 
endeavour. What will societies in future accept or not accept when it comes to 
actions that are deemed to be ‘corrupt’ practices? We will have to continue to 
determine and define what is ‘abuse’ of office, power, position, influence, 
privilege, or access. Corruption moves rapidly towards becoming the answer to 
the question of how does someone “make money” or accumulate wealth in 
countries that seem unable to create enough jobs (and therefore money and 
well-being) in sustainable amounts for the majority of their people. In the 
situations where corruption becomes almost a way of life and the only way to 
earn a living for an increasing number of individuals we enter into dialogue 
regarding what will be tolerable or bearable for “the good of society”. 
Money does not necessarily have to change hands corruptly ‘under the table’ or 
in a ‘brown envelope’ for money and opportunities to be obtained further down 
the road by the same people, the same cliques, the same cadres or ‘elite’ groups. 
Over a period of time it could be possible that any consistently one-way traffic of 
the supply of lucrative benefits to a person or to a small number of people or 
companies – thereby excluding others from being able to obtain the same kind of 
benefits and treatment – becomes corrupt whilst not breaking any applicable 
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laws. Indeed, ‘crony capitalism’ is deemed to be a pejorative term. The ways in 
which those who hold power disburse power and influence and the 
opportunities to make money without breaking the law is of importance and of 
consequence.  
2. The Oral Drive and Wealth Accumulation 
The argument at the core of this thesis is that there is a strong case to be 
made for orality as the psychical underpinning of the need, urge, instinct, drive 
for the amassing and accumulation of money and wealth. Freud stated that the 
instincts or drives (the choice of term is dependent on one’s translation of the 
German word: ‘Trieb’) were the “most abundant sources” of “internal excitation” 
and the “representatives of all the forces originating in the interior of the body 
and transmitted to the mental apparatus” (Freud, 1920, p. 34). This thesis has 
argued that orality in the form of the oral instinct/drive, engendered during the 
oral development phase, is likely to have strong plausible connections with 
financially corrupt behaviour. The repetition of the most primary experience of 
need for food and satisfaction of hunger is key. Orality is a valuable tool in 
understanding. Steps in the progress towards a psychoanalytic theory pertaining 
to acts of financial corruption would have been difficult to make without it. 
Indeed, key elements of what was written theoretically about anality and money 
were actually also highly pertinent to our alternate reading of orality and money, 
as we have attempted to highlight in Chapter Two and Chapter Four. The subject 
of anality will be returned to shortly but first, let us consider another example 
from Ferenczi (1914), one which brings to the fore the way in which 
interpretation is necessary in order to bring out the duality and potential 
similarity of the impacts of the two developmental phases upon the relationship 
between money and the unconscious. Ferenczi, speaking only in terms of anality, 
wrote that: 
 
After what has been communicated, however, it is already not 
improbable that the capitalistic interest, increasing in correlation with 
development, stands not only at the disposal of practical, egoistic 
aims – of the reality-principle, therefore – but also that the delight in 
 212 
gold and in the possession of money represents the symbolic 
replacement of, and the reaction-formation to, repressed anal-
erotism, i.e., that it also satisfies the pleasure-principle. 
The capitalistic instinct thus contains, according to our conception, an 
egoistic and an anal-erotic component. 
(Ferenczi, The Ontogenesis of the Interest in Money, 1914, p. 331) 
 
The importance of repression applies to both stages of development. But the 
argument of this thesis is that the delight in gold and money is “the symbolic 
replacement of, and the reaction-formation to” repressed oral-erotism. And 
Ferenczi’s “capitalistic instinct” is akin to a wealth accumulation drive and 
Fenichel’s (1938) “drive to amass wealth”. Under the oral hypothesis money has 
been positioned as being unconsciously oral. Repressed greed (or as the oral 
hypothesis would frame it: repressed desire for more mother’s milk) could 
become unrepressed and aligned with the desire to be entitled to be greedy, to 
demand more with the kind of sadistic demands that were outlined in Chapter 
Four’s discussion of Abraham’s theories on sadistic orality.   
Thus, what would be potentially at stake would be either the repression, or the 
malignant, pathological, corrupted development of that desire for money, that 
desire for the narcissistic supply of multiple forms of food from the environment 
that have to be gained at all costs. Notions of desire, notions of lack of the desired 
object, of loss, and of ‘not having’ what one could ‘have’ are some of the vital 
considerations that were discussed in Chapter Five. In terms of financial 
corruption, the desire being desire for monetary gain at whatever cost – 
remembering that ‘food’ under the wider definition (that is, for both physical and 
egotistical needs) used by the oral hypothesis is later unconsciously and 
inextricably connected to money. Within the terms of the oral hypothesis 
suggested in this thesis, when money is held in any form be it in notes, coins, 
plastic, or accounts, we have unconsciously reassured ourselves that our ability 
to access food is attainable and secure. It is worthwhile providing here a 
reminder in the form of a summary from Jones (1916) of the process involved in 
the formation of symbolic equations, as was explored in Chapter Two: 
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In so far as a secondary idea B receives its meaning from a primary 
idea A, with which it has been identified, it functions as what may be 
called a symbolic equivalent of A. At this stage, however, it does not 
yet constitute a symbol of A, not until it replaces A as a substitute in a 
context where A would logically appear. There is an overflow of 
feeling and interest from A to B, one which gives B much of its 
meaning, so that under appropriate conditions it is possible for B to 
represent A. According to the view here maintained, the essential 
element of these conditions is an affective inhibition relating to A. 
This holds good for all varieties of symbolism, in its broadest sense. 
With the debit and credit card we have abstracted even further the symbolic 
equation and symbolism that connects money and access to food. The physical 
presence of the small square of plastic with its raised letterings and codified 
numbers unconsciously signifies by its insertion into and approval by 
computerised machines that food is guaranteed and its availability does not have 
to be thought about or cause unconscious anxiety. As Jones put it succinctly: 
“Only what is repressed is symbolised; only what is repressed needs to be 
symbolised” (Jones, 1916, p. 116).  
In Chapter Five it has been argued that the psychoanalytic roots of financial 
corruption could have strong bases in the individual’s internal and external 
realities, that is, his unconscious and conscious thoughts and feelings; relations 
with money and wealth; relations to others in a particular society; and relations 
with society’s ideological structures in a particular historical setting. Fenichel 
(1938) pointed out that: “It is a society in which power and respect are based 
upon the possession of money, that makes of this need for power and respect a 
need for riches” (Fenichel, 1938, p. 79). Crucially, he asked: 
 
Is not the state of affairs with the will to possession exactly the same 
as with the instinct to become wealthy: in a social system in which 
possession presents the possibility of satisfying needs or of acquiring 
respect, is not possession aspired to just as a special case of the 
striving for the satisfaction of needs, or for respect? But just at this 
point psychoanalysts have discovered that behind these rational 
motives there are further irrational ones for accumulating 
possessions, and it is exactly the question of the relation between this 
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specific irrational ‘collecting instinct’ and the general ‘drive to become 
wealthy’ that is under discussion. 
(Fenichel, 1938, p. 79) 
 
For Fenichel: “The will to power on the one hand, and the will to possession on 
the other, are roots of the drive to amass wealth” (Fenichel, 1938, p. 87).  
Fenichel uses the term ‘the drive to amass wealth’. This calls up the notion of the 
existence of a potential ‘money drive’. It could also be called a ‘wealth 
accumulation drive’. In this thesis the attempt has been made to argue that, in 
terms of what it defines as  the oral hypothesis, a wealth accumulation drive 
could be triggered in anybody under the right circumstances, particularly in 
countries experiencing great economic, societal, and transitional changes. “A 
drive to accumulate wealth” states Fenichel in support, “exists only in certain 
definite social epochs” (Fenichel, 1938, p. 95). He urges that research should be 
“based on as many historical examples as possible so that we may compare the 
drive to amass wealth in other times and societies with that of today” (Fenichel, 
1938, p. 94). This insightful statement appears to amplify a sense that some 
things are difficult to shift in that human beings will keep seeing the reassurance 
of  wealth accumulation and the subsidiary possessions that accompany wealth 
in many societies, such as power and respect. 
This thesis suggested a hypothesis of orality whereby it was argued that which 
‘money’ represents, ie the ability to purchase food, will come to stand in the 
unconscious for pleasure and satisfaction from food, or the anxiety and fear of 
hunger and possible starvation from the deprivation or non-availability of food. 
And further that: ‘Money’ could exist in a repressed oral-erotically or oral-
sadistically derived, sexual instinct charged, symbolic equation with ‘food’ and 
what ‘food’ means to mankind’s self-preservation and self image. 
In the last section of Chapter Five some possibilities were opened up as a result 
of the inquiry exploring the probable positioning of financial corruption in 
relation to a possible money drive (or wealth accumulation drive, or drive to 
amass wealth). Financial corruption could probably be considered as an orally 
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erotic or an orally sadistic activity. In other words, financially corrupt acts could 
be unconscious acts of ‘feeding’, and thus of life preservation; or acts driven by 
unconscious aggressive, destructive instincts. As stated at the end of Chapter 
Five, an act of financial corruption could be committed narcissistically and oral-
erotically to restore the status of the ego or could be an act committed to inflict 
oral-sadistic wounding upon the money itself or its original owner. And, an 
important, notable factor emerged from the arguments and perspectives 
elaborated generally in Chapter Five (arguments that were made both through 
the narratives of writers in Africa during the 1960s and through classical 
Freudian psychoanalytic texts): the person committing the act of financial 
corruption could bring into being a new conception of the psychoanalytic reality 
of who he was and new conceptions of how he perceived the realities and rights 
of those around him.  
However, when one considers the possible psychoanalytic situating of an 
individual in relation to an act of financial corruption there does seem to be 
another perspective that should also be addressed, albeit briefly due to its 
complexity and vast associative range in psychoanalytic theory. This area 
concerns terms that were frequently used descriptively in the discourse, that is, 
‘perverted’ and ‘perversion’. In particular Colin Leys (1965), who figured in a key 
manner in Chapter Five equated ‘corruption’ as: “to change from good to bad; to 
debase; to pervert” (Leys, 1965, p. 216). It is also worthwhile remembering that 
Leys stated further that the rule or regulation that was contravened in an act of 
corruption had to have “the sense in which it is said to have been perverted” 
(Leys, 1965, p. 221). And, to reiterate, he asked acutely: “Who regards the 
purpose which is being perverted as the proper or ‘official' purpose? It may be so 
regarded by most people in the society, including those who pervert it; or it may 
be so regarded by only a few people” (Leys, 1965, p. 221-222). It is not the aim of 
this concluding chapter to enter into the substantial arena of perversion within 
psychoanalytic theory. Our intention here is only to add to our discussion a 
perspective on perversion with respect to money and corruption which will 
suggest  future avenues for research. Briefly, we would adhere to our initial 
commitment  to return to Freud and his foundational classical psychoanalytic 
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thinking in order to address the psychoanalytic possibility of a perverse relation 
to money as a sexualized object.  
3. Money as an Object of Perversion 
Can an act of financial corruption be considered as an act of a perverted 
relation to money? That is, money has become an object of perversion, an object 
of a perverse aim because money has become a wholly sexual object. Some further 
interesting questions can be raised, such as: Can an act of financial corruption be, 
therefore, the result of a perverted aim of the sexual oral (money) drive? Can 
such perverted aims be a characteristic of financial corruption generally or only 
feature in some specific cases? But, these questions can only be raised and not be 
pursued in any depth as they relate to perverse activities and are thus somewhat 
outside the range and scope of this research study. But the raising of them would 
seem to be required to illustrate the possible nature of the perverse relation to 
money that we are attempting to address in this section. In addition, questions 
about ‘perversion’ in general are questions that are, indeed, related to this 
investigation in the following respect. 
This thesis has argued for the consideration of sadistic activities and sadistic 
desires as underlying acts of financial corruption, and thus it is important to note 
that in classical Freudian theory on the sexual instincts (Freud, 1905) sadism 
itself and its counterpart masochism are regarded as a ‘perversion’ of the sexual 
instinct in that they are diversions from what would be considered as being 
either the normal satisfying goal or the normal final aim of an instinct/drive. A 
perverse act diverts from what is regarded as being the normal. Freud states 
that: “From the very first we recognized the presence of a sadistic component in 
the sexual instinct. As we know, it can make itself independent and can, in the 
form of a perversion, dominate an individual’s entire sexual activity” (Freud, 
1920, pp. 53-54). And he noted that: “Sadism and masochism occupy a special 
position among the perversions, since the contrast between activity and 
passivity which lies behind them is among the universal characteristics of sexual 
life” (Freud, 1905, p. 159). Thus, in discussing oral sadism and orally sadistic 
activities, for example, we are already, in a strong sense, discussing activities that 
can be designated as perversions.  
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The assumption that has to be made is that there exists a ‘normal’, legitimate aim 
in the pursuit of money. That is, that a ‘normal’, uncorrupted pursuit of money 
and finance is normal. There is a legitimate need of money that exists for reasons 
that have been set out previously in this study (in Chapter Three), for example: 
for physical survival, for a decent standard of living, or for work or consultation 
conducted that requires the financial settlement of bills. The ‘normal’ aim of a 
drive for money could be regarded as being for a ‘good enough’ income. Thus, the 
illegitimate pursuit and acquiring of money could comprise the ‘abnormal’, that 
is, the ‘perverse’, the excessive. And a minority of people in behaving in such 
corrupt ways and contravening rules could be carrying out what were regarded 
by the majority as being ‘perverse’, immoral acts. The pursuit of and acquiring of 
money illegally, corruptly, could be regarded as a perversion of a normal wealth 
accumulation drive. When a perverse aim totally removes the normal aim, then it 
can be regarded as a “pathological symptom” as Freud explained (the italics are 
his): 
 
In the majority of instances the pathological character in a perversion 
is found to lie not in the content of the new sexual aim but in its 
relation to the normal. If a perversion, instead of appearing merely 
alongside the normal sexual aim and object, and only when 
circumstances are unfavourable to them and favourable to it – if, 
instead of this, it ousts them completely and takes their place in all 
circumstances – if, in short, a perversion has the characteristics of 
exclusiveness and fixation – then we shall usually be justified in 
regarding it as a pathological symptom. 
(Freud, 1905, p. 161) 
 
The probing question that continued from the end of Chapter Five concerned the 
possible theoretical positionings that could be reached psychoanalytically with 
regard to financial corruption. Now, to augment what has been expressed in that 
chapter, it can be seen that there is an additional consideration as to how the 
oral drive might be operating with regard to financial corruption. It allows for 
the possibility of the perverse fixation of the oral drive to be considered alongside 
the more straightforward uninhibited unleashing and unrepressing of the oral 
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(money, wealth accumulation) drive that has been drawn so far. Could not an act 
of financial corruption be a perverted aim of the oral drive, which itself can be 
characterized as a money drive? With regard to Freud’s use of the phrase 
“pathological symptom” in his acute description of the process of perversion in 
the above citation, perhaps the following could be said about financial corruption 
from the perspective of an act of perversion: Financial corruption could be 
positioned as a symptom of perversion emanating from the oral conflicts arising 
out of the repression of a wealth accumulation drive.  
Returning to the consideration of the hostile individual with an ego starved of 
respect, love, regard, money: in other words, an ego that was desperately seeking 
‘food’ but living in a deeply impoverished environment with few ego ideals, how 
easily and how quickly could his aims become diverted from the normal, 
legitimate pursuit of money and become attracted to and fixed upon the new 
perverse aim of financial corruption? Why would an African present this 
symptom of a repressed wealth accumulation drive? On asking this question  – 
that is, why would he have become involved in financial corruption – this could 
lead to an answer suggesting that this had occurred because he was unable to 
earn money or prevented from accumulating wealth in a legal, ‘normal’, 
‘traditional’ fashion. He was poor. Or he was in a rush to accumulate as much 
money as possible as quickly as possible. If financial corruption is a symptom, 
then that is, perhaps, because symptoms can be perceived as ways of behaving. If 
its symptom-like qualities have been little perceived as such, perhaps that is 
because particular behaviour patterns can manifest themselves over time as 
routine and normalized in the eyes of others. Symptoms could become ways of 
continual behaviour, and can even constitute permanent formations or 
foundations of character, as Freud (1908) expounded upon with regard to 
anality and character formation. ‘Symptoms’ cannot, it appears, be regarded as 
one-off or only temporary demonstrations of character or behaviour caused by a 
particular occurrence or illness. What if symptoms are your character, or that 
your character is composed of a finely mixed melange of symptoms, that can no 
longer detangle themselves? You are your symptoms, in that case; your 
symptoms are you. One aspect of this could mean that one could develop 
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substantial parts of one’s character much later in life due to traumatic impacts 
perceived and received in adulthood – such as extreme poverty – rather than 
having much of one’s character laid down as a result of traditional development 
theory adhering to the stages as outlined in classical psychoanalysis. As Freud 
observed, we are throughout life continually reacting to what we consider to be 
unsatisfied needs and what we consider to be threats of danger:  
 
Most of the unpleasure that we experience is perceptual unpleasure. 
It may be perception of pressure by unsatisfied instincts; or it may be 
external perception which is either distressing in itself or which 
excites unpleasurable expectations in the mental apparatus – that is, 
which is recognized by it as a ‘danger’. The reaction to these 
instinctual demands and threats of danger, a reaction which 
constitutes the proper activity of the mental apparatus, can then be 
directed in a correct manner by the pleasure principle or the reality 
principle by which the former is modified. 
(Freud, 1920, p. 11)  
 
Note Freud’s usage of “pressure by unsatisfied instincts” and “instinctual 
demands and threats of danger” which are reacted to by the workings of the 
mental apparatus either in accordance with the pleasure principle or in 
accordance with the reality principle “by which the former is modified”. 
Therefore when reality does not modify the pleasure principle, the pleasure 
principle reigns dominant and repressed or unsatisfied instinctual demands do 
their best to satisfy themselves. Instinctual demands such as the demand to have 
wealth and money and a certain standard of living that only a significant amount 
of money can buy? Money that if one cannot earn legitimately, will have to be 
obtained illegitimately, corruptly, stolen. Regarding the frequency and 
commonality of what could be described as perverted aims, Freud writes that: 
  
No healthy person, it appears, can fail to make some addition that 
might be called perverse to the normal sexual aim; and the 
universality of this finding is in itself enough to show how 
inappropriate it is to use the word perversion as a term of reproach. 
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(Freud, 1905, p. 160) 
 
In conclusion, the consideration of a perverse fixation in relation to money as an 
object has been added to our efforts to broach possible psychoanalytic 
positionings for acts of financial corruption. It is our argument that the possible 
positionings outlined tentatively at the end of Chapter Five and in this section all 
have in common orality as the underlying sexual drive. They can be considered 
as acts of narcissistic feeding, whether oral erotically or oral sadistically, or a 
perverse act denoting a symptom arising from oral conflicts.  
To reiterate: An act of financial corruption could be committed narcissistically and 
oral-erotically to restore the status of the ego or could be an act committed to 
inflict oral-sadistic wounding upon the money itself or its original owner. And 
there is also the possibility that: An act of financial corruption could be a 
perverted aim of the oral sexual drive, which this thesis has hypothesized as the 
primary money drive. 
The overall research question of this study was: What could be the possible 
psychoanalytic roots of financial corruption? The motor engine for the decision 
to investigate orality as being a potentially rich source for a psychoanalytic 
discourse on financial corruption was the dissatisfaction with the psychoanalytic 
theory on the relationship between money and the unconscious that was based 
on the anal development phase. The anality theory of money was constructed 
during the years of the classical period following the turn of the century and 
prior to the outbreak of the second world war, and Chapter Two outlined 
Ferenczi’s classical delineation based on Freud’s writings. This thesis has argued 
for a duality of thinking on the unconscious and money in order to assert a place 
for orality. Thus, in order to maintain a duality of thought, a double door, a dual 
key approach, should not the anality theory of money sit alongside the oral 
hypothesis and be retained. 
4. Retaining Anality Alongside Orality: “Potty” Deposits and Food 
Containers 
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It is important to state that the anal theory of money has not been 
rejected outright – there are very likely to be areas in which anal characteristics 
could be argued as being related to financial concerns or as being connected to 
some or part of the conflicts aroused. But it was to be questioned why anal 
erotism should be awarded an especially privileged place in theories on money. 
In his paper ‘Contributions to the Theory of the Anal Character’ Abraham (1921) 
reminds us of some of the Freudian processes at work and some of the 
formations of character: 
 
In his first description of the anal character Freud has said that certain 
neurotics present three particularly pronounced character-traits, 
namely, a love of orderliness which often develops into pedantry, a 
parsimony which easily turns to miserliness, and an obstinacy which 
may become an angry defiance. He established the fact that the 
primary pleasure in emptying the bowels and in its products was 
particularly emphasized in these persons; and also that after 
successful repression their coprophilia either becomes sublimated 
into pleasure in painting, modelling, and similar activities, or proceeds 
along the path of reaction-formation to a special love of cleanliness. 
Finally he pointed out the unconscious equivalence of faeces and 
money or other valuables. 
Freud, Ferenczi, Jones, Abraham – the foundational classical psychoanalytic 
theorists examined in this research study – all believed in “the unconscious 
equivalence of faeces and money”. Here Abraham is accepting this and not 
questioning the supposedly “unconscious” foundation of the equation. What was 
baffling was how all of them accepted the anal theory of money whilst at the 
same time all of them set out the foremost importance during the child’s anal 
period of the educational element involved in training a child in how and when 
to empty its bowels and what not to do with the contents. Jones (1918) detailed 
further what the sublimations and reaction-formations entailed for the anal 
character. As argued in this thesis, the psychoanalytic significance placed by the 
theoretical writers upon the character traits in the adult traced backwards to the 
anal developmental period of the infant had severe implications with regard to 
money, for it would imply that, if the symbolic equation were correct and 
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unconscious, then people with ‘money complexes’ – and that would include 
financial corruption – would all be people whose character formation was anal 
erotic in type. Classical psychoanalytic theory implied that there was specifically 
an ‘anal character’ – note, for instance, the titles of the papers by Freud (1908), 
Jones (1918), and Abraham (1921) – someone whose character formation was 
devolved from and heavily influenced by their experiences during this infantile 
period. The interesting focus and privilege awarded to anal erotism generally 
and to its part in the formation of character was in stark contrast to the attention 
paid to the other pregenital stage, orality, which, as has been argued throughout, 
deserved a much greater focus and emphasis than that given to it. The 
disquieting thought had been that, surely character types had some aspects of a 
legacy from both their oral and anal periods of development. The special 
significance or special contribution of anality could not be upheld. Abraham 
(1924a, p. 398) beautifully connects orality and anality when he speaks of “the 
abandoned act of sucking” leading to abnormal anality, which, to reiterate from 
Chapter Four, he terms as “defective development” that is built upon “the ruins of 
an oral erotism whose development has miscarried.” But let us discuss a more 
prosaic contender for the main connective point between anality and orality that 
should be highlighted as affirming the eligibility of the two to be considered 
together: their storage systems.  
The connective point that can be made that retains anality alongside orality is 
with regard to containers. A “potty” to collect faeces can be viewed as a 
container, a bank, a deposit holder. Ferenczi’s statement that children “hold back 
their stools” and that: “The excrementa thus held back are really the first 
‘savings’ of the growing being” (Ferenczi, 1914, p. 321) could be equally applied 
to an oral motif. The stools being held back are not yet in the potty – they are in 
the intestine. Food that is held in the stomach whilst being digested, or prior to 
digestion, could also be considered a ‘deposit’, a “saving”. It should be 
remembered that the alimentary canal journeys from the mouth to the anus, 
therefore, why should the last part, the intestines, where food has been 
processed into faeces and is waiting to be evacuated, be privileged over earlier 
parts where food is held and also awaits its turn during the process of digestion? 
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But it could be argued that one has no physical control over the process of 
digestion, that one cannot prevent it from taking place; whilst the infant does 
have some control over whether to allow the faeces to emerge or not, over 
whether to “go” whilst on the potty. However, such control is only temporary; at 
some point the physical process of defaecation, the necessity of having to 
defaecate, will take over. And anybody who has had diarrhoea is aware that 
there is no temporary or short-lived physical control: the faeces must come out. 
Thus, it is possible that one can argue that food deposits in the stomach could 
equal faeces deposits in the bowels of the alimentary canal. As such, the rest of 
the citation also becomes applicable to the stomach as a region akin to a bank for 
“collecting, hoarding, and saving”: 
 
children originally devote their interest without any inhibition to the 
process of defaecation, and [that] it affords them pleasure to hold 
back their stools. The excrementa thus held back are really the first 
“savings” of the growing being, and as such remain in a constant, 
unconscious inter-relationship with every bodily activity or mental 
striving that has anything to do with collecting, hoarding, and saving. 
(Ferenczi, 1914, p. 321) 
 
But it is not only faeces that have the ability to be collected and thus to be 
symbolically equivalent to something that is collected or saved. Oral goods – 
gastronomic (as opposed to coprophilic) objects – can also be collected or saved. 
Most importantly, people also hoard food. And food is even stacked as hoarded 
goods. Supermarket shelves can be conceptualized as selling and displaying food 
as hoarded goods in multiple rows and shelves upon shelves. Then there is the 
food hoard in containers of multiple packets and tins and kept in the home. This 
could also be considered as the equivalent of anality’s potty. Finally, with regard 
to orality and its right to be alongside anality: surely the mother’s breast and its 
contents should be regarded as the first store for possessing food and collecting 
food. The first saving is mother’s milk in the breast for the yet to be born and fed 
child. 
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There is the interesting perspective that generally in many African countries the 
fat stomach of a man is particularly regarded as the guarantor that he is a 
wealthy man. The factors at play here are: the largeness of his stomach, the 
knowledge that it has had so much food deposited inside it, that he has had the 
ability to purchase such an amount of food to consume that this access to money 
has given rise to the size of his stomach, all denote a rich, wealthy person. In 
Africa’s recent past, as African countries emerged onto the world stage following 
their independence from colonialism, a fat man was a rich man – and paraded 
himself as such. In western countries, it seems to be the opposite: rich people are 
not supposed to be too fat or even fat at all. There is the popular saying, “You can 
never be too rich or too thin”, whereby the two situations are equated as being 
related in their equal height of desirability and connectivity. There is also the 
stigma attached to fatness and large waistlines and their linkage to poverty and 
the consumption of cheap, high fat, high sugar food products by significant 
numbers of those on low incomes.  
In conclusion,  Ferenczi charged in his paper that: 
 
Pleasure in the intestinal contents becomes enjoyment of money, 
which, however, after what has been said is seen to be nothing other 
than odourless, dehydrated filth that has been made to shine. 
(Ferenczi, 1914, p. 327) 
 
One could add, however, that: “Pleasure in the intestinal contents becomes 
enjoyment of money”, is equally applicable to and also originates from another 
source: the mouth. It could be that: ‘enjoyment of money’ is also orally derived and 
not only attributable to anality. This is the argument that we support.  
But can the enjoyment in and interest in money be separated from the spending 
of money? Given the general dearth of detailed theoretical work about a 
psychoanalytic positioning of money, one can hypothesise that what may have 
been conflated is the spending of money with the interest in money.   
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5. The ‘Interest in Money’ versus the ‘Spending of Money’ 
Abraham could have distinguished theoretically between the spending of 
money and the interest in money, as the title of his paper, ‘The Spending of Money 
in Anxiety States’ (Abraham, 1917) suggested that he might do. However, he 
seemed not to have wanted to consider differentiating between the two activities 
and certainly did not challenge the existing Freudian paradigm with regard to 
what money was symbolically aligned with. As elaborated in this study, 
excrement’s alleged linkage to money is based wholly on classical 
psychoanalysis’s linkage of possessions and gifts to faeces: the infant’s stools 
presented to the mother or parental carer. Added to this is the material link 
between possessions and gifts and the economic requirement for gold, currency, 
money, which that necessitates in order to purchase those possessions and gifts. 
These linkages form a trio of inter-connected assumptions based on ‘possessions 
and gifts’, ‘faeces’, and concepts and constructions of money. One could even 
regard these three assumptions as forming a triangular structure of their own 
interconnected relations.  
It can be positioned as a true statement that possessions, gifts, wealth, feeling 
and being financially rich, are linked to having money (held in its various forms). 
But the foundational assumption made in classical psychoanalysis that ‘faeces’ 
equals ‘money’ (for example, gold) is contestable. It is contested on the 
inadequacy of the existence of substantive unconscious evidence for there being 
an untutored, uneducated a priori relationship in the psyche between faeces and 
possessions and gifts. As discussed in numerous ways in the preceding pages, 
this led to an ultimately unsatisfactory psychoanalytic theoretical relationship 
between faeces and money. Such an unsatisfactory relationship would have 
clinical, practical, socio-economical, and cultural repercussions. As argued, 
rather than dirt and faeces, a more appropriate symbolic interpretation for 
money would be anything connected with and to food, the means of its 
attainability and its eating and digestion. That is, the psychoanalytic 
symbolization of money should be more oral than anal in its potential for erotic 
and object cathexis.  
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But although psychoanalytic thinkers did not question closely the supposed link 
between anal erotism and an “interest” in money, a few years after Ferenczi’s 
paper on the interest in money (Ferenczi, 1914), Abraham raised, correctly, the 
question of the spending of money (Abraham, 1917). However this proved 
ultimately unsatisfactory, since he did not differentiate  “interest” in from the 
“spending” of money. Abraham’s curt handling of the topic of the spending of 
money indicated that he didn’t think it warranted more than the few pages in 
which it was disposed of and without any need to add or to formulate new 
theoretical speculation or hypotheses. Both tendencies and activities, that is 
“interest in” and “spending of” money were still sourced to anal erotism. This 
was a missed opportunity to open the exploration of and, perhaps, even lay down 
the foundations for the possible future study of alternative hypotheses on 
money. It could be argued that perhaps it is the spending of money that is rooted 
in anal eroticism, that is, miserliness, hoarding, being a spendthrift, etc. All these 
individual characteristics can be aligned with and psychoanalytically rooted in 
an anal erotic organization.  
We have the general instruction from classical psychoanalysis that it is 
important to remember that the symbolization of a ‘thing’ or a construct should 
be innate in the language used by a people or place. Just as pertinent, such 
symbolization should also be intricately woven into myths, folktales, and other 
stories and narratives. The ‘thing’ symbolized and its symbolic structuring and 
rendering, however abstract, should emerge within the common language used 
with little consciously forced thinking or interpretation. It is in the expressions, 
the idioms, the sayings and phrases that we are often most likely to find the true 
unconscious meaning of a ‘thing’ or an abstracted notion. Note how the 
expression “to be tight-fisted”, in other words someone who is mean with 
spending money and does not like spending money, when visualized as a hand 
clenched into a fist actually has the appearance of a closed anus. Shut tight and 
refusing to give out, distribute, or disburse its contents. Then there are the 
unavoidable anal references in some common expressions connected to money. 
There is the term to be “as mean as mouse shit”. And the expression to earn “jack 
shit”, as in to earn very little money. Spending has to be limited or “mean” if one 
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does not have any money or there is very little money available or there is 
restricted access to money. All could be descriptive of the condition of being poor 
and being in “tight” circumstances when one has to be careful with money 
because of uncertain economic or social circumstances. Whilst being a 
spendthrift could be regarded as being loose with the contents of one’s bowels, 
with very loose verging on suffering from diarrhoea. 
However, that the interest in money is similarly rooted psychoanalytically in anal 
erotism can be contested on the grounds that here what “the interest” signifies is 
a looking for, a searching for, a trying to accumulate money prior to spending it. 
One is hunting and gathering in the wild, so to speak; or wanting, desiring, to do 
so, or to have the ability and opportunities to do so. And, thus, under the oral 
hypothesis, what one is trying to find is money as food. With regard to language 
usage, this would take us to the almost generic usage of orality and food-based 
terms such as “bread” and “dough” for money and income, and “the 
breadwinner” being the person in charge of the household’s financial wellbeing. 
From the above perspective it does seem possible that the spending of money 
could be separated theoretically from the interest in money. It seems that, just as 
in relation to the argument made with respect to orality and money generally, it 
can be argued that Freud and Ferenczi were looking at the wrong end of the 
body, the anus and not the mouth, in their attempt to theorize where the interest 
in money arose from. But, in their identification of the psychoanalytic process by 
which the interest in money was generated, they had pinpointed correctly the 
mechanisms of symbolic equivalence and repression necessary to the process – 
but used faeces as the symbolic object, which, possibly, if it were to be used, 
could be used for the spending of money. Ironically, had such a distinction been 
made between interest in and spending of money, the classical paradigm that 
championed anality would be further strengthened in the spending half of the 
divide.  
It seems it is possible to argue that Ferenczi and Abraham did not demonstrate 
how there could exist a co-identification with faeces in the symbolic equation 
with regard to both the spending of money and the interest in money. Questions 
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were not raised about the anality symbolism that propped up the entire 
theoretical structure, and, thus, what they did not disturb was the overarching 
symbolic process with faeces at its centre. An overarching co-identificatory 
process that, when delved into deeper theoretically unravelled into a 
problematic. At the very least the unravelling means that there is  a potential to 
separate the symbolism and symbolic equation for the spending of money when 
it is compared and contrasted with the symbolism and symbolic equation for the 
interest in money.  
6. Dirt, Shit, Poverty, and Cleanliness 
There is a further point that ought to be made concerning the anal 
developmental stage as determined and structured within the Freudian classical 
equation. Poverty can often equal the lack of sanitary conditions and the 
presence of dirt, because lack of money can frequently equal being forced to 
inhabit surroundings that are less clean. Life could be lived in dirtier conditions 
and thus become a dirt-filled life. For people who live in conditions like these, it 
appears frequently that it is in describing poverty-ridden circumstances that the 
spending and earning of money are directly linked to fighting and attempting to 
alleviate ‘shit’ and ‘dirt’. Expressions and idioms reflect this. There is the term 
“dirt poor” as in having absolutely nothing to live on and thus, presumably, being 
forced to live in conditions that are aligned with being poverty-stricken. Then 
there is “they live like shit” as in they live disgustingly or they live in degrading 
conditions. Being “dirt poor” and surrounded by “shit” and the problems of 
sewage disposal were standard features of poverty-inflicted conditions up until 
the middle of the twentieth century in western countries; but such “dirty”, 
“filthy” conditions are still ongoing in many other parts of the world particularly 
in Asia and Africa, and parts of Eastern Europe. The battle against bad sewage 
disposal and poor sanitation is structurally aligned in economic developmental 
terms with the alleviation of poverty and the improvement of the health of 
people who are poor.  
Thus, it could be argued that what is also underpinning the Freudian classical 
money equation, a particular underpinning that has not been acknowledged, is 
that unconsciously the faeces and striving for cleanliness that feature in the anal 
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developmental stage of the child are also part of the phylogenetic structuring that 
could be said to have been introjected with the force of an unconscious reality 
into an equivalent developmental phase of mankind. There has always been (and 
probably will always be) an economic, or industrial, or social epoch, or phase, or 
‘age’ in which mankind strives to overcome poverty and dirt and, literally, shit in 
his environmental surroundings through the earning of and spending of money 
and his striving for cleanliness and an orderly existence. The connection can be 
made with the infant’s psychoanalytic anal developmental ‘age’ when he or she, 
too, has to be educated about faeces and trained in cleanliness and an orderly 
routine. Dirt, poverty, and insanitary conditions are associated with the lack of 
money. In the following extract from Freud’s paper on ‘Character and Anal 
Eroticism’ (1908) in which he explained how certain character types were 
formed out of anal erotic sublimations and reaction-formations, he writes of 
those who were very particular about cleanliness that: 
 
The intrinsic necessity for this connection is not clear, of course, even 
to myself. But I can make some suggestions which may help towards 
an understanding of it. Cleanliness, orderliness and trustworthiness 
give exactly the impression of a reaction-formation against an interest 
in what is unclean and disturbing and should not be part of the body. 
(‘Dirt is matter in the wrong place.’) 
(Freud, 1908, pp. 172-173) 
 
Following repression, shit could become associated with money: filthy lucre, but 
on the basis that not having money causes filth and causes an environment to 
look like “shit”. And for people to be living among open sewers, overflowing 
gutters, and dirt. Freud stated classically that: “It is possible that the contrast 
between the most precious substance known to men and the most worthless, which 
they reject as waste matter (‘refuse’), has led to this specific identification of gold 
with faeces” (Freud, 1908, p. 174). But there appeared to be no alarm bell at least 
tinkling to nag at the seemingly effortless overlooking at querying such a 
“contrast” between a “precious substance” and the attitude expressed towards it 
of worthlessness and, indeed, rubbish, waste matter, “refuse”: in other words, 
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insanitary conditions. Surely such a disparity in perspective could amount 
psychically to more than the observations that Freud (1908) detailed of common 
language usage and common stories, such as devils’ and witches’ gold turning 
into shit, or a spendthrift being known as a “shitter” of the currency? And it could 
be that such stories in themselves by expressing those same dismissive attitudes 
were also concealing something and demonstrating some particularized 
psychical mechanism. One can envisage there being a hatred of ‘dirt’ and ‘shit’ in 
circumstances in which only money can improve the situation by providing 
better conditions. This conscious reality would provide a conscious connection 
between dirt and deep poverty and money. Repression of the need for but 
unavailability of money would become the central feature of the psychical 
processes that could take place in such situations. The path that the repressed 
need could follow would be a path that takes that need, represses it, and only 
allows it to emerge again once it has overturned itself, changed itself and its 
focus, and thus performed an act of reversal. In such circumstances the utter 
need for money could indeed become derided as a worthless desire. With such a 
reversal, money, instead of being a necessity, would be dismissed as rubbish. 
What Ferenczi, Abraham, Jones, and, of course, Freud himself did not speculate 
upon, (although all three of his psychoanalytic disciples placed tremendous 
importance, correctly, upon Freud’s 1908 paper) was that such repression and 
reversal might have taken place with regard to money, faeces and anality.  
One is reminded of the Biblical saying that the love of money is at the root of all 
evil, and that the manner in which the term “filthy lucre” is commonly used 
emphasizes the undesirability of pursuing money and the necessity to distance 
the human subject from the object of money by decrying it as unclean, something 
that one has to be protected from and prevented from acquiring in too great an 
amount.   
But an act of reversal upon its desired object would not necessarily mean 
changing from love to hate; it could mean changing the object of desire entirely, 
that is, making the new object of desire the direct opposite of the repressed 
desired object of the instinctual need. With money (the repressed desired object) 
now connected to dirt and faeces under the anal theory of money (and thus 
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worthless rubbish and refuse), the new object of desire becomes dirt’s reversal: 
cleanliness. Cleanliness would become loved and strived for in whatever 
circumstances. But the repressed desire could still make itself felt with talk of 
“money laundering” and “clean money” in relation to money obtained by “dirty” 
corrupt methods.  
But money itself can be clean by itself. There clearly exists an untainted, strong 
desire for access to a clean life without poverty that clean money can provide. 
One of the first things that previously poor people who have attained money 
tend to do is to buy a house. A clean house that is an opposition to cramped, 
crowded, or dirty, unsanitary living conditions. Money can be equated with 
cleanliness of itself. Money can also be equated with the cleanliness of newness: 
money’s purchasing power has the ability to buy new things, and can be equated 
with the freshness and cleanliness of newly acquired spaces. At the other end of 
the spectrum from the satisfactions of the wants of what could be considered to 
be ‘the common man’, one could consider the oligarch’s yacht, the billionaire’s 
mansion above and below ground, the ruler’s vast palaces and monolithic 
buildings, all kept in pristine conditions. Having money, wishing for money could 
equal, could symbolize, the cleanliness of the ‘good’ life, the life of few material 
wants. Thus, the life where financial needs are satisfied could equal a clean life. 
It seems clear that anality does and can stand alongside orality in thinking about 
money. One should not rule out the well established theories that state that 
money exists in a relation with faeces. One can examine the possibilities of 
separating the spending of ‘money’ from the interest in money theoretically, one 
can examine language and idiomatic usage, and one can explore the possibility of 
a displaced affective association between money and faeces caused by severe 
repression. But, however, even these theoretical possibilities still lead us back 
ultimately to what this thesis considers to be the primary and stronger 
association between food and money. There is a human need to be near the 
sources of food and there is a drive to have or to obtain the means and abilities 
to obtain food however abstracted ‘food’ might have become in its concrete 
forms of representations. This was clearly the situation in 1960s’ Africa where, 
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as argued in Chapter Five, this drive, the oral drive, was on full display both 
legitimately and illegitimately.  
The following section, which concludes both the chapter and the thesis as a 
whole,  unfolds a few final thoughts on money as a neglected subject of 
psychoanalysis whose importance to both the individual and the group was 
rarely deliberated upon. This general attitude taken towards the discussion of 
money and psychoanalysis can be laid at Freud’s door.   
  
7.  Conclusion : Why did Freud Leave Out Money? 
I have argued throughout my thesis – particularly with its championing of 
orality – that psychoanalysis did not seem to look closely enough at what could 
be the severe impacts and impressions of money on the minds of individuals 
both inside and outside the consulting room. Chapter Three explored what 
money meant for them and what money did for them or stood for in their minds. 
However, what psychoanalysis did look at and tried to examine was what people 
interested in money were like in terms of their infantile drive structuring. 
Psychoanalysis did attempt to examine how some groups, for example, hoarders 
or misers, could be characterized or grouped together within the structures of 
psychoanalytic knowledge. Classical psychoanalysis examined certain 
characters, who they were, and character formations, what they were like 
psychoanalytically; instead, perhaps, the commodity should have been 
interpreted: what it was, what it was used for, and what it meant to people 
psychchically. This difference in approach might have led to the examination of a 
deeply repressed orality. It is this different approach, an oral approach, which 
can now be suggested as a theoretical alternative to the classical anal approach. 
However, anality was psychoanalysis’s standard-bearer and its favoured answer 
in relation to questions about money. For too long a period in psychoanalysis 
only anality seemed to provide what was regarded as an adequate explanation 
and only the anal phase of development was reached for in order to explain what 
was considered to be the root causation of money complexes and of all attitudes 
towards wealth and financial behaviour.  
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If psychoanalysis had earlier looked more closely at what money is, what it 
represents, what it stands for in the life of the individual, it is quite possible that 
at the very least there could have been theoretical provision for a more flexible 
causal structure for the roots of the interest in money, and, as a result, there 
could have developed a psychoanalytic theory of money that could have enabled 
later researchers and psychoanalysts to explore more widely and more fruitfully 
the toxic and pathological offshoots of the interest in money, such as financial 
corruption and other money complexes. These offshoots and complexes that 
have become more complicated as our relations to money and financial wealth 
have become more complex with each passing decade. 
The question regarding why the probing of money was left out by psychoanalytic 
thinkers was as interesting to ponder as the question of what role money played 
in the psyche of man. To leave something out – like to leave someone out – is an 
action that is taken, even if it turns out to be an unconscious act, with unconscious 
motivations. With regard to why psychoanalysis left money out there are 
therefore conscious motivations and unconscious motivations. In fact if one 
adheres to and uses psychoanalysis’s own precepts, the latter, unconscious 
motivations, are more important as a determination. It is clearly possible to state 
that money is associated unconsciously with life through the instincts that 
preserve life, that is, through the need for food that preserves life, and thus 
through orality. Fear of being without money can be the equivalent of fear of 
death. People kill other people to get another person’s money. Money is 
associated unconsciously with being able to live, with being kept alive, and being 
able to maintain life. We say to make your ‘living’, as in “is that enough for you to 
live on?” and “is that job good enough to earn you a living?” and “what am I going 
to live on?” If our money ‘disappears’, if we lose all our money, there is fear of or 
the actuality of collapse. It is a collapse: it is a ‘depression’ or a ‘breakdown’ 
whether economic or personal, and these are experiences that can take many 
years to recover from – or not at all. It appears that in both personal and national 
cases such economic depressions and breakdowns leave conscious and 
unconscious marks of memory. 
 234 
Perhaps I can be granted some leeway here for the relating of an observation. In 
a baker’s shop a small child, a girl aged about three or four, was standing 
clutching a fistful of dollars. An adult held out her hand in an asking motion and 
this delighted the child. She did not appear to understand why the adult wanted 
her to give some of her money, but she clearly did not want to share her 
possession and refused. The adult made the same requesting motion again and 
the child was now positively gleeful in refusing. However, the most notable 
factor was how odd it looked to see a child holding money. Indeed, one could 
even go as far as to characterize the sight as looking wrong, as if something 
inappropriate to her status as a child. The child saw that the pieces of paper, one-
dollar bills that she clutched in her hand, were similar to the notes of paper that 
some of the adults around her were handing over and then carrying off bags of 
bread. She knew that what she had was valuable but she did not fully understand 
how it was used as a transaction, but she was watching closely. However, it is 
unclear how the child could work out for herself that what she held in her hand 
had any connection in any form to what she may have deposited into her potty. 
That is a connection that would have to be forced into her unconscious. Whilst 
everyday she would have been absorbing the process of money being handed 
over for food items until that passed into her unconscious as she got older: 
spontaneously, naturally, and organically. Perhaps it ought to be remembered 
that many children from infancy accompany a parent during shopping for food, 
particularly if that parent is the mother. From an extremely young age, a few 
weeks even, they are in the presence of (and observing as they get older) 
transactions that involve money as coins and notes: something being handed 
over and food being received in return. 
Psychoanalysts did not question enough and did not seem to ask enough times: 
what if we were wrong? What if, even within the boundaries of a given body of 
psychoanalytic knowledge, there were other roots, other possible causations for 
the interest in money, for the drive for money? What if it were oral not anal? Or 
oral and anal. What my thesis has tried to do is to bridge the critical gap in 
theoretical writings that exposed anality as being the single foundation for the 
unconscious symbolization of money. I have attempted to provide an alternative 
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exploration of what the root cause of the interest in money could be by 
approaching the subject from the psychoanalytic theoretical perspective of 
orality.  
An in-depth theoretical consideration of the significance of money is missing  in 
psychoanalysis. But was it deliberately left out by Sigmund Freud? J’accuse! Freud 
did know how important money was to mankind. 
Money is in psychoanalysis. And in one particular respect it is so prominent that 
it can be difficult to see the issue at first: that is, without money one cannot get 
access to psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis was the medical treatment in which 
‘the doctor’ was paid to attend to a patient by “just” sitting by the patient and 
listening to the patient talk. “The talking cure”. There were no “healing hands” on 
the patient’s body, no chemical or plant-based drugs proffered for imbibing. 
Quite often ‘the doctor’ also spoke to the patient and a conversation might be 
entered into that could also involve an interpretation of what was being said or 
felt. But paramount was the one-way traffic from the patient’s mind via his or her 
words to ‘the doctor’ who listened. And then the patient had to pay ‘the doctor’. 
Psychoanalysis can be unattainable without the means of money for someone 
seeking private psychoanalytic treatment for an illness (even in low-fee clinics) 
or for somebody who wants to train in the profession, who also has to undergo 
long-term analysis that has to be paid for. Money is woven into the fibres of all 
kinds of business life and psychoanalysis has its business aspects, too. 
Psychoanalysts can find the acknowledgement of this unsettling and problematic 
(as we saw in Chapter Three) but psychoanalysts have to run the financial side of 
their operations as any small business would in terms of accountancy and 
ensuring that it is viable as a going concern.  
The cost of getting psychoanalytic treatment and continuing with it and the cost 
of the candidate’s own training analysis have always been issues that connect to 
the class or background of the people who receive psychoanalysis privately or 
who become psychoanalysts. There is a preponderance in the profession of 
people from more financially secure backgrounds. Poorer and less financially 
secure people find difficulties in accessing  the means to enter psychoanalysis as 
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a profession or to receive private psychoanalytic treatment. Provision of 
psychoanalytic therapy by the state health service can entail a very lengthy 
waiting time, and when and if provided the durations of treatment cannot match 
the open-ended nature and frequency of private treatment over months and 
years. In comparison perhaps it is a short course over some weeks (six, eight?) of 
one-hour duration by appointment, and for treatment based on cognitive 
therapy.   
But the question of anxiety over lack or loss of money and income and the 
resulting impact on access to psychoanalysis also, critically, extends to ‘the 
doctor’, too. Given that psychoanalysis is mostly a paid-for private medical 
treatment even today, it is even more remarkable that psychoanalytic theorists 
did not expend time and thought on the anxiety that is caused by not having 
money and having to worry about money, the fear of losing money, all states of 
mind which they must have experienced having no safety catch structures 
themselves in place if they had no patients or if patients did not pay their bills. 
Thoughts like these must have been too close to the bone, providing further 
reasons for money to be ignored theoretically. In Chapter Three it was seen how 
Freud and his colleagues had to ensure that they made enough money to live on 
and with which they could support their families. The ignoring of money could 
have been a deliberate omission, and an omission occasioned by shame at the 
sheer necessity and importance of something so material. Did Freud feel 
ashamed that something such as mere money could play such a profound part in 
one’s life? It is my view that this was the case. In his theoretical work Freud 
undermined and stripped away money’s importance, consigning money to the 
rubbish and refuse bin as worthlessness and dejecta. It could even be considered 
as a full frontal unconscious attack on money by Freud, or at the very least a 
disawoval.  
In one sense Marx, who provided wrenching descriptions of his poverty (as cited 
in Chapter One) and attitude towards money, could be regarded as being on the 
other side of the coin: he did not care that he went without money. He was 
determined that the lack of money that he wrote about was not to stop him from 
doing his intellectual work. Money was a mere material construct and he would 
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do without it. Engels would support him financially. Marx was prepared to suffer, 
to go without, as nothing was to intrude on his accumulation of knowledge and 
information. The accumulation of money and wealth was to go its own way. But 
‘not having’ money is as important and critical as ‘having’ money. Money was still 
a dominant factor in Marx’s life because he did not have money. The importance 
of money to human beings is generally such that money drives them  to do 
things, to have to do things, to become something that they perhaps do not want 
to become or did not plan on becoming. Sometimes to being someone that s/he 
does not particularly like being: a (wo) man corrupted. 
But ultimately, at the heart of it, is a repression of the need for food and of the 
precariousness of the lives of those who daily struggle to eat. What ‘money’ has 
come to represent is an abstraction of this fact: the rendering of the triumph over 
the deadly power of hunger and starvation; the omnipotence of man over an 
utterly fundamental ‘want’. The hunter-gatherer is no longer bringing meat to 
the cave’s table as in those primaeval days; he is hunting and gathering with and 
for money and the unconscious hope is still for food. I shall leave the last word 
with Freud, as a theory is a way of explanation and, perhaps, that is why theories 
are not cast in stone and can be supplanted, contradicted, opposed by other 
theories. 
 
a few words of critical reflection. It may be asked whether and how 
far I am myself convinced of the truth of the hypotheses that have 
been set out in these pages. My answer would be that I am not 
convinced myself and that I do not seek to persuade other people to 
believe in them. Or, more precisely, that I do not know how far I 
believe in them. There is no reason, as it seems to me, why the 
emotional factor of conviction should enter into this question at all. It 
is surely possible to throw oneself into a line of thought and to follow 
it wherever it leads out of simple scientific curiosity, or, if the reader 
prefers, as an advocatus diaboli, who is not on that account himself 
sold to the devil. 
(Freud, 1920, p. 59)  
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